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This thesis investigates the accounts of human understanding proposed by 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, the Abbé de Condillac, Claude-Adrien Helvétius and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and explores the consequences of their epistemologies for 
their theories of morality and natural law. In response to the ethical question 
how humans may determine the morality of their conduct by means of reason, 
the five thinkers we will investigate draw normative conclusions from a 
descriptive account of human nature. We will thus see that their descriptive 
account of the role of both the passions and reason in the determination of our 
actions provides the basis for a normative account of moral judgment. For the 
five thinkers we will investigate, reason is thus not merely the ability to produce 
knowledge by comparing disparate ideas, but also a faculty involved in practical 
deliberation, which not only allows us to determine whether our actions are 
prudent, but ultimately also whether they are moral. Accordingly, their account 
of human understanding not only constitutes their epistemology, but is also an 
integral part of their moral philosophy. As the epistemology of these five thinkers 
is clearly empirical in outlook, this thesis will document the impact of the 
empirical turn on early-modern moral philosophy. This enquiry will provide 
grounds to reconsider some prevailing scholarly opinions on the relation 
between reason and the passions in early-modern moral philosophy. In addition, 
our discussion will aim to clarify the relation between facts and values in the 
theories of several early-modern thinkers predating Hume. Finally, this thesis 
will trace the development of early-modern consequentialist accounts of 
normative judgment towards more explicit formulations of utilitarianism, and 
discuss the objections of one of the most important early-modern opponents of 
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In this thesis, we will investigate the accounts of human understanding proposed 
by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, the Abbé de Condillac, Claude-Adrien Helvétius 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and explore the consequences of their epistemologies 
for their theories of morality and natural law. These five authors wrote in widely 
different contexts and over the course of more than a century. Nonetheless, the 
fact that these thinkers shared a significant number of philosophical 
preconceptions and preoccupations justifies their selection for our discussion. 
Thus all five thinkers advance an empiricist account of human understanding, 
according to which reasoning is nothing but the comparison or relating of ideas 
acquired through experience and organised with the help of language.1 
Furthermore, these philosophers accept a hedonist account of human motivation, 
maintaining that all human thoughts and actions are occasioned by a desire for 
pleasure or aversion of pain. With the possible exception of Locke and Rousseau, 
these thinkers also conceive of morality as a prudential guideline that indicates 
the means to felicity, conceived as the durable satisfaction of the passions. 
Finally, all five philosophers maintain that this moral guideline may be deduced 
by means of reasoning.  
 Yet by their own account of the faculty of reason, it is by no means 
obvious how these philosophers think that reasoning could provide human 
beings with an understanding of morality or natural law. All five thinkers 
describe the process of reasoning as the comparison of ideas derived from 
experience and structured with the help of language. This account of reasoning 
describes relatively clearly how human beings use reason to acquire knowledge 
of empirical reality. Yet as we will see, this same account does not yet provide a 
method by which reason can produce normative conclusions. As the five thinkers 
featured in this thesis nonetheless claim that morality and natural law are 
                                                          
1
 In the case of Hobbes and Rousseau, their characterisation as empiricists may be disputed. Thus 
while Hobbes clearly develops an empiricist account of human understanding, certain elements of 
his scientific method, such as his insistence on the use of syllogistic logic and his conception of 
science as a unified body of knowledge, diverge from the empiricist tradition as it developed from 
Locke onwards. While Rousseau likewise adopts an empiricist account of human understanding, he 
also introduces some innate properties and faculties to his conception of human nature. Observing 





accessible by means of reason, we will try to reconstruct their account of 
normative reasoning. The starting point of our investigation will thus be the 
question how these philosophers think that human beings should use their 
reason in order to understand morality and natural law. The resulting discussion 
will then provide us with new perspectives on the ethical theories of these five 
thinkers, as well as on the history of early-modern moral philosophy as a whole. 
 Of course, scholars have previously discussed the theories of these five 
philosophers at length, as well as the history of early-modern moral philosophy 
in general, placing them in a variety of contexts. Thus many scholars have 
already described how seventeenth-century philosophers became particularly 
concerned with the question of the foundations of morality following the demise 
of the scholastic metaphysics that had buttressed previous theories of ethics.2 
Others, most notably Richard Tuck, have maintained that seventeenth-century 
moral philosophers including Grotius and Hobbes aimed primarily to counter the 
relativist arguments of ancient scepticism, which had experienced something of a 
revival in the period.3 Alternatively, Stephen Gaukroger has placed early-modern 
ethics in the context of the scientific revolution, claiming that the transformation 
of the norms and methods of the natural sciences also shaped the moral 
philosophy of the era.4 Furthermore, Tim Hochstrasser has shown that the 
modern perception of early-modern natural law has been shaped by the early-
modern historiography of moral philosophy.5 Finally, early-modern ethics also 
features prominently in the historiography of the Enlightenment, as intellectual 
                                                          
2
 Stephen Darwall, ‘The Foundations of Morality’, in: Donald Rutherford (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge 2006) 221-247, 223; Paulien Westerman, The 
Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finnis (Leiden 1998). 
3
 Richard Tuck, ‘The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law’, in: Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages 
of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge 1987) 99-119. Knud Haakonssen, Natural 
Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge 1996) 25 agrees 
with this view. On scepticism and its relation to Hobbes’s thought in particular see Gianni 
Pagannini, ‘Hobbes and the French Skeptics’, in: John Christian Laursen and idem, Skepticism and 
Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Toronto 2015) 55-82 and Tuck, 
‘Optics and Sceptics: the Philosophical Foundations of Hobbes’s Political Thought’, in Edmund 
Leites (ed.), Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge 2002). This 
interpretation of Hobbes as motivated by scepticism is contested by Perez Zagorin, ‘Hobbes’s early 
philosophical development’, Journal of the History of Ideas 54 (1993) 505-518; Zagorin, ‘Hobbes 
without Grotius’, History of Political Thought 21 (2000) 16-40. 
4
 Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the 
Shaping of Modernity 1680-1760 (Oxford 2010). 
5




historians have documented how philosophical ideas inspired contemporary 
discussions on social and political reform.6 
 These are of course all valuable perspectives on the history of early-
modern moral philosophy. In this thesis we will try to complement these 
scholarly achievements by analysing the moral philosophies of several important 
early-modern thinkers in the context of their theories of epistemology. Even if 
the relation between early-modern ethics and epistemology has not been entirely 
ignored in the literature, more recent scholars have generally had other 
preoccupations.7 In fact, some prominent historians have explicitly questioned 
the continued relevance of epistemology to the interpretation of early-modern 
moral philosophy. Thus Knud Haakonssen laments that the historiography of 
early-modern philosophy has been distorted by an ‘epistemological paradigm,’ 
according to which all philosophical questions are seen as subsidiary to the 
question of the origin of knowledge.8 Accordingly, Haakonssen dismisses the 
notion that early-modern epistemology also had consequences for morality as a 
Kantian anachronism.9 A similar point has been made by J.B. Schneewind, who 
criticises the approach of scholars who would treat moral philosophy as merely 
                                                          
6
 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton 2009 [1951]) is perhaps still the 
most illuminating study of the philosophical theories behind Enlightenment ideals. Anthony 
Pagden, The Enlightenment and why it still Matters (Princeton 2013) is a more recent synthesis of 
Enlightenment thought that also relates social and political debates to philosophical ideas. The 
most comprehensive recent study of the Enlightenment is presented by Jonathan Israel in his 
trilogy Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford 2001); 
Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752 (Oxford 
2006); Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford 
2011). Yet while Israel is expansive in the selection of source material, his interpretation is rather 
sweeping, as he attempts to classify all Enlightenment thinkers into two opposing schools of 
thought based on their ontological preconceptions. Israel is therefore hardly interested in 
epistemology and its possible relevance to ethics. For a critical and insightful review of the 
shortcomings of Israel’s approach, see Anthony la Vopa, ‘A New Intellectual History? Jonathan 
Israel’s Enlightenment’, The Historical Journal 52 (2009) 717-738. 
7 
It is for instance acknowledged by Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 108. 
8
 Knud Haakonssen, ‘The History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy: History or Philosophy?’, in: 
idem (ed.), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge 2006) I 3-25, 14. 
9
 Haakonssen, ‘Natural Law without Metaphysics: a Protestant Tradition’, in: Ana Martinez 
Gonzalez (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Natural Law (London 2008) 67-85, 72-73. 
Haakonssen maintains that (moral) knowledge for Lockeans was not propositional. Yet this would 
seem to contradict with the insistence of Locke and Hobbes and others that morality would be 




derivative of a thinker’s ontology and epistemology.10 Although Schneewind 
admits that epistemology and moral philosophy were not isolated fields of 
enquiry, he maintains that generally it was the moral views of thinkers that 
influenced their epistemology and not the other way around.11 
 Yet in our own discussion of five prominent early-modern philosophers, 
we will see that they did not apply any strict demarcation between moral 
philosophy and epistemology – a term that was in fact unknown at the time.12 
Thus Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding is nowadays read as 
primarily a treatise on epistemology. Yet Locke likely wrote the Essay in 
response to debates on morality and revealed religion.13 Indeed, a close 
inspection of the Essay reveals that while at first glance many of its chapters do 
not appear to be directly concerned with ethics, most of its theories do have 
important consequences for morality. Conversely, Hobbes’s Leviathan is today 
rightly considered as a landmark in moral and political theory. Yet Hobbes does 
not commence his deduction of natural laws and exposition of the rights of 
citizens and sovereign before providing a theory of human understanding 
indicating the method by which humans should consult their reason in order to 
guide their conduct. Finally, we will see that Rousseau is another thinker whose 
account of human understanding is an integral part of his moral philosophy. 
While Rousseau is not primarily interested in epistemology in order to provide a 
theory of knowledge, his objective is to document how the development of 
human understanding has transformed man from a solitary but happy creature 
into a social yet miserable being.14 As Rousseau considers the development of 
                                                          
10
 J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy 
(Cambridge 1998) 9-10. 
11
 Schneewind, ‘Voluntarism and the Foundations of Ethics’, in: idem, Essays on the History of 
Moral Philosophy 202-221, 203: ‘Philosophers did not simply apply to morality the theoretical 
views they developed in response to problems posed by scepticism and the new science. Rather, 
substantive moral beliefs imposed conditions on the theories of knowledge.’ 
12
 For brevity’s sake, we will nonetheless employ the modern term ‘epistemology’ to refer to 
early-modern accounts of human understanding and associated theories of knowledge. 
13
 G.A.J. Rogers, ‘The Intellectual Setting and the Aims of the Essay’, in: Newman (ed.), The 




 Throughout our discussion we will sometimes employ the term ‘man’ to refer to all human 
beings, both man and women, in an abstract sense, thereby following the practice of Hannah 
Dawson, who in her Locke, Language and Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge 2007) 1n1 explains 
that: ‘Early-modern philosophers generally speak of ‘men,’ rather than ‘men and women.’ In order 




morality as inextricable from the progress of human understanding, his writings 
provide an eighteenth-century example of a philosophy in which ethics and 
epistemology are interrelated rather than separate subjects. These observations 
then suggest that the endeavour of exploring the relations between early-modern 
ethics and epistemology is not as much based on anachronistic assumptions as 
the idea that these topics should be considered separate fields of inquiry. 
 For this reason, our own reading will take a more holistic approach, as 
we will interpret the moral philosophy of five early-modern thinkers on the 
premise that their views on morality are not isolated positions, but constitute a 
more or less coherent philosophy. This coherence is reflected in the methodology 
employed by the five thinkers we will investigate, as they all present a descriptive 
account of human nature as the foundation of both their theory of epistemology 
and moral philosophy. Like most other early-modern empiricists, these 
philosophers thereby formulate answers to questions about both knowledge and 
morality by investigating how human beings think and act in practice. Thus 
confronted with the question how humans may acquire knowledge, they first 
reconstruct how the contents of the mind is acquired through experience and 
structured with the help of language. Subsequently these thinkers describe 
meticulously how the process of reasoning may turn disparate ideas into 
knowledge. This descriptive account of human understanding then implies how 
human beings should conduct their reasoning in order to gain reliable knowledge 
of empirical reality.15   
 In response to the moral question how humans should conduct 
themselves towards each other, the five thinkers we will investigate also draw 
normative conclusions from a descriptive account of human nature – albeit in a 
slightly different manner. They begin this account of human nature by 
determining what motivates people, describing the process by which alternating 
desires and aversions provide the impetus for all our thoughts and actions. Yet 
most early-modern empiricists recognise that human beings are not merely 
automatons that blindly follow their desires. These philosophers describe how 
                                                          
15
 This approach common to most empiricist theories of deriving normative epistemological 
conclusions from a descriptive account of human understanding is dismissed by Richard Rorty, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton and Oxford 2009 [1979]) 139-148. For Rorty, the 
problem of this approach is not only that it is impossible to derive normative conclusions from a 
descriptive account of human understanding. According to Rorty, this account of human 
understanding is itself based on ‘armchair reflection,’ rather than empirical enquiry, thereby 




humans may employ their reason to determine which passions are worthwhile 
pursuing, and which are better ignored. In other words, they provide an account 
of practical deliberation. This descriptive account of the role of both the passions 
and reason in the determination of our actions then provides the basis for a 
normative theory on how humans should use their reason to determine the 
morality of their conduct. For the five thinkers we will investigate, reason is thus 
not merely the ability to produce knowledge by comparing disparate ideas, but 
also a faculty involved in practical deliberation, which allows us to determine 
whether our actions are prudent. Yet as these thinkers, with the exception of 
Rousseau, consider morality as a prudential guideline, practical deliberation by 
means of reasoning is also at the basis of moral judgment. Accordingly, not only 
the epistemology but also the moral philosophy of these early-modern 
empiricists relies on an account of human understanding. Ultimately, this is the 
most important reason why this thesis will investigate the moral philosophy of 
five early-modern thinkers in the context of their theory of human 
understanding. And as the epistemology of these five thinkers is clearly empirical 
in outlook, we will thereby document the impact of the empirical turn on early-
modern moral philosophy. 
 
Main Themes and Research Questions 
As we discuss the conceptions of human nature of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, 
Helvétius, and Rousseau in order to discover how they think reasoning may 
allow us to understand morality, we will encounter a number of recurring topics 
and associated questions of interpretation. These issues are not equally relevant 
to all five thinkers, as they each have their own preoccupations. Nonetheless, we 
will find that there are at least five subjects that feature to some extent in all the 
chapters of this thesis. In the following, we will briefly outline these five 
recurring issues and formulate several questions that will inform our 
interpretation. The order in which these subjects and questions are displayed in 
this section roughly represents the structure of the chapters of our main 
discussion. 
 As we aim to interpret the moral philosophy of five thinkers in the 
context of their epistemology, our first task will be to provide an overview of 
their accounts of human understanding. We will then find that all the five 
philosophers agree that reasoning is nothing but the activity of comparing and 
relating ideas, which they consider as the cognitive units that provide the 
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contents of our thoughts. Furthermore, they all concur that the contents of these 
ideas may ultimately be traced back to our experience of empirical reality. While 
this preconception describes the origin of ideas of empirical objects, it does not 
yet explain the means by which human beings may acquire normative concepts 
like ‘justice’ or ‘property,’ as the contents of these notions is not simply 
experienced by means of the senses. Our investigation will therefore start by 
considering the question: by what means do the five philosophers envision that 
human beings acquire their ideas of morality? Our answer to this question will 
then reveal that many of these philosophers in fact think that moral concepts are 
a distinct type of idea separated from our ideas of empirical reality. Accordingly, 
we will also consider the question to what extent this dichotomy between moral 
concepts and ideas of empirical objects is relevant to our interpretation of their 
moral philosophy. 
 Subsequently, we will further investigate the epistemology of Hobbes, 
Locke, Condillac, Helvétius, and Rousseau in order to reconstruct their 
conception of normative reason. We will see that these philosophers all deny that 
reason is an autonomous faculty somehow innate to human nature that may 
deduce eternal truths independent from experience. They describe reason rather 
as simply the activity of comparing and relating ideas present in the mind. Yet 
we will see that while they agree on this presupposition, the five philosophers 
diverge in their account of the mechanics of reasoning. Thus some, such as 
Helvétius and arguably also Hobbes and Condillac, portray the process of 
reasoning as nothing other than the self-sustained interaction of ideas present in 
the mind. Others, including Locke and Rousseau, assume that the mind contains 
a distinct faculty of judgment that reasons by actively comparing ideas. 
Accordingly, some scholars have ascribed to these thinkers the theory that this 
faculty of judgment is also responsible for normative reasoning, leading to an 
interpretation according to which the ability for moral reasoning is innate to 
human nature. In our own investigation, we will therefore not only consider the 
question: to what extent do the five philosophers think that reason depends on 
abilities innate to human understanding? We will also inquire if they indeed 
claim that normative judgment is an ability innate to human nature as well. 
 Another recurring issue in our discussion will be the role of language in 
normative judgment. All five philosophers consider language not merely as a 
method of communication, but also maintain that the use of words is 




development of human understanding. In fact, several thinkers claim that the 
ability for reasoning is only made possible by the use of language. Yet this theory 
that the use of words facilitates reasoning may also suggest that language could 
influence or even determine our thoughts. We will see that the philosophers 
following Locke were particularly sensitive to the fact that the signification of 
words is circumscribed by conventions upheld by the tacit consent of the 
community of speakers. In order to be understood, individuals are thus required 
to conform the signification of terms to linguistic conventions. In combination 
with the theory that the composition of complex ideas is only made possible by 
the use of words, this position suggests that individuals accommodate the 
composition of their ideas to established linguistic conventions. Accordingly, the 
conventions of language would also direct normative reasoning. As there have 
been scholarly interpretations that ascribe this conclusion to several of the 
philosophers discussed in this thesis, we will reconstruct their precise views on 
the role of language in cognition. Subsequently, we will pose the question: do any 
of these five philosophers believe that as words fulfil a crucial cognitive function, 
this also entails that the meaning of these words determines thought processes 
including normative judgment? 
 A fourth recurring issue in our discussion will be the role of the passions 
in the moral epistemology of Locke, Hobbes, Condillac, Helvétius, and Rousseau. 
We will see that these thinkers agree that all human thoughts and actions are 
ultimately motivated by a desire for pleasure or an aversion of pain. 
Furthermore, they equally reject the Aristotelian notion that human nature 
suggests a specific purpose that all persons should strive to fulfil in order to 
achieve moral and achieve happiness. In other words, these five philosophers 
dismiss the notion of a summum bonum. Alternatively, they maintain that human 
beings find happiness simply by fulfilling their passions, and accordingly have no 
other clearly defined purpose in life. Furthermore, the five thinkers examined in 
this thesis maintain that the passions also determine subjective normative 
judgment, as individuals consider the objects of their desire as good, while they 
value actions with painful consequences as evil. Altogether, these positions raise 
at least two questions that will be addressed in this thesis. First of all, if the 
passions provide the ultimate motivation for all thoughts and actions, what is the 
role of reason in practical deliberation? Secondly, if there is no summum bonum, 
as the object of the passions and thereby subjective normative judgment diverges 
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considerably among individuals, how could we devise a moral guideline that 
nonetheless directs all individuals towards felicity? 
 Following our discussion of these particular elements of the conceptions 
of human nature of the five philosophers, we will finally outline how these 
components fit together to form a coherent account of moral epistemology. We 
will then be in the position to answer our main question by reconstructing the 
method by which they think that reason may provide insight into morality and 
natural law. Yet on the basis of our investigation of the moral epistemology of 
these thinkers, we will also be able to contribute to the interpretation of their 
moral philosophy as a whole. Thus in several of the chapters of this thesis, we 
will conclude our discussion by considering the following two questions: in view 
of the conclusions of our investigation into their moral epistemology, what kind 
of moral theory did these philosophers propose? And: does our reconstruction of 
their accounts of moral epistemology suggest that any common interpretations of 
the moral philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, Helvétius, and Rousseau must 
be amended? 
 
Approach and Methodology 
The selection of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, Helvétius, and Rousseau for our 
discussion may at first appear somewhat arbitrary, as these thinkers published 
their primary writings over the course of a century in widely different social and 
political contexts. In addition, this selection ignores a great number of thinkers 
whose theories might also deserve attention in a discussion of early-modern 
moral philosophy.16 Admittedly, the choice to include these particular five 
thinkers in in our investigation was not entirely premeditated, as expanding 
interests led research for this thesis down unforeseen paths. In accordance with 
our expansive selection of authors, each chapter in this thesis will present a 
largely self-contained discussion. Of course, these discussions will often provide 
references to other chapters. Furthermore, as we have outlined above, there are 
several recurring issues that feature in all our subsequent chapters. Nonetheless, 
                                                          
16 
Probably the most obvious candidate to include in our discussion would have been David 
Hume. Furthermore, following appraisal of Schneewind, ‘Pufendorf's Place in the History of Ethics’, 
Synthese 72 (1987) 123-155, the inclusion of Samuel Pufendorf would also have been a valuable 
addition. Yet as the inclusion of these two thinkers would widen the scope of this already expansive 
discussion to include the contexts of both the German and Scottish Enlightenments, we will have to 




the chapters of this thesis have been structured in order to allow them to be read 
as isolated interpretations of five early-modern philosophers. 
 At the same time, we may provide several reasons to justify our selection 
of authors. Firstly, as we have already explained at the start of this introduction, 
these five thinkers share a number of fundamental presuppositions. 
Consequently, they develop their moral theories from a similar point of 
departure. Furthermore, all five thinkers are at least to some extent concerned 
with epistemology. With the possible exception of Condillac, they also make 
important contributions to moral philosophy. This combined interest in 
epistemology and ethics makes these thinkers especially suited to our discussion 
of moral epistemology. Finally, despite their shared preconceptions, these five 
thinkers each have their own goals and preoccupations that will provide diversity 
to the scope of our discussion. For instance, Condillac’s interest in the role of 
words in cognition will provide us with the opportunity to explore at length the 
relation between language and morality. Likewise, Helvétius’s engagement in 
contemporary polemics will allow us to illustrate how a theory of moral 
epistemology could also provide the basis for an intervention in more concrete 
social and political debate.  
 As the chapters of this thesis have diverse preoccupations, we will also 
employ slightly different methodologies in our investigation. In most chapters, 
we will follow the methodological suggestions of Knud Haakonssen on the 
interpretation of early-modern moral philosophy. Haakonssen presents an 
alternative to the popular methodology championed by Quentin Skinner and the 
Cambridge School, which considers all historical utterances – including 
philosophical treatises – as performative interventions in contemporary debate. 
Accordingly, proponents of the Cambridge school primarily seek to interpret 
their source material by placing it in the context of contemporary social and 
political discussions.17 Haakonssen maintains that while this is a viable approach 
for many kinds of source material, our understanding of early-modern moral 
philosophy would also benefit from an investigation focused on philosophical 
ideas themselves.18 Following Haakonssen suggestions, we will therefore explain 
                                                          
17 
Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory 8 
(1969) 3-53 contains the classic formulation of this methodology. 
18
 Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy 10: ‘it would seem that to be part of the 
intellectual historian’s task to write the history of the utterance not only as a performance but also 
as a reference. The latter, however, cannot be done except through an investigation of the 
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the positions of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac and Rousseau primarily by providing a 
detailed reconstruction of the arguments of their moral philosophy. Yet our goal 
is not always to provide a fully coherent reconstruction of the philosophy of 
Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, and Rousseau. Rather, our interpretation will be 
perceptive to any fissures and inconsistencies in the arguments of these thinkers. 
We will therefore proceed upon the assumption that uncovering and displaying 
the loose ends of a theory will ultimately be more instructive than trying to 
resolve all inconsistencies to produce a fully coherent interpretation. Finally, as it 
is clear that the purpose of Helvetius’ writings was not merely the discussion of 
abstract philosophical theory, but also intervention in contemporary polemics, 
our chapter on Helvétius will occasionally supplement this focus on philosophical 
arguments with a more contextual approach to interpretation.  
  
Contribution to Scholarship 
Throughout our investigation, we will engage with scholarly literature on several 
levels. As this thesis features largely self-sufficient interpretations of Locke, 
Hobbes, Condillac, Helvétius, and Rousseau, we will predominantly engage with 
scholarly literature dedicated to the interpretation of their individual 
philosophies. The chapters on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, will therefore 
feature detailed discussions of the extensive range of scholarly interpretations of 
their writings. Our discussion of their moral epistemology will then allow us to 
evaluate some of the main lines of interpretation of their moral philosophy as a 
whole. Yet as we have seen, this thesis will also feature some recurring issues 
and questions. Accordingly, we will also engage with the literature on some more 
general themes. In particular, we will contribute to our understanding of two 
distinct issues that have been either underrepresented or misconstrued in the 
literature on the interpretation of early-modern moral philosophy, namely 
regarding the origin of normativity and the role of the passions in practical 
deliberation and morality. 
 To begin with, our combined discussion of epistemology and ethics will 
allow us to reconsider the source of normativity in early-modern moral 
philosophy. More specifically, we will be able to reconstruct the relation between 
facts and values in early-modern moral philosophy. Throughout our main 
                                                                                                                                              
purported objects of reference, which, in intellectual history, will primarily be the ideas employed 
by an historical speaker in making an utterance.’ Paulien Westerman, The Disintegration of Natural 




discussion, we will find that some scholars have simply assumed that early-
modern thinkers accept Hume’s famous prohibition against deriving values from 
facts.19 Yet our own interpretation will suggest that Hobbes for instance did not 
yet recognise the is/ought distinction. In fact, as Hobbes infers natural law from 
a conception of human nature and generalisations about the human condition, 
we will maintain that his aim was precisely to derive morality from certain 
distinct properties of empirical reality.20 Subsequently, we will see that the 
distinction between facts and values does arise in Locke's philosophy as a 
consequence of his dichotomy between ideas of empirical objects acquired by 
means of experience and moral concepts constructed by the mind at will. At the 
same time, we will discover that strict adherence to this epistemological 
dichotomy obscures the source of normativity in Locke's account of moral 
reasoning. Our discussion of moral philosophy in the context of epistemology will 
then suggest that the is/ought dichotomy is closely related to an empiricist 
account of human understanding.21 
 Furthermore, our investigation will provide a different perspective on 
the relation between reason and the passions in early-modern moral philosophy. 
As we will see, several modern interpreters have ascribed to Hobbes, Locke, and 
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 Stephen Darwall, ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes’s Leviathan’, The Philosophical Review 
109 (2000) p.313-347 for instance assumes that Hobbes ascribed to the distinction. 
20
 Hume’s famous prohibition against deriving values from facts has been interpreted by many 
commentators, including J.L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory (London 1980) 47, as directed at moral 
realists like Cudworth and Clarke. Yet Sophie Botros, Hume, Reason and Morality: A legacy of 
contradiction (London and New York 2006) 72-95 shows that Hume’s is/ought distinction is not 
only directed at moral realism, but also at moral naturalists like Hobbes, who would aim to derive 
normative conclusions from empirical facts. 
21
 Westerman, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory 288-289 also relates the emergence of 
the fact/value dichotomy to an empiricist theory of knowledge. Yet this relation is also suggested by 
the fact that the dichotomy is rejected by modern detractors of empiricism. Thus pragmatists like 
Hilary Putnam reject the notion that we may derive a theory of knowledge from a descriptive 
account of human understanding. Accordingly, in his The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and 
Other Essays (Cambridge MA 2002), Putnam tries to demonstrate that the is/ought dichotomy 
rests on an unfounded distinction between ideas of empirical reality and moral concepts. Earlier, in 
his Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge 1981) 127-149 Putnam had shown that the dichotomy 
between facts and values cannot be sustained, as scientific practice already relies on a number of  
values, the most basic of which is that the aim of science is to establish truth. Alternatively, 
conservative thinkers like Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London 2011 
[1981]) 69-71 present the dichotomy as a consequence of the empiricist rejection of Aristotelian 
teleology. As MacIntyre seeks to revive a teleological conception of morality, he also rejects the 
fact/value distinction. 
 Contribution to Scholarship 23 
 
 
Rousseau the view that the purpose of reason in practical deliberation is solely to 
find the means towards the satisfaction of our desires. Accordingly, these 
scholars maintain that Hobbes and Locke anticipated the Humean view that 
‘reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions.’22 Yet our own investigation 
of the account of practical deliberation of these thinkers will demonstrate that by 
weighing the consequences of our actions, reason not merely finds the means to 
whatever desires we might experience, but may also participate in determining 
the ends of our pursuits. While our reading assigns reason a more prominent 
role in practical deliberation, it also explains how reason may determine the 
morality of our actions on the basis of their consequences. Accordingly, we will 
interpret the moral philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac and Helvétius as 
early examples of consequentialism, thereby substantiating the suggestion that 
the moral philosophies of these thinkers anticipate the preconceptions of classical 
utilitarianism.23 
                                                          
22
 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ed. by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford 
2000) II.iii.3 §4 p.266. 
23
 The role of Hobbes, Locke, and in particular Helvétius as forerunners to classical utilitarianism 
is attested by: Colin Heydt, ‘Utilitarianism before Bentham’, in: Ben Eggleston and Dale E. Miller 
(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism (Cambridge 2014) 16-37; Frederick Rosen, 
Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (London and New York 2003) 82-96; Pierre Force, Self-
Interest before Adam Smith, A Genealogy of Economic Science (Cambridge 2003) 93-94; Albert 







1. Reasoning about Consequences: Hobbes’s Consequentialist 
Theory of Morality 
 
Introduction 
The moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is based on a comprehensive 
investigation of human nature. The most paradigmatic formulation of Hobbes’s 
science of human nature can be found in the first part of Leviathan.24 Like any 
other science concerned with physical objects, the method of this science of 
human nature is empirical.25 Although building upon the findings of more 
fundamental scientific fields of inquiry, Hobbes thinks our knowledge of human 
nature derives both from observation of human behaviour anfd introspection of 
our own mental states.26 On the basis of the findings of his own investigation of 
human nature, Hobbes first describes the cognitive processes by which humans 
are able to reason about empirical objects and their consequences on the basis of 
sense experience and with the help of language. This description also has 
normative implications, in the sense that it indicates which forms of reasoning 
are valid, and which methods lead us into error or absurdity. Secondly, Hobbes 
provides an account of human motivation, indicating that all our actions proceed 
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 In this chapter, we will generally follow the suggestion by William Sacksteder, ‘Hobbes’s 
Science of Human Nature’, Hobbes Studies 3 (1990) 35-53, 37 that part I of Leviathan contains the 
definitive synthesis of Hobbes’s science of human nature. To be sure, Hobbes discusses many 
specific aspects of human nature more extensively in some of his other writings – specifically in De 
corpore, De homine and Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance. In the following, we 
will therefore occasionally turn to these latter works, but only for the purpose of explaining and 
contextualising the often concise arguments we find in the Leviathan. 
25
 In contrast to some antiquated readings, including F.S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of the Leviathan 
(New York 1968) 66-87 and Aloysius Martinich, Thomas Hobbes (London 1997) 98 who claim that 
Hobbesian science is one long deduction, with the conclusions of more applied subjects like morals 
and politics derived entirely from the results from more fundamental fields like physics and 
geometry. This notion is definitively refuted by William Sacksteder, ‘Three Diverse Sciences in 
Hobbes: First Philosophy, Geometry, and Physics’, Review of Metaphysics 45 (1992) 739-772 and 
Tom Sorell, Hobbes (London and New York 1986) 5-6, who maintain that Hobbes favours an 
empiricist methodology in the natural sciences, which encompass the science of human nature. 
26
 Hobbes, Leviathan ed. by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis and Cambridge 1994) Introduction §3 
p.4: ‘whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, 
reason, hope, fear, &c, and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know, what are the 
thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions.’ See also XXXII.1 p.245; Sacksteder, 
‘Hobbes’s Science of Human Nature’; Laurens van Apeldoorn, ‘Hobbes on the Scientific Study of the 
Human Mind’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 97 (2015) 308-333; Sorell, Hobbes 7; 25-27. 
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from certain passions and desires. Yet while the passions ultimately provide 
motivation, it is the role of reason to decide which desires are worth pursuing, 
and to find the means to their fulfilment.  
 After outlining man’s capacities and motivations, Hobbes devises a 
theory of morality that follows from this conception of human nature. This 
theory of morality is presented in the form of natural laws – basic moral precepts 
that are both recognisable and applicable to all human beings. As the first step in 
his deduction of the laws of nature, Hobbes conducts his famous thought 
experiment of the state of nature, posing the question how human beings would 
behave towards each other without any established authority to keep them in 
check. Hobbes describes how in such a state, the inherent and unrelenting desire 
for pleasure combined with the capacities for speech and reasoning would bring 
human beings to seek power, riches, and glory – even to the detriment of others. 
As a result, competing individuals would inevitably come into conflict with each 
other. Hobbes then famously concludes that in view of the abilities and 
inclinations of human nature, life in such a state would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.’27 Yet while the war of all against all that characterises the 
state of nature is a consequence of the combination of man’s sagacity with his 
destructive tendencies, Hobbes maintains that human nature also contains the 
intellectual abilities to overcome this adverse situation. Thus Hobbes states that: 
‘reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn 
to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of 
Nature.’28 
 Hobbes thus claims that natural law – and therefore a basic yet universal 
formulation of morality – can be deduced by employing our capacity for 
reasoning.29 Yet upon Hobbes’s own account of reason, it is not immediately 
evident in what manner reason would arrive at the normative guidelines of 
natural law. Hobbes maintains that reason is an artificial faculty dependent on 
language, thereby rejecting the claim of the Scholastics and arguably even 
Hobbes’s immediate predecessor Grotius that human beings simply have an 
intuitive or a priori access to the verities of natural law.30 Instead, Hobbes 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan XIII.9 p.76. 
28 
Hobbes, Leviathan XIII.14 p.78. 
29
 Hobbes, Leviathan XV.40 p.100: ‘the true doctrine of the laws of nature is the true philosophy.’ 
30
 The interpretation of Grotius advanced here is contested by Richard Tuck, ‘The ‘modern’ 
theory of natural law’, 99-120 who portrays Grotius as prefiguring Hobbes’s concept of natural law 
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maintains that reasoning is nothing but drawing conclusions from combinations 
of words that serve as marks to ideas of empirical objects.31 But how can such a 
form of reasoning by itself lead to any normative conclusions? Hobbes of course 
maintains that natural law is a rule indicating the most effective means towards 
self-preservation – thereby indicating that self-preservation should be the 
prevailing goal of our actions. But Hobbes himself does not spell out the 
deduction by which he reaches this normative conclusion. This raises the 
question why self-preservation should be the purpose of natural law. Why not 
felicity, conceived as the continuous satisfaction of whatever desires individuals 
might have?32 This question acquires even greater relevance in light of the 
common critique that Hobbes’s conception of natural law based solely on the 
desire for self-preservation leads to a society that provides peace and safety, but 
does very little to promote the happiness of its citizens.33 In light of these issues, 
we will investigate Hobbes’s philosophy starting from the question: how may 
reasoning with words attached to ideas acquired by means of the senses arrive at 
the normative conclusion that natural laws are guidelines to our self-
preservation? 
 Modern interpreters of Hobbes have formulated a variety of answers to 
these questions. A first line of interpretation maintains that natural laws are in 
fact not the product of reasoning upon words attached to ideas, but rather follow 
from a ‘natural reason’ innate to human nature. According to scholars like Gert 
and Hoekstra, this ‘natural reason’ is then able to identify which actions and 
pursuits are inherently rational, of which the concern for self-preservation is the 
                                                                                                                                              
solely based on self-preservation. Yet as Robert Shaver, ‘Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest’, 
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 78 (1996) 27-47 and Westerman, The Disintegration of 
Natural Law 132-140 have pointed out, Tuck’s interpretation is based mainly on Grotius’s De iure 
praedae, and early work not published until the nineteenth century. In De iure belli ac pacis, 
Grotius’ main work, he departs from his earlier views towards a more Aristotelian position. 
31
 Whether this is also applies to mathematics and metaphysics is an issue disputed among 
commentators, but not particularly relevant for our purposes. Cf. Sorell, Hobbes 55-67. 
32
 Hobbes, Leviathan XI.1 p.57 defines felicity as: ‘a continual progress of the desire, from one 
object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter.’ 
33 
Alisdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (Oxford 2002 [1967]) 133-134. Rousseau in his On 
the Social Contract in: idem, On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy 
ed. by Roger Masters, trans. by Judith Masters (Boston 1978) I.iv p.49 voices a variation on this 
critique, stating: ‘It will be said that the despot guarantees civil tranquillity to his subjects. […] Life 
is tranquil in jail cells too. Is that reason enough to like them?’ 
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prime example.34 This reading thus attributes Hobbes a conception of reason not 
unlike the innate faculty assumed by the scholastics and arguably Grotius as well. 
An alternative though related view has been advanced by Stephen Darwall, who 
ascribes to Hobbes a projectivist theory of morality. Darwall does not maintain 
that the normative priority of self-preservation follows from natural reason, but 
rather that human beings are naturally disposed to reason from the premise that 
self-preservation should be the purpose of their actions. This disposition then 
causes humans to project normative properties upon the objects they encounter 
through sensation.35 A third line of interpretation, proposed by John Deigh, takes 
a position diametrically opposed to the view that natural law as guidelines for 
self-preservation is somehow innate to human understanding. Deigh instead 
maintains that when Hobbes claims that reasoning is ‘reckoning (that is, adding 
and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon,’ he literally 
means that reasoning is determined by the conventional signification of words.36 
According to Deigh, the laws of nature ensuring self-preservation therefore 
follow from the composition of our language.37 
 However, these three interpretations dissent from what is by far the 
most common reading among scholars. The standard interpretation starts out 
from the premise that for Hobbes all human actions are motivated by the 
passions, and that in practical deliberation reason has the role of finding the 
means towards the actions desired. Because being alive is a necessary 
prerequisite to the satisfaction of any desires, the pursuit of self-preservation is 
also a conclusion of reason finding the means towards any of the objects of our 
passions. According to this interpretation, the natural laws designed to safeguard 
our self-preservation are the product of reason as means-to-ends thinking. In 
line with Hobbes denial that there is such a thing as a ‘rational appetite,’ reason 
would not participate in identifying which desires to pursue, but merely indicate 
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 Bernard Gert, ‘Hobbes on Reason’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001) 243-257; Kinch 
Hoekstra, ‘Hobbes on Law, Nature, and Reason’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003) 111-
120, 118-120. Richard Tuck, ‘Hobbes’s Moral Philosophy’, in: Tom Sorell (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Hobbes 175-207, 187 approaches the same position by claiming that this focus on 
self-preservation is simply self-evident – an interpretation that does not explain much. 
35
 Darwall, ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes’s Leviathan.’ 
36
 Hobbes, Leviathan I.v.2 p.22-23. 
37 
John Deigh, ‘Reason and Ethics in Hobbes’s Leviathan’, Journal for the History of Philosophy 34 
(1996) 33-60. For a critical response to Deigh’s interpretation see: Mark Murphy, ‘Desire and Ethics 
in Hobbes’s Leviathan: A Response to Professor Deigh’, Journal for the History of Philosophy 38 
(2000) 259-268. 
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the most effective method to achieve them.38 Thus when Hobbes states that the 
laws of nature are ‘dictates of reason,’ he maintains that they are rational 
guideline outlining the surest means to felicity.39 
 Throughout this chapter, we will engage with these various 
interpretations more extensively. We will then see that none of them fully 
represents Hobbes’s theory. Our own interpretation of Hobbes’s conception of 
normative reason fundamental to natural law will expand upon the recent work 
of van Apeldoorn and Abizadeh.40 This interpretation is based on a reading of 
Hobbes’s account of practical deliberation that recognises that we may use 
reason to determine whether our passions are truly desirable. This reading 
thereby contests the common view that Hobbes regards the passions as given 
and that the role of reason in practical deliberation is limited to finding the 
means to whatever we desire.41 Our own interpretation assigns reason a more 
active role in practical deliberation, as it also participates in the scrutiny and 
selection of our desires by considering the consequences of objects or actions. We 
will see that this reading is fully consistent both with Hobbes’s claim that reason 
is an acquired rather than a natural faculty, and with his position that all pursuits 
following from the will ultimately derive from the passions. On the basis of this 
reading of Hobbes’s account of reason and its role in practical deliberation, we 
will then be able to formulate a more accurate answer to the question how 
Hobbes thinks reason is able to arrive at normative conclusions – including those 
of natural law. Finally, we will outline how reason deliberating on the 
consequences of the passions inherent in human nature concludes that the desire 
for self-preservation has normative priority over all other desires.  
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 Hobbes, Leviathan I.vi.53 p.33. Cf. De cive I.iv.1 ann. 
39
 Noel Malcolm, ‘Hobbes and Spinoza’, in: idem, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford 2002) 27-52, 32. 
Jeffrey Barnouw, ‘Reason as Reckoning: Hobbes’s Natural Law as Right Reason’, Hobbes Studies 21 
(2008) 38-62; David Gauthier, The Logic of the Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of 
Thomas Hobbes (Oxford 1969) 21; Stephen Darwall actually endorsed the same interpretation in a 
book preceding the article discussed above: The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’ 58-59. 
40
 Arash Abizadeh, ‘Hobbes on Mind: Practical Deliberation, Reasoning, and Language’, Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 55 (2017) p.1-34; Laurens van Apeldoorn, ‘Reconsidering Hobbes’s 
Account of Practical Deliberation’, Hobbes Studies 25 (2012) 143-165. Adrian Blau, ‘Reason, 
Deliberation, and the Passions’, in: A.P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Hobbes (Oxford 2016) 195-217 provides a similar reading. 
41
 MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics 134; Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of 
Modernity (Chicago 2008) 236. 
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We will start our inquiry with a review of Hobbes’s account of basic 
human cognition, moving subsequently to a discussion of his theory of reason as 
dependent on language. Meanwhile, we will also scrutinise John Deigh’s 
interpretation that ascribes to Hobbes the view that the precepts of natural law 
are contained within the conventions of language. Subsequently, we will analyse 
and dismiss the reading that Hobbes thinks that natural law follows from an 
innate faculty of normative reason distinct from descriptive reasoning based on 
speech. After considering the interpretation of natural law as the means to our 
ends, we will then develop our own reading by first reconsidering Hobbes’s 
account of practical deliberation, as well as his theory of subjective normative 
judgment, concluding that the latter is ultimately consequentialist in nature. 
Subsequently, we will examine to what extent the normative judgment of 
individuals is capable of rendering them sociable creatures, and conclude that it 
are ultimately the limits of subjective reasoning that necessitate the erection of a 
sovereign to make humans comply with natural law. Finally, we will conclude 
that Hobbes’s deduction of natural law employs a method similar to that of 
practical deliberation. Thus by scrutinising the desires inherent in human nature 
in view of their consequences, Hobbes concludes that the desire for self-
preservation takes priority over all other passions, and should consequently be 
the basis of natural law. 
 
Experience and Understanding 
The fundamental thesis of Hobbes’s theory of human understanding, appearing 
right in the first chapter of the Leviathan, is that the content of all thoughts may 
ultimately be traced back to sense perception.42 Hobbes describes how 
representations of objects arise in the mind due to pressure exerted upon the 
organs of sense. While sensation itself is fleeting, perceptions leave imprints 
upon the mind that give rise to what Hobbes calls the imagination. Describing the 
imagination as nothing but ‘decaying sense,’ Hobbes details how it preserves our 
sensations, thereby enabling what is commonly called memory. Over time, the 
                                                          
42
 Hobbes, Leviathan I.2 p.6; De corpore ed. by William Molesworth (London 1839) I.vi.1 p.66. 
Sorell, Hobbes 86-87 suggests that this empiricist position appears to conflict with some of 
Hobbes’s more detailed views on the origin of knowledge, which indicate that in fact Hobbes thinks 
that many parts of the sciences – such as those concerning magnitude and motion – are not 
conducted through empirical enquiry. Cf. Marcus Adams, ‘Hobbes, Definitions and Simplest 
Conceptions’, Hobbes Studies 27 (2014) 35-60 for a contrary reading. 
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sensations in our imagination will decay and become more obscure because they 
are supplemented and replaced by the steady stream of new perceptions flowing 
from the senses. The resulting collection of sense-perceptions retained by the 
imagination is then what Hobbes calls experience.43  
 On the basis of this experience alone, it is already possible to make very 
basic kinds of judgments about the world around us. First of all, the imagination 
can perceive the differences and similarities between objects of sense and 
memory. This comparison of ideas does not require any independent and 
assenting faculty, as Hobbes thinks that judgment is nothing but sensing the 
similarities and differences between ideas and sensations.44 Secondly, Hobbes 
explains that our perceptions are always acquired in an order that mirrors the 
sequence of phenomena perceived. Our memories therefore exhibit conformity to 
the temporal order of nature, as ‘those motions that immediately succeeded one 
another in the sense continue also together after sense.’45 This succession of 
memories reflecting the order nature then allows the mind to conjecture causal 
relations between objects and events.46 Hobbes maintains that this form of 
understanding of the conjunctions between one object and another is common to 
both man and beast. Consequently, all creatures endowed with the abilities for 
sense-perception and imagination have the ability to understand causes and 
foresee potential effects, provided they have past experience of objects similar to 
the one they encounter. This form of conjecture is what Hobbes calls prudence, 
and can be used by both man and animal to guide their actions and satisfy their 
desires.47 The extent of our prudence – and thus our ability to achieve our aims – 
then depends on the range of our experience, ‘the future being but a fiction of the 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan II.2-4 p.8-9; De corpore IV.xxv.7 p.396. 
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 Hobbes, De corpore VI.xxv.8 p.399. Both Susan James, Passion and Action: the Emotions in 
Seventeenth Century Philosophy (Oxford 1999) 128 and Sorell, Hobbes 85 note that Hobbes 
sometimes ascribes the imagination cognitive abilities that go beyond merely sensing, recalling and 
distinguishing particular ideas. In other words, it is not clear that according to Hobbes’s own 
description, the imagination would on its own have the capacity for some of the forms of thinking 
Hobbes ascribes to it. 
45
 Hobbes, Leviathan III.2 p.12. 
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 As Sorell, Hobbes 30 n.1 notes, this position may appear to anticipate Hume’s sceptical theory 
of causality. Yet this only holds for the prudential understanding of causality based solely on 
experience. Hobbes also thinks that humans do have the ability to ascertain causal relations with 
certainty through ratiocination – a theory dismissed by Hume as incomprehensible. Cf. David 
Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding ed. by Peter Nidditch (Oxford 1975) IV p.25-
39. 
47
 Hobbes, Leviathan III.7 p.13-14. 
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mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present; which 
with most certainty is done by him that has most experience.’48 
 Hobbes therefore claims that the combination of sense and imagination 
alone already facilitates a rudimentary form of cognition that is not only behind 
all animal behaviour, but accounts for many human actions as well. Yet Hobbes 
also indicates that an understanding of the world merely based on prudence is 
both severely limited and prone to be inaccurate. He provides several reasons 
why this is the case. First of all, prudence is based solely on our own experience, 
excluding the possibility of benefitting from the wisdom of others. Secondly, the 
‘decaying sense’ of our imagination on which prudence depends is fleeting, as it 
is continually supplemented and replaced by new experiences. Thirdly, Hobbes 
seems to think that prudence alone cannot ascertain causal relations with any 
certainty, as the relations perceived between objects of experience may not 
always be the same.49 Finally, Hobbes claims that the imagination can only 
acquire and consider particular ideas based on singular experiences. By itself, it is 
unable to construct universal or abstract concepts that represent multiple objects 
at the same time. On the basis of prudence, humans and animals can therefore 
only deliberate and reflect on the singular objects and events they have 
experienced in the past.50 
 
Language and Reason 
While prudence is common to both man and beast, Hobbes claims that the higher 
cognitive ability of humans is due entirely to our capacity for language.51 In 
Hobbes view, language thus not only has a communicative function that allows 
us to learn from others, it also changes the way we think, as we ‘turn the 
reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of 
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Hobbes, Leviathan III.7 p.14. 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan III.2 p.12; XLVI.2 p.454. It is not entirely clear how Hobbes thinks that a 
diversity of experiences would in fact confuse our prudential comprehension of causal relations. 
Possibly his point is that without language as a tool to accurately register the causal relations 
perceived, the mind would have difficulty distinguishing the merely casual from constant 
conjunctions.  
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 Hobbes, Leviathan IV.6 p.17; V.5 p.23-24. 
51 
Michael Losonsky, Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy (Cambridge 2006) 49-50 completely 
disregards this aspect of Hobbes’s philosophy of language. Losonsky claims that Hobbes’s 
discussion of language is solely meant as a methodological prelude to his main project of political 
philosophy. Hopefully, our own discussion will demonstrate that Losonsky underestimates the 
importance of Hobbes’s philosophy of language. 
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the consequences of appellations.’52 According to Hobbes, it is therefore only by 
acquiring speech that we transcend mere prudence and develop our capacity for 
reasoning. Hobbes thinks that the imposition of words extends the fundamental 
abilities of the mind in a number of ways. First of all, words serve as marks to 
thoughts, thereby enhancing our otherwise fleeting memory of causal relations. 
Thus Hobbes thinks that words and the connections between them allow the 
‘registering of the consequences of our thoughts, which being apt to slip out of 
our memory and put us to a new labour.’53 By registering our experience of 
causal relations, we then also increase our ability to distinguish and compare 
them, giving rise to more accurate judgment. 
 More importantly still, language also broadens the scope of human 
understanding by enabling us to think about species of things, rather than solely 
about individual objects. Hobbes is a nominalist regarding universal concepts, 
which means that he thinks that universals are not mental concepts, but rather 
terms with a certain definition:  
 
Of names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing, as Peter, John, this man, 
this tree; and some are common to many things, as man, horse, tree, every of which, 
though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things, in respect 
of all which together it is called an universal, there being nothing in the world 





As we have seen, Hobbes thinks that by itself, the imagination can only consider 
singular objects. But by using universal terms, human beings gain the ability to 
reason and communicate about whole classes of objects. The reference of these 
universal terms is then based on their definition.55 With the help of these 
universal terms, humans can greatly expand and streamline their thinking. 
Hobbes himself gives the example of a person studying a triangle and discovering 
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one of Euclid’s theorems. Without the use of words, this person would have to 
repeat the mathematics every time she encounters a slightly different three-
cornered object. But after acquiring and learning the definition of the universal 
term ‘triangle,’ this person would become able to attribute Euclid’s theorem to 
any three-cornered object she encounters, without having to repeat her 
reasoning. Hobbes therefore thinks that with the help of universal terms, ‘the 
consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as 
a universal rule […] and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first, 
and makes that which was found true here and now, to be true in all times and 
places.’56 Universal terms then allow us to formulate general rules and 
propositions indispensible to reasoning and the practice of science.57 Without 
universals, all our reasoning and knowledge would be of particulars.58 It is 
therefore only by using well-defined universal terms that we can formulate laws 
of nature of both the moral and scientific kind.  
 According to Hobbes, universal terms, as well as proper names – 
together with a range of other types of words, including abstract terms, 
numerals, negations, and the copula – therefore transforms and enhance human 
understanding, thereby producing reason.59 As these terms are related to each 
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himself envision the possibility that ‘man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan IV.16 p.20; De corpore I.iii.3-4 p.32-34. Besides universal terms, Hobbes 
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Instead, an abstract term refers to a property common to many different objects, while its 
signification derives from a definition constituted or accepted by speakers themselves. Like 
 Language and Reason  35 
 
 
other by grammatical and logical relations, they collectively provide a framework 
for reasoning.60 Thus while animal or prudential thinking is entirely determined 
by experiences assessed through innate cognitive structures, humans order their 
thoughts through the artificial structure of language. Consequently, human 
reasoning is both broader in scope and detached – although not entirely dissolved 
– from the particular order of ideas acquired through experience. Yet Hobbes is 
not altogether clear on the precise implications of this transformation of human 
understanding by means of language. Consequently, scholars have debated 
whether Hobbes’ss account of the role of language in cognition is sufficient to 
explain that human beings are conscious, reflective, and autonomous agents 
rather than merely passive beings conditioned by their environment.61 Yet as this 
issue is not of primary importance to our own discussion, we may refrain taking 
a position in this debate. 
 
Language and Natural Law 
A more relevant issue for our purposes is the question to what extent language 
not only constitutes reasoning, but also determines its outcome. In the preceding, 
we have seen that reasoning depends on both universal and abstract terms. Yet 
we have also seen that Hobbes thinks all our ideas are particular. Universal and 
abstract terms therefore do not signify any universal or abstract conceptions in 
the mind – simply because Hobbes thinks these cannot exist. The meaning of 
universal and abstract terms is rather determined by their definition, which 
indicates the extent of their reference to objects of experience. It therefore 
follows that when we reason with general and abstract terms, the outcome of our 
reasoning will be determined by the definitions of the terms we employ. This is 
also the reason why Hobbes emphasises repeatedly that our reasoning should 
                                                                                                                                              
universal terms, abstract names enable forms of thought not restricted to the consideration of ideas 
of individual objects acquired through sensation. Therefore they allow humans to communicate 
and reason about objects of experience in a way that transcends merely prudential thinking. 
60 
Hobbes, Leviathan II.10 p.11. Cf. Sorell, Hobbes 30-32 on this notion of language and reason not 
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through experience. 
61 
Abizadeh, ‘Hobbes on Mind’, 19-30 does think that the extent of language is such that humans 
escape passivity and gain the ability to assent consciously to statements and propositions. Cf. 
Michael Losonsky, Enlightenment and Action from Descartes to Kant (Cambridge 2001) 42-70.  
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commence with scrutinising and settling the definitions of the terms we aim to 
use.62 
Yet this importance of definitions to our reasoning also raises the 
question from where Hobbes thinks these definitions of universal and abstract 
terms are derived. On first inspection, his answer appears to suggest that the 
definitions fundamental to our reasoning are nothing but human conventions: 
 
From hence also this may be deduced, that the first truths were arbitrarily made by 
those that first of all imposed names upon things, or received them from the 
imposition of others. For it is true (for example) that man is a living creature, but it is 




Hobbes’s writings abound with similar passages in which he seems to endorse 
the view that the meaning of words depends on arbitrary conventions 
determined by the inventors of language. Elsewhere, he states that ‘names have 
their constitution, not from the species of things, but from the will and consent of 
men.’64 Consequently, some of Hobbes’s readers – Leibniz among them – have 
claimed that Hobbes holds that man’s reasoning is entirely determined by the 
conventional meaning of words. Hobbes would therefore retain a conventionalist 
theory of truth, according to which the truth and falsity of a propositions is 
entirely dependent on linguistic convention.65  
 This line of interpretation has recently been revived by John Deigh, who 
applies this reading to explain how Hobbes thinks that reason would deduce 
natural law. According to Deigh, moral philosophy producing natural law is a 
form of science that relies on reasoning with aptly defined universal terms. 
Furthermore, Deigh assumes that the proper definitions of words can be found 
among the linguistic conventions that make communication possible.  Deigh then 
concludes that for Hobbes the outcome of both normative and scientific 
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reasoning is determined by the linguistic conventions upheld by the community 
of speakers. On this reading, the normative primacy of self-preservation over all 
other pursuits, as well as natural law in general, would simply follow from the 
constitution of our language. Deigh concedes that linguistic conventions are likely 
to reflect characteristics of relevant aspects of empirical reality – in this case 
presumably human nature. Nonetheless, the reasoning leading to natural law is 
based on artificial linguistic conventions drawn up by the founders of language 
and upheld by the community of speakers.66 
The interpretation proposed by Deigh has not found many followers.67 
There are several reasons why Deigh’s reading misrepresents Hobbes’s views – 
two of which we will mention. First of all, Deigh’s interpretation of natural law 
as following from linguistic conventions does not clarify why individuals would 
be compelled or obliged to follow its precepts. Given Hobbes’ss position that 
desires and appetites ultimately occasion all human action, natural laws would 
have to be formulated and presented as guidelines that facilitate the fulfilment of 
these desires in order for individuals to act on them.68 In other words, natural 
law needs to be based on man’s moral psychology to be in any way convincing 
and obliging to its recipients. Deigh’s conventionalist interpretation rather 
presents natural law as a deontic rule deduced through reason, but then fails to 
explain how or why these natural laws would induce obedience if these laws are 
constructed on the basis of linguistic conventions rather than the interests of 
individuals.69 
 More importantly, Deigh’s reading – as well as the conventionalist 
interpretation in general – relies on a misrepresentation of Hobbes’s 
epistemology and philosophy of language. We have seen that Deigh ascribes to 
Hobbes the view that socially upheld linguistic conventions are the source of the 
definitions of the terms used in reasoning. Yet in Hobbes’s own writings, we do 
not find anything like a theory of meaning detailing the role of linguistic 
conventions in circumscribing the definitions of terms.70 In fact, Hobbes 
generally presents the process of imposing terms as a private process, in which 
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38 1. Hobbes 
 
 
individuals are free to devise their own definitions for the words they employ. 
Hobbes therefore thinks that in the first instance, the function of words is to 
serve as marks to our thoughts, while their use as signs in communication is 
secondary.71 While Hobbes briefly mentions that speakers must adhere to some 
extent to conventions in order to communicate effectively, Hobbes never suggests 
that these linguistic conventions also influence or even determine the content 
and sequence of our private thoughts. 
 On the contrary, Hobbes thinks that individuals should not simply 
borrow the meaning of words from others, but rather ‘examine the definitions of 
former authors, and either correct them, where they are negligently set down; or 
to make them himself.’72 Individuals should therefore derive definitions ‘from 
their own meditation.’73 But what does Hobbes mean by this, and how can this 
statement be reconciled with his view that ‘the first truths were arbitrarily made 
by those that first of all imposed names upon things?’ In order to answer these 
questions, we must first recognise that for Hobbes, the truth of propositions is by 
no means entirely detached from our experience of empirical reality. Although 
Hobbes is decidedly vague on the issue, a number of scholars contesting the 
conventionalist reading have attempted to reconstruct how according to Hobbes, 
human beings derive their definitions of universal terms from experience. Thus 
James Watkins maintains that since Hobbes allows that common names can 
stand for an accident common to many things enables him to avoid a truly 
conventionalist theory of truth.74 A more recent interpretation has been proposed 
by Marcus Adams, who argues that for Hobbes the science of geometry cannot be 
conventional, and thereby can provide a solid foundation for the development of 
the other sciences.75  
For our present purposes, it is not necessary to discuss these readings in 
great detail or to decide which one is the more accurate. What matters is that 
                                                          
71
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 Hobbes, Leviathan I.iv.13 p.19. 
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75
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these interpretations show that for Hobbes, the definition of terms – and thereby 
the truth of propositions – is not merely conventional, but ultimately depends on 
our experience of empirical reality.76 But then how should we interpret Hobbes’s 
conventionalist sounding claims that truth is the consequence of the arbitrary 
imposition of names? The most probable explanation is that Hobbes does not 
intend to claim that truth itself is but a collectively upheld fiction, but merely that 
the terms in which truth is expressed are arbitrary and conventional. His point is 
therefore that words themselves are nothing more than arbitrary signs whose 
relation to objects is entirely conventional. Hobbes thereby takes position against 
the view – first expressed in Plato’s Cratylus but still common in the seventeenth 
century – that there is a natural relation between linguistic signs and the things 
they reference.77  
In addition, Hobbes possibly also meant that the reference of universal 
terms is – at least to some extent – dependent on our own will. Thus we are free 
to choose the particular properties of experience by which we classify natural 
objects into species. But once defined, we are obliged to apply universals in line 
with our experience. Finally, when Hobbes states that truths are made by those 
who first imposed language, he may refer to the fact that truth is an exclusive 
property of linguistic propositions. Without language, mental discourse proceeds 
following innate cognitive structures. Only by rendering our thoughts in 
propositional form does it become possible to evaluate them as either true or 
false. In other words, Hobbes intended to say that language makes our thoughts 
truth-apt – a point he also makes elsewhere.78 Following these explanations, it is 
almost certain that Hobbes did not hold a conventionalist theory of truth, and 
neither did he think that our reasoning producing natural law merely follows the 
conventions of language.  
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 Finally, this analysis is corroborated by considering Hobbes’s more 
specific views on the ways in which language may influence our thoughts. 
Hobbes is in fact highly concerned with the possibility that opinions are swayed 
and reasoning perplexed by certain forms of language: 
 
Wherefore, as men owe all their true ratiocination to the right understanding of 
speech; so also they owe their errors to the misunderstanding of the same; and as all 
the ornaments of philosophy proceed only from man, so from man also is derived the 
ugly absurdity of false opinions. For speech has something in it like to a spider’s web, 
[…] for by contexture of words tender and delicate wits are ensnared and stopped; 




At first inspection, this passage again suggests that it is language itself that 
determines our reasoning and has the ability to lead our thoughts astray. If 
Hobbes really thought that conventional meanings used for communication 
shape our thinking, we would then expect him to be worried about inaccurate or 
imprecise linguistic conventions leading us into error. Yet if we inspect Hobbes’s 
more detailed descriptions of the power of words to sway our thoughts, we find 
that he is mainly concerned about rhetorical, deceptive and absurd forms of 
speech. Thus Hobbes in particular warns against the ability of metaphorical 
language to trick us into believing false opinions.80 In addition, he maintains that 
people can be deceived by the use of terminology without any signification. 
Examples include concepts like ‘incorporeal substance’ or ‘free will,’ as well as 
the inconceivable claim that there might be ‘accidents of bread in cheese,’ all of 
which cannot signify any idea in the mind and are literally inconceivable and 
absurd.81 According to Hobbes, these vacuous terms are able to mislead us into 
accepting otherwise invalid argumentation – a practice he sees commonly 
employed by scholastic philosophers.82 While Hobbes is therefore clearly 
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sensitive to the fact that metaphorical and absurd speech may lead us astray, he 
never mentions the possibility that our thoughts may be distracted by the 
conventional meanings of words. 
  In the end, we must conclude that Deigh’s interpretation of natural law 
as based on linguistic conventions does not stand up to scrutiny. Yet our effort in 
refuting it has also lead us to a general understanding of Hobbes’s theory of 
reasoning as based on language. We have seen that Hobbes’s own explication of 
this theory is not always easily understood. Yet for all its ambiguity, we have also 
seen that Hobbes’s theory is most plausibly interpreted as a form of empiricism, 
as it describes how human beings use language to reason with universal and 
abstract terms ultimately defined though experience. Hobbes then thinks that by 
employing these well-defined terms in syllogisms, we would be able to produce 
the universal propositions of science. Yet while this interpretation of Hobbes’s 
epistemology and philosophy of language avoids the conventionalism supposed 
by Deigh, it also raises new questions if we would consider it in light or our 
investigation into the basis of natural law in reason. Thus our interpretation of 
reason as grounded in experience explains the method for descriptive reasoning. 
But it does not yet incorporate an account of the normative reasoning required 
for deducing natural law. 
 
 
Normative Reason as Innate? 
Accordingly, several scholars have questioned whether reasoning conducted 
through language would in fact be able to arrive at the normative conclusions of 
natural law. These authors – Stephen Darwall and Bernard Gert among them – 
maintain that Hobbes’s conception of reason as clarified above is exclusively 
concerned with descriptive propositions. Reason thus produces scientific laws 
that describe how the world functions, but by itself it cannot tell us what we 
should do or how we should live our life.83 Thus reason may supply us with the 
means to our ends, but it cannot show us these ends themselves. These  
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interpreters thereby apply to Hobbes philosophy the dichotomy between 
descriptive and normative statements that has become famous as Hume’s law.84 
They assume that Hobbes would not have violated the is/ought distinction by 
attempting to derive normative conclusions from empirical facts. Gert and 
Darwall therefore conclude that when Hobbes stated that natural law is a dictate 
of reason, he could not have meant that it is a dictate of reasoning with universal 
terms referencing objects of experience. 
 As an alternative, these authors propose that besides what they refer to 
as ‘verbal reason,’ Hobbes retains an additional conception of reason responsible 
for moral judgment. A cursory reading of Hobbes writings indeed yields some 
passages that seemingly suggest that human beings have an innate rational 
faculty that would allow them to intuitively arrive at the normative conclusions 
of natural law. Thus Hobbes states that ‘reason, which is the law of nature itself, 
has been given to each and every man directly by God as a Rule for his actions.’85 
Gert, supported by Kinch Hoekstra, therefore claims that natural law is a product 
of ‘natural reason,’ a faculty of moral judgment innate to human nature.86 In a 
somewhat similar vein, Darwall maintains that according to Hobbes, ‘we reason 
from the end of self-preservation itself, not from the fact that it is our end.’87 
Inspired by Hume’s projectivist theories of morality and causality, Darwall 
attributes to Hobbes the theory that we project our innate inclination for self-
preservation upon the objects of experience, similar to how we project our 
experience of colours. According to this interpretation, the projection of 
normativity upon the objects of experience is then the starting point for moral 
reasoning. While Gert and Darwall disagree upon the specific cognitive 
mechanisms at work, they both ascribe to Hobbes a theory in which morality and 
natural law follow from a certain faculty or property innate to human nature.  
 While Hobbes occasionally appears to suggest that the pursuit of self-
preservation and adherence to natural law simply follow from an inclination or 
faculty innate to human nature, there is sufficient textual evidence suggesting the 
contrary. Thus Hobbes emphasises that ‘reason is not, as sense and memory, 
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born with us, nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by 
industry, first in apt imposing of names, and secondly by getting a good and 
orderly method.’88 This passage clearly indicates that Hobbes considered reason 
an artificial faculty dependent on language. At the same time, Hobbes’s 
statements that appear to refer to an innate faculty of normative reason 
independent from ‘verbal reason’ are often brief, and occur outside the context of 
Hobbes’s dedicated discussions of reason. They may also be interpreted as merely 
indicating the normative function of artificial reason as dependent on language.89 
The textual evidence for the interpretation that Hobbes attributed to human 
beings an innate ability for normative reasoning separate from descriptive 
reasoning facilitated by language is therefore not compelling enough.  
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 Finally the interpretations by Gert and Darwall assume that Hobbes 
would not have violated Hume’s prohibition against deriving normative 
conclusions from empirical facts. Yet there is no reason to think that Hobbes 
actually adhered to the is/ought distinction. Apart from the fact that Hume first 
formulated his famous law over a hundred years after the publication of 
Leviathan, there is no solid evidence that Hobbes considered it problematic to 
derive values from facts. On the contrary, the case could be made that Hobbes in 
fact made no clear distinction between empirical facts and normative positions. 
Thus Hobbes applies no strict demarcations between different forms of inquiry, 
as he presents all forms of science, including ethics, as part of a single body of 
knowledge. In addition, as Noel Malcolm has noted, Hobbes did not yet accept a 
dichotomy between analytic and synthetic propositions later introduced by 
Locke.90 Unlike Locke, Hobbes therefore did not maintain that moral concepts 
exist independent from the facts of empirical reality. Our own interpretation of 
Hobbes’s moral philosophy will in fact attest that Hobbes did not make a clear 
distinction between facts and values. Thus we will show that he attempts to 
derive his conception of natural law from a conception of human nature. As this 
conception of human nature is derived from empirical observation, Hobbes’s 
approach was in fact precisely to derive normative conclusions from empirical 
facts.91 
 
Natural Law as the Means to Ends? 
All the interpretations discussed above assume that for Hobbes, reasoning on the 
basis of language is a purely descriptive activity not concerned with the day-to-
day deliberation of actions. By reasoning, we may gain a scientific understanding 
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of the world, as well as deduce the universal morality of natural law. But 
according to the interpretations reviewed above, reason is not involved in 
practical deliberation. In the following, we will take a closer look at Hobbes’s 
conception of practical deliberation and investigate its relation to morality. We 
will then see that reason in fact plays a crucial role in deliberating our actions 
and forming the will. Reason is thus not merely a theoretical, but also a practical 
faculty. It is this role of reason in practical deliberation that allows it to formulate 
the normative conclusions of natural law. Yet the precise role of reason in 
practical deliberation is again subject of scholarly debate. Many interpreters 
consider Hobbesian reason solely as an instrumental faculty that finds the means 
to satisfy whatever desires we might have. In the following, we will see that 
while reason is certainly instrumental in finding the means to ends, this reading 
is too simplistic by itself, and that reason is also involved in the selection of 
desires worthwhile pursuing. This analysis of the role of reason in deliberation 
will subsequently allow us to understand how reasoning dependent on language 
may produce the normative conclusions of natural law. 
The fundamental assumption of Hobbes’s account of deliberation is that 
the motivation for all human actions ultimately derives from the passions. 
Hobbes thereby rejects the notion – common to both Stoic and many scholastic 
moral theories – that reason may determine the will independent from the 
passions.92 Instead, practical deliberation always starts with a desire or aversion 
to a certain object. By themselves, these desires and aversions are morally 
neutral, as Hobbes states that ’the desires and other passions of man are in 
themselves no sin.’93 In practice, this means that while the mind is continuously 
affected by desires and aversions, no single passion inherently has normative 
priority over others. The decision which of the passions should be acted upon, 
and which forms of endeavour will have to be ignored, is therefore taken by the 
mind through a process of practical deliberation. Unfortunately, Hobbes’s own 
description of deliberation, and the role of reason in this process, is often 
misconstrued. Hobbes describes deliberation as an ’alternate succession of 
appetites, aversions, hopes and fears,’ thereby giving the impressions that 
deliberation is little more than a rotation or contest between desires and 
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aversions.94 Accordingly, some interpreters have assumed that for Hobbes, 
human beings are wholly determined by their passions, as reason plays solely an 
instrumental role in the deliberation of the will. Reason would then identify the 
means to our desires, but is entirely dissolved from the process determining 
which end is worth pursuing in the first place.95 
Consequently, these interpreters portray the role of Hobbesian reason in 
practical deliberation as a purely instrumental. Again, this reading is 
strengthened by some of Hobbes’s own comments that appear to describe reason 
merely as a faculty finding the means to the ends determined by our desires. 
Thus Hobbes states that ‘the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to 
range abroad and find the way to the things desired.’96 Some scholars therefore 
seem to view Hobbes’s position on the role of reason in deliberation as an 
anticipation of Hume’s statement that ’reason is and ought to be the slave of the 
passions.’97 To be sure, Hobbes thinks that reason developed by means of 
language is not essential to finding the means to our ends. Like animals, which 
possess neither language nor reason, human beings may seek to satisfy their 
desires by using prudence.98 Yet as prudence is entirely dependent upon our own 
experience, it is both fallible and limited in scope. Hobbes thinks that by using 
reason, with its ability to formulate and comprehend universal propositions, we 
gain a much improved understanding of causal relations, which then greatly 
enhances our abilities to find the means to our ends.  
 Closely related to this interpretation of reason as solely instrumental in 
the achievements of our desires, is the view that Hobbesian natural law is 
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nothing more than a set of prudential guidelines indicating the most effective 
means to felicity, conceived as the continuous satisfaction of whatever desires we 
might have. According to this reading, the pursuit of self-preservation decreed by 
the law of nature is the means towards the satisfaction of all other desires, simply 
because being alive is the necessary prerequisite to the satisfaction of any 
desire.99 The laws of nature themselves are then the means to best realise this 
pursuit of self-preservation. Hobbes therefore states that ’it is a precept, or 
general rule, of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace,’ because peace 
is the most effective means to self-preservation, which in turn is a necessary 
means to the satisfaction of our desires.100 Following this interpretation, Hobbes 
does not consider the pursuit of self-preservation as imperative because it 
follows from a desire that should be considered inherently moral. As desires are 
by themselves morally neutral, Hobbes maintains that the pursuit of self-
preservation is rational merely because it is a necessary means to all other ends. 
 
Practical Deliberation 
This interpretation of reason as instrumental to achieving our ends certainly 
describes one of the more important roles of reason in practical deliberation. As 
we have seen above, the cognitive functions of language allow human beings to 
extend their understanding of causes beyond their own particular experiences, 
thereby supplementing mere prudence with the faculty of reason. This artificial 
faculty then allows human beings to formulate purely descriptive scientific laws. 
But there is no ground to the assumption that this improved understanding of 
consequences cannot also greatly expand our capacities for finding the means to 
objects desired. John Deigh’s position that solely prudence, and not reason, is 
used to find the means to ends is therefore unfounded.101 In fact, following the 
lead of van Apeldoorn and Abizadeh, a closer reading of Hobbes’s account of 
practical deliberation will demonstrate that reason has a role in the 
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determination of our actions even more extensive than supposed by the 
commentators presenting reason as purely instrumental.102 
We should begin this reading by acquiring a more thorough 
understanding of Hobbes’s conception of desire and aversion. In line with his 
materialist metaphysics, Hobbes thinks that like all other cognitive processes, 
these desires and aversions ultimately depend on material processes in the body. 
He maintains that desires and aversions originate in the imagination, where 
memories of pleasure and pain associated with certain objects give rise to 
voluntary motion or endeavour towards these objects of experience. Yet while 
they are ultimately based in material processes, most desires and aversions are 
not simply the consequence of non-cognitive and corporeal urges. Apart from 
hunger, thirst and some other basic appetites, Hobbes thinks ‘appetites of 
particular things, proceed from experience and trial of their effects upon 
themselves or other men.’103 The passions therefore arise in the imagination and 
depend on experience, as the memory of pleasurable or evil consequences of 
attaining a certain object in the past will give rise to a desire to reclaim or avoid 
the same object in the future. For Hobbes, the passions are therefore clearly 
cognitive phenomena that depend on ideas of objects and their consequences in 
the imagination.104  
In line with this more precise understanding of Hobbes’s conception of 
the passions, we may now revise the interpretation of practical deliberation 
encountered in the previous section. A closer reading of Hobbes’s account of 
deliberation reveals that the will does not simply follow from blind passion, but 
that reason plays a significant role as well: 
 
When in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one 
and the same thing arise alternately, and diverse good and evil consequences of the 
doing or omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts, so that 
sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes and aversion from it, sometimes 
hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of 
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desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done or thought 




In this passage, Hobbes indicates first of all that deliberation is not merely an 
unregulated alteration or contest of desires producing the will. When 
deliberating, the mind rather examines all the possible consequences of attaining 
an object of desire, as well as of the actions required to achieve this end. Hobbes 
concedes that we do not always have time for careful deliberation, and therefore 
often act on a whim.106 But when we have the time and inclination to deliberate, 
the mind then weighs the foreseen good against potential evil consequences and 
then decides whether an object should be pursued or not. We could therefore see 
deliberation as the process of deciding which desires should be acted upon, and 
which should be ignored.107 Yet it is probably even more accurate to describe 
deliberation as the mental discourse by which we decide which objects we have 
reason to desire – in other words, which objects reason considers desirable in the 
first place.108 
 Apart from a limited number of purely bodily desires, the passions are 
therefore not merely mindless urges that incite human actions – as some 
interpretations have supposed.109 Instead, they are more akin to beliefs that 
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objects or actions will produce pleasure and avoid pain. In practice, these beliefs 
are often short-sighted or mistaken, leading us to imminent pleasure but 
unfortunate long-term consequences. Yet we may improve our chances for 
lasting felicity by careful deliberation on the potential consequences of desired 
objects or actions. During this process of deliberation, the mind will typically 
consider a whole range of beliefs about objects and their possible consequences. 
These beliefs do not arise spontaneously, nor are they purely determined by our 
physical constitution. As ideas in the imagination, desires are part of our mental 
discourse, and occur in reaction to preceding reflections – including those of 
practical deliberation. During this succession of beliefs about the consequences of 
actions or objects, the mind will reject all desires deemed unfavourable, and 
finally act upon the one passion that promises the most durable form of felicity. 
Consequently, desires and aversions are both the object and the product of active 
deliberation in which the mind judges the good or evil consequences of pursuing 
or avoiding objects in the imagination.  
Finally, this reading is further supported by Hobbes’s own explicit 
comparison between the use of reason in practical deliberation leading to the 
will, and the use of reason in search of scientific truths producing ‘judgment.’ 
Hobbes thus describes the process of reasoning about empirical objects as the 
alternation of ‘opinions’ – thoughts or hypotheses about the consequences of a 
certain object. During this mental discourse, the mind considers various opinions 
about the object imagined, using experience and/or reason to determine their 
validity. This process ends only when all but one opinion have been discarded as 
unfounded. Hobbes therefore states that ‘the last opinion in search of truth of 
past and future is called the Judgment.’110 Hobbes subsequently indicates that 
practical deliberation in fact proceeds through an analogous process, in which 
deliberated but restrained desires compare to opinions and the will to 
judgment.111 Thus in practical deliberation the mind experiences various desires 
and aversions by considering the possible good or evil consequences of an object 
or action. Like in the case of judgment of opinions, this deliberation ends when 
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all but one desire have been rejected as ultimately insufficiently favourable in its 
consequences. Hobbes therefore describes the will as nothing but ‘the last 
appetite in deliberating.’112 Hobbes’s own comparison between the process of 
reasoning about empirical objects and that of practical deliberation then provides 
additional – albeit circumstantial – evidence for our reading that reason is 
involved in the determination of the will. 
  
Normative Judgment 
Following this reappraisal of Hobbes’s account of desire and deliberation, we 
may now distinguish more precisely the role of reason in both determining our 
actions and producing normative conclusions. We have seen that practical 
deliberation is not just a blind alteration of desires, but a cognitive process in 
which the pleasurable or painful consequences of an object or action are 
weighed, ultimately giving rise to the will. As with purely descriptive mental 
discourse producing judgment, deliberation thus relies on an understanding of 
causal relations. We have seen in the first section that the understanding of the 
consequences of objects or actions depends in turn on either prudence derived 
from experience, or the ability to reason acquired with language. While 
deliberating with the help of prudence, both man and beast use their personal 
experience of particular objects to decide whether these objects and their 
consequences are desirable or not. Yet as we have seen, Hobbes thinks that 
prudence may only generate a limited understanding of causal relations. Only by 
using reason do we gain the ability to perceive and understand long chains of 
consequences attached to certain objects or actions. By learning a language and 
acquiring the ability for reasoning, human beings – as opposed to animals – 
therefore not only increase their understanding of causal relations in nature, 
giving rise to superior judgment. They also significantly enhance their ability to 
foresee the pleasurable or painful consequences of objects or actions. 
 Yet as practical deliberation is used to formulate the will, the same 
process is also responsible for normative judgment on the level of the individual. 
Hobbes can be classified as a moral subjectivist. This entails that he denies that 
there is some moral rule to be taken from the objects themselves, and that 
individuals diverge in their normative evaluation of objects and actions.113 
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Accordingly, Hobbes maintains that ‘whatsoever is the object of any man’s 
appetite or desire that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of 
his hate and aversion; evil.’114 This passage may seem puzzling at first, as it 
appears to suggest that our normative judgment is somehow determined by our 
passions. Yet in light of our interpretation of Hobbes’s account of practical 
deliberation, it is clear that this passage does not entail that our estimation of 
good and evil is simply the consequence of whatever passions we might have at 
any given moment. Instead, we have seen that passions are more akin to beliefs 
about the pleasurable of painful consequences of objects. And ideally we consider 
carefully the prospective consequences of objects or actions before acting upon 
the last desire of our deliberation, thereby producing the will.115 In short, when 
we call an object good or evil, this simply entails that we foresee that it will have 
either pleasurable or painful consequences. On the subjective level, methodical 
normative judgment is therefore nothing other than a careful deliberation about 
consequences of an object or action. Accordingly, we could classify Hobbes’s 
conception of normativity as consequentialist. 
 This interpretation of Hobbes’s conception of morality as 
consequentialist is corroborated by a brief philological digression in the 
Leviathan on the various meanings of the words ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ Hobbes 
explains that terms good and evil accommodate multiple significations not easily 
distinguished in English, but differentiated in Latin by three separate terms. 
Thus the word jucundum refers to the pleasurable effect of a certain object, while 
utile signifies that a certain object is good because it is a valuable means towards 
satisfying our desires. Furthermore, Hobbes points out that the Latin pulchrum is 
used to denote: ‘that which by some apparent signs promiseth good.’116 The word 
‘evil’ can be translated by a similar triad of terms: molestum for evil in effect, 
inutile for evil in the means, and turpe for the promise of evil. This digression 
then illustrates that Hobbes thinks that we do not consider an object good or evil 
without reason, but rather on the basis of our foresight of the consequences it 
has for us. Thus Hobbes’s discussion of the term pulchrum indicates that when 
we desire an object and therefore call it good, this signifies that we have reason 
to conclude that an object will have favourable consequences in the future. This 
                                                          
114 
Hobbes, Leviathan VI.7 p.28. Cf. De Homine VII.3 p.32. 
115 
Thus in De cive I.2 p.43 Hobbes describes the will as ‘that, which every one of those, who 
gather together, propounds for himself for good.’ 
116 
Hobbes, Leviathan VI.8 p.29 
 Normative Judgment 53 
 
 
again indicates that for Hobbes, normative judgment of objects or actions follows 
from the prediction of potential pleasurable or painful consequences in future. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore how our reading of 
Hobbes’s account of subjective normative judgment as consequentialist affects 
the interpretation of his theory of morality and natural law. For now, we should 
note that following our consequentialist reading, Hobbes’s conception of 
normative judgment could at the same time be described as a species of moral 
intellectualism. We have seen that our capacity for normative judgment – and 
thereby our ability to identify and pursue our long-term interests – is dependent 
on our respective ability to foresee relations of cause and effect in nature. As 
reason is an integral part of deliberation and normative judgment, any failure to 
identify and pursue our interests therefore cannot simply be attributed to 
misdirected passions. Rather, these failures follow from either defective or 
careless reasoning, failing to foresee the consequences of our desires and the 
means to achieve them. The corollary of this moral intellectualism is then that no 
individual does wrong willingly. In Hobbes’s case, this means that no person 
would voluntarily and knowingly harm her self-interest, but only following 
misguided reasoning about the consequences of actions. 
 
Reason and Sociability 
On the basis of this consequentialist and intellectualist understanding of 
Hobbes’s conception of practical deliberation and subjective normative judgment, 
we should now consider the question to what extent reason allows humans to 
achieve their ends and live together in society. In theory, normative judgment 
may be perfectly accurate as long as we deliberate carefully about all the 
prospective consequences of our actions. Yet if human beings would indeed have 
the ability to perceive their long-term interests through the rational 
understanding of the consequences of their actions, this raises the question why 
Hobbes is so pessimistic about the natural condition of mankind. If human beings 
have such a potent instrument for perceiving the consequences of their actions, 
why will they not naturally live in harmony among each other? In this respect, 
Hobbes departed significantly from both Aristotle and his immediate predecessor 
Grotius, who had argued that it was precisely our rational faculty that allowed 
humans to become social animals.117 By contrast, Hobbes maintains that some 
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species of animals lacking reason – including bees and ants – are indeed naturally 
social, but that human beings do not display sociability as a natural tendency.118 
In the first instance, human sociability is therefore not natural because it relies 
on the artificial faculty of reason. Yet Hobbes also thinks that by itself, the 
capacity for reasoning is not sufficient to transform human beings into truly 
sociable creatures.  
The most immediate reason why Hobbes thinks that human beings are 
not naturally sociable can be found in the fact that the normative judgment of 
individuals tends to diverge considerably. Hobbes thinks that this disagreement 
in normative judgment has two underlying causes in practical deliberation: 
 
And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend, not only to the 
procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life, and differ only in the way; 
which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions in divers men, and partly from the 





Hobbes’s thus maintains that while all human beings strive for felicity, they 
disagree both about what felicity entails concretely, and about the best means to 
achieve it. In the first instance, this disagreement is caused by a diversity in the 
passions, which is in turn the consequence of diverging predilections, as humans 
consider different consequences pleasurable or not. In line with his materialist 
ontology, Hobbes thinks that these variations in taste depend partially on 
education, and partially on corporeal factors, as differences in physical 
constitution and fluctuating bodily needs may render the same object pleasurable 
to some while abhorrent to others.120 Even if human beings would have an 
infallible understanding of causality, these differences in predilections would 
nonetheless ensure disagreement in subjective normative judgment. As 
variations in their physical constitution cause individuals to disagree about the 
things they find desirable, they will never be able to formulate a finis ultimus 
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that indicates the universal end of all human beings.121 Hobbes thereby rejects the 
possibility of a teleological morality of the Aristotelian kind.122  
Unlike naturally social animals, human beings thus have different 
desires, and therefore diverging interests.123 This property of human nature is 
sometimes considered the main cause for the conflicts of the state of nature, and 
consequently the primary reason why human beings are not naturally social. But 
this analysis is not an exhaustive explanation why humans are not naturally 
social beings. As Hobbes states in the passage quoted above, individuals also 
differ in their comprehension of causal relations, leading to dissenting opinions 
on how to achieve their ends. These differences will be particularly prevalent 
when human beings employ prudence – derived solely from their own personal 
experience – in deliberation, thereby exacerbating their normative disagreement 
even further. Yet as we have seen, Hobbes thinks humans are also capable of 
using reason in deliberation to better foresee the remote consequences of their 
actions. Presumably, this would enable them to conclude that it is in their 
collective interest to set aside their differences and see beyond their own 
particular views on good and evil. Accordingly, individuals would pursue their 
own desires to the extent that they do not harm the interests of others, thereby 
evading conflict and enabling them to live in harmony among each other. In 
other words, despite their conflicting views on good and evil, reason would allow 
human beings to become sociable after all. 
On the one hand, Hobbes agrees that this is indeed possible, as he states 
that despite the normative disagreement among individuals, ‘reason suggesteth 
convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These 
articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature.’124 These natural 
laws therefore collectively guide individuals towards a more harmonious 
existence in which the most violent conflicts of interest are neutralised, while 
individuals remain free to pursue their desires to the extent that they do not 
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harm others. Thus while Hobbes denies that human beings are naturally social, 
reason nonetheless enables us to perceive which kind of actions we should 
perform or forbear in order to end the conflicts of the state of nature and live in 
society with our neighbours.125 On the other hand, Hobbes is not at all optimistic 
that human beings will follow the laws of nature on their own initiative. 
Consequently, resolving the conflicts of the state of nature requires the erection 
of an all-powerful sovereign to keep all subjects in awe.126 This then raises the 
question why Hobbes thinks that despite man’s potential rationality, human 
beings nonetheless tend to disregard the rational guidelines of natural law. 
In line with our intellectualist reading, Hobbes’s pessimism – or realism 
– in this respect may be explained as the consequence of the shortcomings of 
reason. We have already seen that Hobbes concedes that it is not realistic to 
assume that human beings will always use their reason when deliberating – often 
they will just act on a whim. Yet even if human beings would always take care to 
reason about their actions, the erection of an all-powerful sovereign would still 
be necessary because human reason will never be infallible.127 Thus for all its 
perspicuity, reason will never allow us to foresee all possible consequences with 
complete accuracy.128 Furthermore, the fact that reason is an acquired rather 
than an innate faculty means that the ability to effectively apply reason in 
deliberation is dependent upon a hardly commonplace level of education. In 
addition, Hobbes concedes that even the mental reckoning of the most able 
reasoners is not immune to errors of computation.129 Finally, Hobbes recognises 
that while language is the medium that enables our reasoning, this same 
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instrument may also be used to lead us astray. Above we have already seen that 
Hobbes is concerned that metaphorical, absurd or rhetorical uses of language 
have the ability to sway our opinions regardless of the truth. The same uses of 
language may also be used to influence views about our interests.130 In other 
words, language greatly improves our capacity to foresee the good or evil 
consequences of things, but it also has the ability to deceive our judgment. This is 
one of the reasons why Hobbes thinks that the sovereign should have the right to 
police the opinions disseminated among its subjects.131  
These factors combined make that reason is far from an infallible guide 
in normative judgment or the pursuit of felicity. This would be problematic for 
individuals subsisting by themselves, but it is an even more serious issue for 
human beings living together. Not only do we lack certainty in our own 
normative judgment. We are also faced with the fact that in society, we cannot 
rely on others to foresee the consequences of their actions. This is especially 
precarious if the interests of these others conflict or overlap with those of 
ourselves. Hobbes illustrates this problem by positing a ‘fool, who hath said in his 
heart that there is no justice.’132 This fool has concluded that in certain situations, 
it would have beneficial consequences if he would break covenants made – 
thereby abusing the interests of others and breaking the third law of nature. 
Hobbes states that while this course of action may seem attractive to some, ‘this 
specious reasoning is nonetheless false.’133  
Although there is considerable scholarly debate on the precise 
interpretation of the reply to the fool, Hobbes appears to be saying that the fool 
does not realise that his transgression is likely to provoke retribution – both in 
society and the state of nature.134 The fool is thus not someone who cannot help 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan VIII.27 p.46-47; IV.13 p.19: ‘as men abound in copiousness of language, so 
they become more wise, or more mad, than ordinary.’ Cf. Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan XV.4 p.90. 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan XV.4 p.91. Cf. De cive II.1 ann. p.52-53: ‘the whole breach of the Lawes of 
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himself; whose action is caused by some overwhelming desire he cannot ignore. 
In addition, the fool does not deny that there is such a thing as justice. He knows 
that the breaking of covenant is a violation of a rule that would contribute to 
collective felicity if all agreed to adhere to it. His transgression is therefore not 
simply the product of moral depravity. Rather, the fool’s mistake consists in a 
failure to foresee that the temporary gain of his transgression will be offset by 
more remote negative consequences. In other words, the fool’s deliberation has 
made use of spurious or short-sighted reasoning.135 
Hobbes’s discussion of the fool indicates that the primary cause of the 
conflict of the state of nature is neither the inconsistency of the desires of 
individuals, nor the supposed subservience of reason to mindless passions. 
Rather, the ultimate cause of these conflicts is to be found in the shortcomings of 
human reason in practical deliberation. Hobbes’s fool illustrates that individuals 
cannot be counted on to accurately foresee the consequences of their actions and 
act in their own long-term interest. Consequently, persons in the state of nature, 
where conduct is not regulated by written laws enforced by a sovereign, can 
never be certain that the individuals they meet will deliberate to act according to 
the laws of nature.  This is then at least one of the underlying reasons why 
Hobbes describes relations between individuals in the state of nature as one of 
diffidence of one another.136 And in this state of diffidence, it will often be in our 
immediate self-interest to act in ways that harm the interests of others, thereby 
also endangering our own in the long. Due to man’s relative equality, this 
                                                                                                                                              
any situation. Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’ 75-76 maintains that Hobbes 
sees the violation of covenants as irrational because it could lead to the expulsion of the agent from 
civil society, exposing him to the inherently worse situation of the state of nature. Michael LeBuffe, 
‘Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool’ Philosophy Compass 2 (2007) 31-45 disagrees and finds Hobbes’s reply 
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individuals to overpower each other by force or cunning. Yet this factor would never be relevant 
but for the insufficiency of subjective reasoning to reconcile the desires of individuals by ensuring 
the collective obedience to the law of nature. 
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dynamic inevitably leads to a state of war. For Hobbes, the only way to overcome 
this situation is then by denying subjects the right to normative judgment on all 
but purely individual matters, and entrusting an all-powerful sovereign with 
both the interpretation and enforcement of justice.  
 
Natural Law 
We may now return to the question posed in at the beginning of this chapter, and 
explain how Hobbes thinks reason may deduce natural law. In the preceding 
sections, we have already seen that language greatly increases our understanding 
of causal relations in nature, thereby producing the capacity for reasoning. 
Subsequently, we discovered that reason plays an important role in practical 
deliberation, as it allows us to foresee the consequences of both desires and the 
means to satisfy them. By the same method, reason also participates in 
normative judgment – the subjective evaluation of the good or evil consequences 
of objects of actions. This normative judgment is self-interested – although not 
necessarily selfish – as it seeks to attain pleasurable and avoid painful 
consequences.137 Yet we have also seen that this normative judgment is both 
fallible in predicting the consequences of actions, and varies among individuals 
due to diverging predilections and differences in experience and education. These 
properties of subjective normative judgment are the fundamental reason why 
human beings are not naturally social, and often come into conflict with each 
other.  
In response, Hobbes outlines a set of natural laws that prescribe how 
human beings may live together despite their conflicts of interest and fallible 
judgment of consequences. These natural laws prescribe how human beings may 
best pursue their self-interest in the company of others who seek to do the same. 
As in the case of subjective normative judgment, the reasoning producing natural 
law relies on a grasp of the consequences found in nature. Yet because natural 
laws do not merely provide moral guidance for solitary beings, but rather for life 
in society, the rational deduction of natural law also requires an understanding of 
the causal relations governing the behaviour of the human beings themselves. 
This is then the reason why Hobbes’s deduction of natural law follows from a 
detailed investigation of human nature, outlining both man’s intellectual 
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capacities and his overall needs and desires. On the basis of this understanding of 
human nature, Hobbes first identifies which kinds of desires are most amenable 
to human society, and secondly the means by which these desires can be satisfied 
most effectively. The role of reason in deducing natural law is therefore similar 
to its function in practical deliberation – it weighs desires in view of their 
consequences, and finds the means to the things desired.138 
In Hobbes’s own deduction of natural law, this scrutiny of the various 
desires and fears commonly found in human beings occurs in chapter XI of the 
Leviathan, just before the description of the state of nature. Hobbes begins by 
stating that humans not only have diverging passions, but also that they will 
never find complete repose from them. Subsequently, he maintains that these 
various passions incline humans to desire power in order to attain their various 
desires. Hobbes then describes how the resulting ‘competition of riches, honour, 
command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war.’139 
According to Hobbes, this desire for power is thus one of the main causes of the 
conflicts that characterise the state of nature. Yet Hobbes also describes which 
kinds of desires are liable to incline human beings towards a sociable life in 
obedience to the sovereign: 
 
Desire of ease and sensual delight disposeth men to obey a common power, because 
by such desires a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own 





Although Hobbes states elsewhere that ’the desires and other passions of man 
are in themselves no sin,’ this apparently does not entail that we should not 
judge desires by their consequences.141 Hobbes here clearly identifies which 
passions contribute to the conflicts of the state of nature, and are therefore 
ultimately undesirable, and which desires cause humans to accept a social 
existence under the rule of a sovereign. 
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This is why Hobbes, Leviathan XIII.13 p.78 states that: ‘And thus much for the ill condition 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan XI.3 p.58. 
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 Hobbes, Leviathan XIII.10 p.77. 
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 Subsequently, Hobbes’s account of the state of nature provides a more 
concrete illustration of the consequences of the various passions inherent in man. 
Here again we find that besides diffidence, the main causes of war in the state of 
nature are the desire for glory as well as competition for power.142 But after 
describing the horrible consequences of pursuing these desires, Hobbes then 
outlines the method for escaping this state of war: 
 
And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in, 
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in 
his reason. The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such 





This passage again suggests that on the basis of his rational investigation of 
human nature, Hobbes makes an implicit normative evaluation of the various 
passions prevalent in man. Employing a method similar to that used in practical 
deliberation, Hobbes has weighed the desires and aversions inherent in human 
nature in view of their consequences, and has concluded that the desire for 
commodious living, as well as fear of death, are to take precedence above most 
other passions – simply because these desires are ultimately more likely to have 
pleasurable consequences.144 
 After drawing this conclusion, Hobbes promptly continues with his 
deduction of the right of nature, which allows one to do anything in pursuit of 
self-preservation, as well as the law of nature, which forbids anything that 
endangers our life or the means of preserving it. The natural laws themselves are 
then moral guidelines that establish a peaceful settlement of the conflicts of the 
state of nature, thereby safeguarding the preservation all individuals living in 
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society. Yet in the Leviathan, we find no clear explanation why only the desire for 
self-preservation – or fear of death – is fundamental to both the right and law of 
nature, while other sociable desires such as for a commodious living or for 
knowledge, appear to be no longer relevant. Some interpreters have therefore 
suggested that self-preservation does not just to refer to bare survival, but also 
includes the ulterior pursuit of convenience.145 Others have maintained that self-
preservation should simply be conceived as the means towards the satisfaction of 
all other desires.146 
 Following our own interpretation of Hobbes’s account of practical 
deliberation, we may also provide an alternative explanation for the normative 
primacy of self-preservation over all other desires. We have seen that due to 
differences in experience and inclinations, individuals generally have diverging 
desires and fears. Accordingly, even sociable passions like the desire for 
knowledge and ease of living are not universally present among human beings, 
as not everyone will understand the favourable consequences of pursuing these 
passions. Yet Hobbes thinks that everyone will be able to foresee the 
consequences of death, and will therefore strive for their own self-
preservation.147 This universal fear of death is then the reason why the desire for 
self-preservation takes normative precedence above all other ends. Consequently, 
man always retains the natural right to defend his life when it is threatened – 
simply because it is always in his interest.148 More importantly, the fact that all 
human beings recognise the consequences of death is the most likely reason why 
Hobbes constructed his formulation of natural law upon the universally 
prevalent desire for self-preservation. As the need for self-preservation is evident 
to all, the precepts of natural law will be recognisable to all individuals who 
would consult their reason. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have interpreted Hobbes’s theory of normative judgment by 
reconstructing his account of the way in which human beings employ their 
reason to perceive morality and natural law. We have begun our discussion by 
investigating Hobbes’s conception of reason, devoting particular attention to the 
role of language in the development of this faculty. Meanwhile, we have 
considered and ultimately dismissed the interpretation of John Deigh, who has 
claimed that as Hobbes thinks that reason is developed only by means of 
language, he must also have thought that normative reasoning producing natural 
law is determined by the conventions of language. Subsequently, we have 
discussed the interpretations of Gert and Darwall, who claim that Hobbes’s 
account of reason by means of language solely describes the process of reasoning 
concerning empirical objects. As they assume that Hobbes would not have 
violated the distinction between facts and values, Gert and Darwall claim that 
Hobbes’s account of reason by means of language cannot account for normative 
reasoning. Accordingly, they each provide an interpretation that ascribes to 
Hobbes the notion that normative reason proceeds from some innate faculty or 
property. We have not only shown that this interpretation is insufficiently 
supported by textual evidence, but also relies on the unsubstantiated assumption 
that Hobbes respected the is/ought dichotomy. 
 In our search for Hobbes’s theory of normative reasoning, we have 
subsequently investigated his account of practical deliberation, which describes 
the mechanism by which human beings deliberate their actions and formulate 
their will. At the same time, we have considered the common interpretation that 
ascribes to Hobbes the view that all human thoughts and actions are the 
consequence of the passions, while the sole purpose of reason is to find the 
means towards the satisfaction of our desires. Accordingly, this reading considers 
Hobbesian natural law as nothing more than a prudential rule that indicates the 
most effective means towards felicity, conceived as the sustained satisfaction of 
whatever passions we might experience. Our own reading of Hobbes’s account of 
practical deliberation has then shown that reason is not merely an instrumental 
faculty that finds means to ends, but in fact plays a crucial role in scrutinising 
desires and the formulation of the will by foreseeing the consequences of actions 
considered in deliberation. We have then shown that Hobbes’s account of 
practical deliberation thereby also functions as an account of subjective 
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normative judgment, as it demonstrates the way individuals may evaluate an 
object or action by foreseeing its consequences.  
 Subsequently, we have seen that this consequentialist reading of 
Hobbes’s theory of normative judgment also has repercussions for our 
interpretation of his conception of natural law. We have started our investigation 
with the question why Hobbes thinks that the desire for self-preservation should 
provide the basis for his conception of natural law. The most common 
explanation has been that Hobbes thinks that self-preservation is the 
prerequisite, and therefore the necessary means, to felicity. Yet our own 
interpretation has shown that reason is not merely instrumental to finding the 
means to ends, but also involved in determining which ends are worth pursuing. 
Accordingly, we have explained that Hobbes did not consider self-preservation as 
the goal of natural law merely because it is a means to felicity. Rather, following 
an investigation of human nature, Hobbes came to the conclusion that regardless 
of the diversity of passions among individuals, every sane person will have 
reason to fear death. Consequently, every person who would consult their reason 
would recognise the necessity of adhering to the laws of nature that provide the 
means towards self-preservation. 
 Finally, supplementing the textual evidence that presented above, we 
may provide an additional argument why our interpretation provides a more 
convincing reading of Hobbes’s moral epistemology. As we have seen, the most 
common interpretation of Hobbes’s account of practical deliberation concludes 
that humans are motivated by mindless and diverging passions, while the role of 
reason is restricted to finding the means to these desires. This interpretation 
therefore ascribes to Hobbes a rather pessimistic view of human nature, as these 
diverging passions will inevitably lead to conflicts that can only be resolved by 
subjecting to an all-powerful sovereign. Yet according to our own reading, 
Hobbes does not suppose that the ends of human beings are simply 
predetermined by passions following from their material constitution. Rather, 
Hobbes maintains that humans may employ their ability to reason about 
consequences in order to determine which ends are worth pursuing. Our reading 
thereby ascribes to Hobbes a somewhat less pessimistic and arguably more 
realistic view of human nature, which recognises that our actions are not simply  
determined by passions, but that humans are able to provide reasons for the ends 
they choose to pursue. 
 










2. In Search for New Foundations: The Moral Epistemology of 
John Locke’s Essay 
 
Introduction 
Like Thomas Hobbes before him, John Locke claims that human beings may 
perceive morality including natural law by means of reasoning. In the Two 
Treatises of Government, Locke in fact shows so much confidence in the power of 
reason that he thinks that even in the state of nature, human beings would 
largely abide by the laws of nature.149 Yet in the Two Treatises themselves, Locke 
does not explain the precise method by which human beings may employ their 
reason to discern natural law. For an answer to this question, we must turn to 
Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, which is often primarily read as 
a treatise on epistemology, but also contains extensive discussions that touch 
upon ethical questions.150 In fact, Locke himself states that he was motivated to 
write the Essay following discussions among friends about morality and revealed 
religion.151 As the primary statement of Locke's theory of epistemology, the Essay 
thus not only explains how humans may acquire scientific knowledge, but also 
aims to outline a method for moral judgment. In this chapter, we will therefore 
study the Essay in order to reconstruct how Locke thinks that human beings 
should use their reason to grasp the universal morality of natural law. 
 Locke’s approach to epistemology assumes that the question how to 
acquire true knowledge may be answered by revealing the mechanism by which 
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human beings collect knowledge in the first place.152 The first step of Locke’s 
methodology is therefore to uncover the ways in which human beings acquire 
ideas – the building blocks of their thoughts – and to trace the various means by 
which the mind may relate these ideas to produce knowledge. This account of 
human understanding would then also imply the correct method by which 
reason would be able to produce true knowledge. This approach provides Locke 
with a reasonably convincing account of the method by which human beings 
should acquire knowledge of empirical reality. Locke seeks to employ the same 
approach in order to explain how humans may grasp morality and natural law by 
means of reasoning. Thus Locke first describes how the mind acquires moral 
concepts, subsequently outlining the process by which reasoning with these 
concepts may produce normative conclusions. 
 Yet we will discover that Locke's theory of normative reasoning lacks the 
credibility of his account of the origin of empirical knowledge. Not only will we 
encounter several objections voiced by contemporaries, including Berkeley and 
Hume, against his account of moral reasoning. Modern scholars have also found 
it challenging to construct a coherent interpretation of Locke’s moral 
epistemology. Nonetheless, in our subsequent discussion we will encounter a 
number of readings that have attempted to reconcile the paradoxes of Locke's 
moral philosophy. Yet our own investigation will proceed from the assumption 
that a valuable interpretation does not necessarily require an entirely coherent 
reconstruction of Locke’s moral epistemology.153 The interpretation proposed in 
this chapter will thus reconstruct Locke’s account of moral epistemology as much 
as is warranted by textual evidence, but will not attempt to tie up all loose ends. 
Instead of an entirely coherent reconstruction, our interpretation will thus rather 
present a diagnosis of some of the inconsistencies and fissures of Locke’s account 
of normative reasoning. 
 As Locke’s account of moral reasoning is an integral part of his broader 
theory of human understanding, we will begin our discussion with a general 
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overview of his epistemology. This examination of Locke's theories on the origin 
of ideas and the properties of reason may appear more detailed than strictly 
necessary for our present concerns. Yet this overview will also serve as a point of 
reference for our discussions in later chapters, as we will see that Condillac, 
Helvétius, and Rousseau were all building upon Locke’s theory of human 
understanding. After this overview, we will proceed with our investigation into 
Locke’s moral epistemology by examining Locke’s views on the origin of the 
moral concepts that comprise normative reasoning. Yet as we will find that 
Locke’s account is hardly straightforward, we will discuss three scholarly 
interpretations that attempt a coherent reconstruction. The first of these ascribes 
to Locke the view that the composition of moral notions is derived from the 
conventional signification of moral terminology. A second line of interpretation 
claims that Locke assumed that human beings are endowed with an innate 
faculty of normative reason which allows them to grasp natural law. Finally, a 
third reading presents Locke as a consequentialist, who would maintain that 
natural law is nothing but a prudential rule that indicates the most effective 
means towards the satisfaction of the passions. While our own interpretation will 
approximate this consequentialist reading, we will conclude that it is not feasible 
to provide a coherent reconstruction of Locke’s moral epistemology that does 
justice to all of his philosophical commitments and preconceptions. 
 
The Origin of Ideas 
John Locke’s philosophy is predicated upon the fundamental thesis that all ideas 
in the mind can ultimately be traced back to experience – either in the form of 
sensation or reflection. In the previous chapter, we have seen that Hobbes had 
likewise accepted this premise. Yet whereas the position plays a relatively 
unassuming role in Hobbes’s thought, Locke makes the sensory origin of ideas 
one of the central messages of his philosophy. Locke’s emphasis on this position 
is mainly caused by his preoccupation with repudiating the theory of innate ideas 
– the notion, suggested by many Cartesian and some Scholastic philosophers that 
certain ideas are naturally present in the mind and do not need to be acquired.154 
                                                          
154
 It is beyond our present purposes to explore the concept of innate ideas in any detail. John 
Yolton, Locke and the Way of Ideas (Bristol 1993 [1957]) 30-47; Samuel Rickless, ‘Locke’s Polemic 
against Nativism’, in: Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding” (Cambridge 2007) 33-66, 35-43 both provide an overview of the targets of 
Locke’s argument. 
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At least according to Locke’s interpretation, many of these philosophers held that 
such fundamental ideas as the notion of God or the basic rules of morality could 
or need not be acquired from experience, but were present – or at least 
potentially present – in the human mind at birth, having been placed there by 
God.155 In the first book of the Essay, Locke is then mainly concerned with 
developing various arguments against the notion of innate ideas.156 
 While the details of these arguments need not concern us here, it is 
important to note that Locke also opposed the theory of innate ideas for moral 
reasons. The idea that morality had been inscribed on the mind by God himself, 
made it possible to claim that some morals were simply natural to man – and 
therefore self-evident and beyond question. This theory could then be employed 
to claim that certain moral conventions prevalent in society are beyond rational 
scrutiny because they are innate. Locke – who was an opponent of this kind of 
dogmatism – strongly dismissed this claim, stating that ‘there cannot any one 
moral Rule be propos’d whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason: which 
would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or so much as self-
evident.’157 Locke thereby posited that no moral conventions or precepts should 
be exempt from rational scrutiny.158 At the same time, Locke thereby dismisses 
the notion that moral judgment is some kind of intuitive perception of self-
evident truths.159 Rather, Locke states that ‘moral Principles require Reasoning 
and Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind, to discover the certainty of their 
Truth.’160 
As Locke denies that any of the ideas we employ in reasoning – including 
normative reasoning – are either innate or self-evident, he needs to provide an 
alternative account of how human beings acquire or construct both their ideas of 
empirical objects and moral concepts. At the foundation of this account is Locke’s 
famous axiom that all ideas of the understanding derive from either sense-
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perception or reflection. Thus through sense-perception, the understanding will 
acquire ideas representing the objects of empirical reality, while reflection 
furnishes us with ideas of the operations of the mind. It is important to note that 
when Locke uses the term ‘reflection,’ he does not refer to what is commonly 
understood as reflection – some form introspective reasoning. Instead, for Locke 
‘reflection’ is merely the passive perception of operation of the mind itself, which 
provides us with our ideas about operations like willing, judging or reasoning.161 
Through sense-perception and reflection, the mind is supplied with so-called 
simple ideas – singular impressions from individual objects or phenomena.162 
Examples include the ideas of colour, sound or taste, which are simple in the 
sense that they are the most fundamental units of thought, cannot be grasped by 
any linguistic definition, but solely acquired through experience.163 
These simple ideas may subsequently be combined by the understanding 
to form several types of complex ideas that transcend the level of immediate 
experience and enable more advanced operations of the mind. According to 
Locke, all thought and cognition operates through ideas and concepts constructed 
from the simple sense impressions derived from the experience of either 
empirical reality or perception of the operations of the mind: 
 
Even the most abstruse Ideas, how remote soever they may seem from Sense, or from 
any operation of our own Minds, are yet only such, as the Understanding frames to it 
self, by repeating and joining together Ideas, that it had either from Objects of Sense, 
or from its own operations about them: So that even those large and abstract Ideas 
are derived from Sensation, or Reflection, being no other than what the Mind, by 
ordinary use of its own Faculties, employed about Ideas, received from Objects of 





Locke’s insistence ‘that even those large and abstract Ideas are derived from 
Sensation’ has sometimes been taken out of context and interpreted as claiming 
that like simple ideas, complex ideas are simply acquired wholesale through 
sensation. This interpretation has been supported by Locke’s somewhat 
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unfortunate adoption of the metaphor describing the mind as a tabula rasa – a 
blank slate. According to this reductionist interpretation, Locke sees the mind as 
a purely passive and receptive faculty that receives both its simple and complex 
ideas through sensation. Accordingly, the only real activity of the mind would be 
to reason with, and reflect on, the ideas it has already acquired through 
sensation.165 Among those who interpreted Locke in this reductionist manner 
were some of the French philosophes of the eighteenth century. As we shall see in 
our discussion of Helvétius, their particular interpretation or adaptation of 
Locke’s epistemology had important consequences for their conceptions of 
human nature. 
 Yet this interpretation fundamentally misunderstands Locke’s theory. 
Thus Locke maintains that the understanding does not simply receive complex 
ideas, but needs to actively construct them. To be sure, in the subsequent section 
on the role of language in cognition, we will see that Locke envisions that 
complex ideas – and particularly moral concepts – may be learned from others 
through the medium of speech.166 But at the same time, Locke maintains that the 
complex ideas that constitute our reasoning may also be constructed 
autonomously. The precise method of this construction varies for different types 
of ideas. Locke makes a strict distinction between complex ideas of substances, 
ideas of modes, and of relations. The first category contains ideas representing 
empirical objects acquired through sensation and/or reflection, such as a chair, 
tree or man. The second type of ideas of modes is not derived immediately from 
experience, but rather constructed by the mind at will from the simple ideas 
acquired through sensation or reflection. Ideas of modes allow for reasoning in 
two realms of knowledge not dependent on empirical investigation but 
nonetheless relevant to our daily lives: morality and mathematics. The ideas of 
the final category of relations indicate connections between singular complex 
ideas of either modes or substances. As this last category of ideas is not relevant 
to our purposes, we will limit our present discussion to complex ideas of 
substances and of modes, which we will now investigate in turn.167  
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 As we have seen, complex ideas represent objects of empirical reality. 
They are constructed when the mind combines simple ideas customarily received 
in conjunction into a complex idea of an object: 
 
We come to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such 
Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and Observation of Men’s Senses 
taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the 




Thus when we think or speak of a ‘horse,’ ‘table’ or ‘cloud,’ we evoke a complex 
idea that unites the simple ideas of sight, touch, smell, hearing, etc. previously 
acquired conjointly in experience into a single mental construct. For instance, the 
complex idea of a ‘horse’ is constructed by the understanding out the of simple 
ideas of the colour, shape, solidity, smell and sound previously experienced in 
objects classified as ‘horses.’ That the mind is not merely passive in the 
construction of these kinds of complex ideas, but in fact is actively involved in 
their assembly, is illustrated by the fact that the understanding even has the 
capacity to combine simple ideas into new and even fantastical combinations. 
This explains our ability to conjure up both new inventions as well as fictional 
beings such as unicorns.169 
 As he claims that complex ideas are not simply received through 
sensation but rather actively constructed, Locke implies the existence of an 
autonomous faculty of the mind that operates independent from the immediate 
stimuli of sensation. Indeed, throughout the Essay, we find mentions of the 
ability of the mind to actively inspect, relate, compose, and decompose its ideas. 
Yet while Locke describes at length the origin and properties of ideas, he declines 
to reveal the source or characteristics of the autonomous faculty that seems to 
have such a crucial role in his account of human understanding. Rather, it 
appears that Locke simply assumes – albeit tacitly – the presence of this 
autonomous perceiving and assenting faculty of the mind. Accordingly, modern 
critics of empiricism including Richard Rorty have pointed out that as Locke’s 
account of human understanding tacitly relies on this ‘ghostly entity’, his 
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epistemology ultimately eludes its goal of describing how the mind may 
transform sensations into knowledge representative of empirical reality.170 Yet 
for our present purposes it is more important to note that Locke’s ambiguity on 
the issue was also recognised by some of his early-modern readers, including 
Condillac. Thus in our next chapter we will see that Condillac sought to remedy 
the deficiency in Locke’s theory by devising an empiricist account of human 
understanding that no longer required any autonomous faculty of the mind. 
Conversely, in our final chapter, we will see that Rousseau adopts many elements 
of Locke’s theory of human understanding, but not without making explicit the 
premise that human reason relies on an autonomous faculty of judgment – albeit 
without further explaining the origin or properties of this faculty. 
 Despite the apparent active involvement of the mind in the composition 
of its ideas, Locke’s credo that all ideas in the mind come from sensation or 
reflection entails that our comprehension and acquaintance of objects of 
empirical reality will never go beyond what we are able to sense about them. As 
is also evident from the passage quoted above, Locke assumes that the sensible 
qualities we perceive in an object are the consequence of an ‘unknown essence.’ 
Inspired by his friend Robert Boyle, Locke envisions that physical objects consist 
of corpuscles – or atoms, as they would nowadays be called – of which the 
properties and organisation are responsible for the sensible properties of the 
objects they comprise.171 But the actual nature of this corpuscularian essence – 
usually referred to as an object’s ‘real essence’ – will necessarily remain hidden 
from us, as it will only reveal itself indirectly through sensible qualities.172 This 
position that the real essences of substances are beyond our comprehension is 
generally referred to as Locke’s doctrine of ‘essence agnosticism.’  
It is important to note that Locke’s essence agnosticism diverges 
distinctly from the position of many of his contemporaries or predecessors – 
Scholastics and Cartesians alike. Many of these thinkers maintained that humans 
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have the ability to grasp the real essences of substances, if only they use the 
correct methods of investigation.173 Thus Locke’s contemporary critic John 
Sergeant maintained that ‘The impressions from objects that affect the senses, 
and by them the soul, do carry the very nature of those objects along with them. 
As a consequence, individuals have the ability to mould their ideas and concepts 
to represent the species and genera present in nature.’174 As these thinkers 
assume that human beings are able to understand the true nature of the objects 
of empirical reality, they envision that we can also acquire demonstrative and 
certain knowledge of these objects.175 
 Conversely, Locke’s doctrine of essence agnosticism rules out this 
possibility. As we are unable to ascertain the real essences of objects, our 
complex ideas of substances solely unite the sensible properties of objects into 
what Locke refers to as a ‘nominal essence.’176 But because sensory perception is 
inherently subjective, individuals are prone to frame more or less diverging 
nominal essences of objects. Of course, humans have a similar physical 
constitution and possess the same sensory organs, and they will not perceive 
objects in radically different ways. The nominal essences of ideas of substances 
will thus tend to display at least superficial correspondence among individuals.177 
Nonetheless, Locke thinks that there is still considerable latitude for variation: 
 
But however, these Species of Substances pass well enough in ordinary Conversation, 
it is plain, that this complex Idea, wherein they observe several Individuals to agree, 
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Consciously or unconsciously, people will thus construct their nominal essences 
of objects in more or less diverging ways. Through observation or empirical 
investigation nominal essences may be refined, but they will never be determined 
definitively by being made correspondent with real essences – simply because the 
latter are inaccessible.179  
 Locke’s position on the elusiveness of the real essences of substances also 
limits our ability to gain certain knowledge of empirical reality. Our limitation to 
the nominal essences of substances means that we may be able to document the 
action and operation of substances on the basis of our experiences of them, but 
we will never be able to truly understand the mechanism responsible for these 
experiences. Because of this inability to grasp the inner functioning of nature, 
Locke thinks that certain and indisputable knowledge of empirical reality will 
necessarily remain beyond our grasp. Reasoning with ideas of substances will 
therefore not proceed beyond the status of probability. This does not mean that 
investigation of empirical reality is fruitless – the resulting probabilistic 
knowledge generally proves to be very useful and may be regarded as true until 
proven otherwise.180 Locke merely wishes to emphasise that because of our 
limitation to sensible qualities and ignorance of real essences, our knowledge of 
substances simply cannot attain the standard of absolute certainty that Sergeant 
and many scholastics presumed possible.  
 Locke’s essence agnosticism and resulting conclusion that all knowledge 
of empirical reality is probable at most may appear to lead to a form of 
distressing scepticism. But Locke is careful to provide a theological explanation 
for the limitation of man’s cognitive abilities. Thus while human beings cannot 
gain demonstrative knowledge of empirical objects, this is not at all problematic, 
as God has ensured that man’s cognitive abilities are not only sufficient, but even 
calibrated to the requirements of life on earth.181 Locke therefore claims that the 
primary purpose of the understanding is not the full comprehension of the 
natural world, but rather to know how humans should govern their actions: 
  
Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct. If 
we can find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which 
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Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions 





In fact, Locke maintains that a neglect of man’s intellectual limitations is prone to 
induce unrestrained investigations, producing nothing but trivial disputes and 
unfounded theories, ultimately leading to scepticism rather than knowledge.183 
Although this does not entail that we should ignore the pursuit of the natural 
sciences, Locke thinks that we should be satisfied with probable knowledge of 
empirical reality.  
At the same time, Locke suggests in the passage quoted above that God 
has equipped man’s intellectual faculties with the ability to know how one should 
govern his actions. In other words, God has ensured that human beings are able 
to acquire knowledge of morality. And in contrast to empirical science, this 
knowledge of morality is capable of demonstrative certainty. Locke does not 
solely support this position by referring to Divine intentions. He also presents 
several additional reasons why human beings have the ability to gain 
demonstrative knowledge of morality. At the most fundamental level, his reason 
is that normative reasoning is conducted through so-called ideas of modes which 
do not depend on our experience of empirical reality. This type of ideas 
constitutes or enables two distinct fields of inquiry – mathematics and ethics. As 
the discussion of mathematics is beyond the scope of our current investigation, 
we will focus on the so-called mixed modes that comprise normative reasoning. 
Locke himself describes ideas of modes as: 
 
such complex Ideas, which however compounded, contain not in them the 
supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, or 
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Like complex ideas of substances, ideas of modes are constructed by the mind on 
the basis of simple ideas. But whereas ideas of substances are collections of 
simple ideas habitually associated with specific objects, modes are concepts freely 
created by the mind independent from experience.185 Locke refers to moral ideas 
specifically as ‘mixed-modes’ – signifying the fact that while these concepts are 
archetypes freely constructed by the mind and do not refer to any concrete 
object, they are nonetheless assembled from ideas acquired through sensation or 
reflection and may be projected upon the objects of empirical reality.186 Thus 
complex ideas such as ‘property,’ ‘citizen,’ ‘father,’ ‘justice’ or ‘murder’ do not 
have any essential existence in empirical reality. They are concepts designed by 
the mind and rather projected upon reality. Concepts like property and murder 
may be identified by us in the events and objects we encounter, but these 
concepts correspond to no particular empirical objects and have no real existence 
outside the realm of thought and language. 
  
Moral Demonstration 
Locke thus maintains that mixed modes are ‘the Workmanship of the Mind’ and 
may be constructed by individuals at will.187 Yet he thinks that reasoning with 
these moral concepts may nonetheless yield useful and concrete knowledge about 
morality. This process of reasoning involves a comparison and relating of ideas 
to each other, whereby ‘Reason perceives the necessary, and indubitable 
connexion of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in each step of any 
Demonstration that produces Knowledge.’188 By diligently applying our reason to 
the consideration of mixed modes, Locke thinks that we may understand 
morality with demonstrative certainty: 
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Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks. For the Ideas that 
Ethicks are conversant about, being all real Essences, and such as, I imagine, have a 
discoverable connexion and agreement one with another; so far as we can find their 
Habitudes and Relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general 
Truths: and I doubt not, but if a right method were taken, a great part of Morality 
might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering Man, no 
more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt the Truth of Propositions in 




According to Locke, the reason why human beings may gain certain knowledge 
of morality is not merely that God intends us to do so. His main argument is that 
moral reasoning employs ideas of modes of which we may grasp the real essence. 
Unlike ideas of substances, moral and mathematical concepts are human 
constructions not tied to any external object with an unknowable real essence.190 
Accordingly, we are able to grasp the real essences of modes simply because – 
unlike with ideas of substances – real essence and nominal essence coincide.191 
Consequently, reason has the ability to perceive connections between moral 
concepts with complete accuracy, leading to knowledge of demonstrative 
certainty. 
 Following his theory of moral reasoning, Locke provides a few examples 
of how moral reasoning functions in practice. The first example of a moral 
demonstration Locke considers ‘as certain as any demonstration in Euclid,’ is the 
proposition that ‘where there is no property, there is no injustice.’192 Locke 
asserts that the concept of property means the tenancy of exclusive rights to a 
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certain thing, while injustice entails the infringements of these rights. 
Consequently, when property rights are abolished or absent, they can no longer 
be infringed, making injustice inconceivable. Locke’s second example works in a 
similar way when he states that ‘no government allows absolute liberty.’193 Here 
the reasoning is that the restriction of liberties through laws is inherent in the 
concept of government. Any government that would allow absolute liberty would 
therefore be inconceivable. Locke suggests that through the diligent application 
and further extension of these kinds of demonstrations one could construct a 
veritable system of moral science.194  
 Yet it is not certain that this claim stands up to scrutiny. Both 
contemporary and modern commentators have reacted with scepticism to 
Locke’s claim for the possibility of a moral science based on demonstrations like 
the examples he provides – and for several good reasons.195 First of all, it is not 
entirely certain whether the two deductions Locke provides as examples actually 
produce any new knowledge. Thus when Locke maintains that there is no 
injustice without property, he is merely stating a conclusion that is already 
contained within the concepts themselves. His deductions therefore tell us 
something about the terms involved, but do not produce any further knowledge. 
In Kantian terms, Locke’s deductions may be seen as analytic rather than 
synthetic. This becomes even more conspicuous if we restate Locke’s deductions 
as propositions. Thus the first example could be rephrased as ‘injustice is the 
infringement of property,’ while the second deduction could simply be read as 
‘government restricts liberty.’ Following David Hume, modern commentators 
have noted that these reformulations suggest that Locke’s supposed 
demonstrations are in fact little more than explications of terms.196 Because they 
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do not yield any knowledge beyond that contained in the terms employed, it is 
hard to imagine how demonstrations like those of Locke’s examples could lead to 
a concrete science of morals.197 This judgment was shared by Locke’s 
contemporary George Berkeley, who in reaction to Locke’s ethics quipped that to 
‘demonstrate Morality it seems one need only make a Dictionary of Words and 
see which included which. This is the greatest part and bulk of the work.’198 
As Locke’s theory indicates that moral reasoning is conducted by 
comparing and connecting mixed modes, this means that the outcome of 
demonstrations is determined by the composition of the moral concepts involved. 
Consequently, it seems that the fundamental and decisive part of normative 
judgment is not demonstration, but rather the composition of the moral concepts 
it involves. At first glance, Locke’s account of moral demonstration suggests that 
he might have underestimated the fact that the composition of moral concepts is 
neither self-evident nor uncontested.199 In order to provide a complete theory of 
moral reasoning, Locke would thus have to specify the method by which human 
beings may accurately compose their mixed modes. We have already seen that as 
modes, moral concepts are not derived from any objects of experience. Rather 
they may be constructed by the mind at will. This suggests that persons are free 
to construct their mixed modes in any way they please, leading to diverging 
results in moral reasoning. Yet we have seen that Locke considers morality 
capable of demonstration – suggesting that morality is dependent on a standard 
independent from individual perspectives or preferences. In order to understand 
how Locke considers morality capable of demonstration, we need investigate in 
greater detail the method by which Locke thinks individuals acquire or compose 
the moral concepts they employ in their reasoning. In the following, we will then 
first see that in Locke’s theory, moral concepts are dependent on language, as 
                                                                                                                                              
This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition.’ Cf. Hume, Enquiry concerning 
the Principles of Morals ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford 1998) appendix I.ii §11 p.86. 
197
 Leibniz also hints at this point when he states in the New Essays IV.iii p.385 that Locke’s 
second demonstration ‘belongs among the corollaries, i.e. the propositions which have only to be 
brought to one’s attention [for their truth to be recognized].’ 
198
 Quoted in: Catherine Wilson, ‘The Moral Epistemology of Locke’s Essay’, in: Newman (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” 381-405, 397. Cf. 
Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy 151n. 
199
 Wilson, ‘The Moral Epistemology of Locke’s Essay’, 397 also makes this point. Yet in Essay 
III.ix.7 p.478 Locke does display some awareness of the contested nature of moral notions, although 
he seems to be mainly concerned with the contested nature of moral terms. 
82  2. Locke  
 
 
mixed modes cannot exist without the use of corresponding moral terms with a 
certain conventional signification. Subsequently, we will turn to the question 
how moral concepts may be composed independent from the conventions of 
language in order to produce the universal morality of natural law. 
 
The Signification of Moral Terms 
Thus far, our discussion has focused on Locke’s classification of ideas in the 
minds of individuals and the particular roles of ideas in various types of 
reasoning. Yet while Locke never tires to emphasise that the contents of the mind 
may always be traced back to experience, he recognises – although belatedly, by 
his own admission – that language also plays an important role in the way 
human beings frame their ideas.200 According to Locke, language then has three 
main functions. On the one hand, human beings use words with a definition 
circumscribed by conventions of common use to communicate their ideas to each 
other. Yet on the other hand, Locke thinks that words also have an important 
role in cognition as structural aids in the composition of ideas – in particular in 
the case of mixed modes. Locke therefore suggests that moral concepts and 
moral terms mutually depend upon each other. Thirdly, Locke thinks that by the 
use of words, it is possible to acquire complex ideas from others, independent 
from our own experience.201 Consequently, there are some grounds to ascribe 
Locke the view that individuals often derive the composition of their mixed 
modes from the conventional signification of moral terms. But before we may 
turn to this issue of the relationship between language and morality, we must 
first understand some of the most important premises of Locke’s philosophy of 
language. We will therefore begin by reviewing Locke’s theory of signification, 
and subsequently consider how linguistic conventions enable communication. 
Only then will we be in the position to determine the extent to which the 
composition of moral concepts is dependent upon the words to denote them in 
common conversation. 
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 The fundamental – and arguably the most distinctive – claim of Locke’s 
philosophy of language is that ‘Words in their primary or immediate 
Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses 
them.’202 Thus when a language user utters or comprehends a word, the meaning 
of this word is determined by a corresponding idea in his or her mind. According 
to Locke this means that words do not immediately signify the empirical objects 
we encounter in experience. He maintains that words do not stand for things, but 
only for the ideas of things that we have framed in our mind. This position 
follows partly from Locke’s essence agnosticism – the view that the real essences 
of substances will always remain beyond human comprehension. Locke then 
argues that words cannot possibly signify anything of which we cannot have an 
idea: 
 
Till he has some Ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the 
Conceptions of another Man; nor can he use any Signs for them: For thus they would 
be the Signs of he knows not what, which is in Truth to be the Signs of nothing. But 
when he represents to himself other Men’s Ideas, by some of his own, is he consent to 
give them the same Names, that other Men do, ‘tis still to his own Ideas; to Ideas that 




Thus when we speak about an empirical object, we only refer to the nominal 
essence the mind has constructed from our own personal experience of the 
object. This nominal essence contained in the idea is of course itself a 
representation of an object. Therefore we may ascribe Locke the view that while 
words immediately signify ideas, they mediately signify objects of which the 
immediately signified ideas are representations.204 
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The precise consequences of Locke’s account of signification emerge only 
when we contrast it with other contemporary theories. Locke diverges most 
notably from the realist position of Aristotelianism. Scholastic and other realist 
early-modern philosophers claimed that human beings do have the ability to 
ascertain the real essences of objects. Accordingly, realist philosophers held that 
particular terms signify both an idea in the mind as well as the real essence of the 
empirical object from which the idea is an exact representation. In addition, these 
realist philosophers generally maintained that natural objects themselves are 
ordered into distinct species and genera. By perceiving these categories of objects, 
human beings have the ability to order their ideas in correspondence with the 
classes of objects that exist in nature. Consequently, realist philosophers also 
thought that universal terms referred both to the species and genera present in 
nature, as well as to ideas of these forms present in the mind.205 Following this 
theory of signification, realist thinkers held that in theory, language could 
function as a flawless method of communication, when the real essences of 
objects and relations of signification would be illuminated and settled in the 
minds of all.206 
 As Locke renounces the notion that nature is ordered into clearly 
distinguishable species and genera, and rather claims the real essences of objects 
are inaccessible to human understanding, he considers this kind of realism as 
unfounded.207 Consequently, he maintains that it is misguided to presume that 
words stand for anything but ideas in our own mind.208 Yet Locke’s own theory 
of signification has not been without its critics. Their main objection is that while 
Locke’s theory describes how the understanding assigns meaning to words, it has 
difficulty explaining how language can also be used successfully in 
communication. The main issue is that because words immediately signify solely 
ideas in the minds of individuals, it is hard to see how they could serve as a 
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means to transfer our precise thoughts to each other. Thus according to Locke’s 
theory, when a speaker utters a term, a listener will assign meaning to this word 
by means of an idea present in her own mind, rather than an idea in the mind of 
the speaker. Because the ideas language users attach to a term need not 
necessarily correspond, they will often attach diverging significations to the 
words they use in communication. By itself, Locke’s theory of signification 
therefore suggests that individuals all have different views on the meaning of 
words, and thereby effectively speak a private language that would preclude the 
possibility of accurate communication.209 
  This conclusion is particularly disconcerting in the case of moral terms. 
We have seen that following his essence agnosticism, Locke thinks that 
individuals often construct diverging ideas of empirical objects. Nonetheless, the 
correspondence of our sense-organs and similarity in our experience of empirical 
reality causes at least a superficial measure of conformity in ideas of substances 
among individuals. Consequently, the signification of terms denoting empirical 
objects would show only a limited extent of divergence among individuals.210 Yet 
as ‘assemblages of Ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind,’ ideas of modes 
are not based on any models in nature, and would therefore appear to lack an 
independent standard by which they could be constructed. Locke therefore 
maintains that the names of mixed modes are often ‘very various and doubtful.’211 
The worry that individuals retain private notions of the meaning of words is 
therefore especially pertinent to moral language. 
 
Common Use and the Meaning of Words 
The signification of words denoting substances thus derives some superficial 
degree of uniformity from the fact that objects occasion similar sensations in all 
individuals. Yet Locke identifies a second way in which the signification of terms 
– both of substances and of modes – receives a degree of conformity sufficient to 
facilitate communication among individuals. Locke recognises that while terms 
immediately signify nothing but ideas in the understanding of individuals, the 
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meaning of words is also governed or at least circumscribed by linguistic 
conventions:  
For words, especially of Languages already framed, being no Man’s private 
possession, but the common measure of Commerce and Communication, ‘tis not for 





Thus in principle, individuals are free to construe the signification of words in a 
more or less idiosyncratic way. But in order to be understood, interlocutors will 
have to accommodate the usage of their terms at least roughly to some pre-
existing and socially established conventional meanings. Due to this requirement, 
individuals are forced, and will often try, to reconcile the signification of their 
words to the standards of common use.  
 Apart from the uniformity of the senses and similarities in experience, 
the necessity to conform to certain linguistic conventions is then an important 
factor in generating conformity in the signification of terms among individuals. 
According to Martin Lenz, this role of common use in Locke’s philosophy of 
language is in fact sufficient to nullify the objection that if words immediately 
signify ideas this entails that individuals each speak a private language. Lenz 
maintains that the standards of common use are stringent and precise enough to 
alleviate or even dissolve the most serious of the sceptical consequences drawn 
by some interpreters of Locke’s theory of signification. While Lenz thereby 
removes an important objection to Locke’s philosophy of language, he does so by 
interpreting it as a social externalist theory. This means that Lenz ascribes Locke 
the position that the meaning of words – and thereby the composition of our 
ideas – is determined to a significant extent by shared linguistic conventions. 
Lenz therefore ascribes to Locke the view that our thoughts are at least partly 
determined by the constitution of our language.213 
Lenz is certainly correct to point out that conventions of common use 
play a crucial role in enabling communication by circumscribing the signification 
of words among language users. But it is not clear that an appeal to linguistic 
convention can entirely dissolve the objection that Locke’s theory of signification 
leads to a conception of language as a private construction. In fact, Locke himself 
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warns that linguistic conventions can only provide limited stability and accuracy 
to the signification of words: 
 
‘Tis true, common Use, that is the Rule of Propriety, may be supposed here to afford 
some aid, to settle the signification of Language; and it cannot be denied, but that in 
some measure it does. Common use regulates the meaning of Words pretty well for 
common Conversation; but no body having an Authority to establish the precise 
signification of Words, nor determine to what Ideas any one shall annex them, 




Thus while Locke thinks that common use is sufficient to facilitate everyday 
conversation, linguistic conventions lack the required precision and accuracy for 
philosophical discussion – which according to Locke’s terminology would also 
include discussion on topics of empirical science. Locke’s first reason for this 
position is that the conventions of common use have generally been established 
in times and by people ignorant of science and philosophy.215 These flawed 
conventions of language are tenacious, as they are socially constructed and 
cannot be amended or changed by an individual without the consent of others.216 
The conventions of common use are therefore permeated with remnants of the 
ignorance and prejudices of earlier ages.217 We will see below that Condillac 
concluded from this suggestion that scientific and moral progress required the 
wholesale reform of the conventions of language – a conclusion not drawn by 
Locke himself. 
A second reason why common use is an insufficient regulator of the 
meaning of words is that its conventions are not only often inaccurate, but also 
‘doubtful and uncertain.’ In particular in the case of very complex ideas, such as 
universal ideas of substances or moral concepts, the conventions of language are 
not sufficiently settled and circumscribed to ensure successful communication 
and preclude the possibility that speakers misunderstand each other because they 
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attach different ideas to the same terms.218 Despite the role of linguistic 
conventions in regulating the signification of words among individuals in 
everyday conversation, the objection that speakers may use a private language 
therefore remains applicable to scientific and philosophical discussions. 
Ultimately, the standard of common use is thus insufficient to entirely negate the 
sceptical consequences of Locke’s thesis that words immediately signify nothing 
but ideas in the mind. In fact, Locke himself seems to think that despite linguistic 
conventions, language nonetheless remains an imperfect method of 
communication – especially concerning morality.219  
 
Words and Ideas 
The social externalist reading proposed by Lenz is thus not entirely able to 
invalidate the private language objection levelled at Locke’s theory of 
signification. But Lenz also claims that for Locke, the conventional signification of 
words determines or at least influences the composition of our ideas. There is at 
least one significant reason why at first glance, this reading might make sense. 
Like Hobbes, Locke thinks that language plays an important role in cognition as 
words are indispensible to the composition and classification of complex ideas. 
But while Locke agrees with Hobbes that there is a close relationship between 
words and complex ideas, he diverges from his predecessor in at least one 
significant respect. In the previous chapter, we have seen that Hobbes maintains 
that abstract and universal ideas are by themselves inconceivable, and that 
abstractions and universals only exist in the mind in the form of words with a 
certain reference specified by a definition.220 By contrast, Locke does think that 
humans may construct abstract or universal ideas by compounding particular 
ideas and isolating them from their circumstances – a view that would later be 
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criticised as unintelligible by Berkeley.221 In contrast to Hobbes, Locke therefore 
thinks universal and abstract terms signify a complex idea in the mind – an 
abstracted mental image. While Hobbes’s theory can be described as a form of 
nominalism, Locke’s position may rather be considered as conceptualism.222 
 Although Locke thinks that ideas and words are separate entities, he does 
recognise that in the case of abstract or general ideas, the former generally 
depend upon the latter.223 Thus Locke thinks that words have an important 
cognitive function in structuring, delineating and preserving complex ideas:  
 
He that has complex Ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better 





Although Locke does not spell it out, this passage suggests that words function as 
cognitive labels that aid the understanding in memorising and retrieving 
compounded ideas. According to Lenz, this means that for Locke, the mind 
cannot retain or process complex ideas of both substances and modes without 
the use of words. Upon this reading, words and ideas would therefore mutually 
depend upon each other, with words acquiring their signification from ideas, 
while ideas rely on words for their stability and accessibility to the 
understanding. Consequently, Lenz maintains that the composition of ideas is 
influenced or determined by the conventional signification of the words upon 
which these ideas depend.225 
 On the basis of the passage quoted above, Lenz’ interpretation might 
seem appealing. But a closer inspection of Locke’s Essay reveals that at least one 
aspect of Lenz’ reading that discerns a mutual dependency of words and ideas 
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has to be amended. It turns out that Locke never explicitly discusses the function 
of words for complex ideas of substances, while he does provide a comprehensive 
account of the structural function and necessity of terms in the composition and 
retention of mixed modes. Locke thus states explicitly that without moral terms, 
the mind would not be able to retain the mixed modes used in moral reasoning: 
 
The near relation that there is between Species, Essences, and their general Names, at 
least in mixed Modes, will farther appear, when we consider, that it is the Name that 
seems to preserve those Essences, and give them their lasting duration. For the 
connexion between the loose parts of those complex Ideas, being made by the Mind, 
this union, which has no particular foundation in Nature, would cease again, were 
there not something that did, as it were, hold it together, and keep the parts from 
scattering. Though therefore it be the Mind that makes the Collection, ‘tis the Name 




Because the mixed modes of morality are not modelled on concrete objects in 
empirical reality, but entirely ‘the Workmanship of the Mind,’ they depend 
exclusively on words for stability.227 Locke therefore suggests that in the case of 
mixed modes, the structural function of words is so important that without 
terminology, it is in fact impossible to retain moral concepts.228 This conclusion is 
also supported by Locke’s insistence that without words for numbers – which 
also classify as ideas of modes – humans are unable to count.229 In addition, 
Locke maintains that the usual method of learning ideas of mixed modes is by the 
explication of the terms that stand for them.230 
 Locke thus clearly states that moral terms and mixed modes are mutually 
dependent. But does the fact that words have a structural role in the retention of 
ideas entail that the conventional signification of these words also influences or 
determines the composition of moral concepts? Considering this question in a 
recent paper, Benjamin Hill has maintained that there are indeed good reasons to 
ascribe this view to Locke. Thus some passages in the Essay suggest that Locke 
thinks that individuals model their moral concepts on the conventional 
signification of words: 
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That the abstract Ideas of mixed Modes, being Men’s voluntary Combinations of such 
a precise Collection of simple Ideas; and so the Essence of each Species, being made 
by Men alone, whereof we have no other sensible Standard, existing any where, but 
the Name it self, or the definition of that Name: We have nothing else to refer these 
our Ideas of mixed Modes to as a Standard, to which we would conform them, but the 
Ideas of those, who are thought to use those Names in their most proper 





In this passage, Locke seems to claim that as mixed modes do not depend on any 
standard accessible to experience, their composition is derived from the 
conventional signification of the moral terms on which they depend. At the same 
time, Hill recognises that this single passage is not overwhelming textual 
evidence for this position, indicating either that Locke had not entirely made up 
his mind or found the issue not important enough to take a definite stance.232 
  Yet Hill nonetheless maintains that it makes sense to ascribe to Locke the 
view that the composition of mixed modes is determined or at least influenced by 
the conventional signification of moral terms. Hill argues that in order to 
function as moral concepts within Locke’s epistemology, mixed modes would 
have to be composed in identical or at least similar ways by all members of a 
community. As collective norms of behaviour, morality only functions when 
everyone in society understands it in a similar way. And because the mixed 
modes of morality do not depend on any models in nature, it appears that the 
conventions of common use are the only standard by which individuals could 
effectively coordinate the composition of their moral concepts – and thereby their 
moral outlook. Upon this reading, the linguistic conventions specifying the 
signification of moral terms are thus indispensible to the actual function of the 
moral guidelines that enable sociability. Hill’s interpretation thereby specifies 
what Locke means when he refers to language as ’the great Instrument and 
common Tye of Society.’233 
 Nonetheless, Hill’s interpretation faces at least two objections. First of all, 
we have seen that Locke claims that the conventions of common use are neither 
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accurate nor precise. As mixed modes are not accessible to experience, this 
applies in particular to the conventional signification of moral terms.234 Thus 
even if Locke thought that in practice the conventions of common use influence 
or determine the way we compose our moral concepts, he would have considered 
this an undesirable reality. And indeed, Locke urges his readers not to think 
merely with words, but rather to consider the ideas signified by them.235 
Secondly, in isolation, the view that the composition of mixed modes constitutive 
of moral reasoning depends on the conventional signification of terms would 
lead Locke towards a position of moral conventionalism. Unless the standard of 
common use exemplifies the universal morality of natural law the resulting 
conception of morality would be merely conventional. Although a singular 
interpretation has recently ascribed Locke a position of moral conventionalism, 
we will see below that this reading completely disregards Locke’s belief in the 
existence of natural law – a universal morality decreed by God himself.236  
 Ultimately, Locke’s remarks on the relationship between language and 
morality are not precise enough to draw any definitive conclusions. Thus Locke 
clearly suggests that moral concepts are regularly acquired through language. In 
addition, the conventional signification of moral concepts often functions as a 
standard for the composition of mixed modes to individuals. At the same time, 
Locke is not explicit on the extent of the influence of language on morality. Even 
though in practice we often acquire moral concepts through language, Locke 
suggests that we could – and, in light of the imprecision of linguistic convention, 
in fact we should – compose our mixed modes independent from the 
conventional signification of moral terms in order to arrive at a conception of 
natural law. In the following chapter, we will see that while Condillac borrowed 
much of his own philosophy of language from Locke, he took a more definitive 
                                                          
234
 Locke, Essay II.xxxii.12 p.388. 
235
 Locke, Essay IV.v.4 p.575: ‘Some confused or obscure Notions have served their turns; and 
many who talk very much of Religion and Conscience, of church and Faith, of Power and Right, of 
Obstruction  and Humours, Melancholy and  Choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their 
Thoughts and Meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the Things themselves, and 
lay by those Words, with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves.’ 
236
 Samuel Zinaich Jr., John Locke’s Moral Revolution: From Natural Law to Moral Relativism 
(Lanham 2006) claims that when Locke declared that morality is capable of demonstration, he 
merely claimed that it would be demonstrable within a firmly established system of moral 
conventions. This interpretation of Locke as a moral relativist is shared by no other important 
commentator. For Locke’s own view on moral convention, cf. Essay I.iii.21-22 p.81-82, where he 
describes the emergence of prejudice among moral conventions. 
 Words and Ideas 93 
 
 
stance on this issue, concluding that the composition of our ideas, including those 
of morality, is inextricably tied to the conventions of language.  
Despite some of the ambiguity in his position, Locke nonetheless makes 
an important contribution on the issue of the relation between language and 
morality. Ever since Aristotle, it had been commonplace for moral philosophers 
to associate man’s propensity for sociability and morality with his capacity for 
language.237 Locke’s reflections on words explain even more thoroughly than 
Hobbes had done how this association between language and morality functions 
in practice. Thus Locke details how the use of words is necessary for the 
composition and transmission of moral concepts – and therefore for morality 
itself. In addition, Locke explains how the standard of common use requires 
individuals to compose their moral concepts in similar ways, thereby imparting a 
measure of agreement in their moral concepts. Finally, Locke’s theory of 
signification also clarifies why despite the unifying role of common use, language 
necessarily remains an imperfect method of communication – especially in moral 
matters. Even though Locke not always reaches a definite conclusion on these 
issues, his discussion provided the impetus for many subsequent early-modern 
debates on language and its role in cognition and morality – of which a few will 
feature in subsequent chapters. Some scholars have therefore presented Locke’s 
philosophy as the first linguistic turn in modern philosophy – and not entirely 
without reason.238 
 
Mixed Modes and the Rule of Right 
In the preceding, we have interpreted Locke as claiming that by reasoning with 
mixed modes, human beings may demonstrate morality, thereby ascertaining a 
conception of natural law. First we noted that by taking Locke’s account at face 
value, these demonstrations turn out to be nothing more than the explication of 
moral concepts, yielding no more than is already contained in the definitions of 
moral terms. We therefore supposed that to understand how Locke thinks these 
demonstrations could yield veritable insight into morality – and in particular the 
morality of natural law – we would need to identify the method by which mixed 
modes are constructed. Subsequently, we saw that there are some grounds to 
ascribe Locke the view that the composition of mixed modes is determined or at 
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least influenced by the conventional meaning of moral terms. Yet we concluded 
that while Locke’s own statements on the issue are not conclusive, he suggests 
that even if words and their conventional meanings often influence our moral 
reasoning, this is ultimately not an ideal practice. In order to ascertain the 
universal morality of natural law, we should rather turn to a universal moral 
standard decreed by God. In the following, we will first inspect Locke’s 
statements on the role of this moral standard in normative reasoning. 
Subsequently we will consider several interpretations on the question of how 
Locke thinks this standard may be ascertained. 
In the passages on moral demonstration discussed above, Locke gives the 
impression that a conception of morality can be established by relating or 
comparing mixed modes to each other. Consequently, Locke seems to claim that 
the outcome of moral demonstration is dependent on the composition of these 
mixed modes themselves. Yet elsewhere in the Essay, Locke presents an 
alternative account of normative reasoning. In a chapter called Moral Relations, 
Locke seems to suggest that by themselves, mixed modes are morally neutral 
concepts that only acquire normative significance when compared with an 
already established rule of right:239 
 
But this is not all that concerns our Actions; it is not enough to have determined Ideas 
of them, and to know what Names belong to such and such Combinations of Ideas. 
We have a farther and greater Concernment, and that is, to know whether such 




Subsequently, Locke contends that the morality of these actions may be 
determined by establishing ‘the Conformity, or Disagreement, Men’s voluntary 
Actions have to a Rule.’241 In view of these passages, we might conclude that after 
all, Locke did not think that mixed modes by themselves constitute morality.242 
Instead, mixed modes are nothing more than archetypes that should be 
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compared to an external rule to determine their normativity. Moral 
demonstration would then turn out to be more akin to judicial procedure – the 
meticulous comparison of moral concepts to an already established law. 
Locke subsequently discusses three types of moral rule by which the 
normativity of mixed modes may be established: the civil law, the rule of opinion, 
and the natural law decreed by God. Of these three moral guidelines, the first 
two are merely conventional and can only indicate conformity of actions to the 
laws or moral customs of a particular society. Locke maintains that ‘The only 
true touchstone of moral Rectitude’ is contained in the natural law decreed by 
our Creator.243 This universal morality is a direct consequence of God’s will, and 
indicates the intentions He has for mankind. Yet in the chapter Moral Relations, 
Locke does not explain how this natural law decreed by God may be ascertained. 
Of course God’s intentions may be inferred through revelation. But Locke does 
not suppose that morality is solely discernable through the interpretation of 
scripture. As we have seen, he clearly thinks that natural law is also accessible to 
human reason. Above we have also seen that in other passages, Locke appears to 
claim that the absolute morality of natural law could be established through 
moral demonstrations with mixed modes. Yet in his discussion on moral 
relations, he rather suggests that reasoning with mixed modes only yields 
normative conclusions in reference to an already established rule. But if moral 
demonstrations with mixed modes by itself cannot produce knowledge of natural 
law, how is this universal moral guideline to be established?  
This question has puzzled both modern scholars and Locke’s early 
modern readers. Taking Locke’s account of the foundations of morality at face 
value, David Hume accuses his predecessor of presenting a circular theory, as the 
normativity of mixed modes depends on a rule, while this rule itself is apparently 
constituted by reasoning with moral concepts.244 Some modern scholars are 
inclined to agree with Hume that Locke’s moral epistemology ultimately rests 
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upon unstable or unclear foundations.245 Others have attempted to clarify Locke’s 
meaning and identify the basis for natural law by placing his account of moral 
demonstration in a broader context. In the scholarship of the past decades, two 
main lines of interpretation have emerged that attempt to salvage, explain and 
justify Locke’s project of a demonstrative moral science by identifying an exterior 
standard that would lend normativity to moral concepts and demonstrations. 
The first line of interpretation claims that Locke considers human nature as the 
fundamental standard of morality, while the second presents Locke’s moral 
philosophy as ultimately a form of consequentialism. In the following, we will 
investigate these lines of interpretation, starting with the view that Locke derives 
morality from a substantive conception of human nature, subsequently reviewing 
a consequentialist reading. 
 
Human Nature as a Normative Standard 
The first line of interpretation claims that in Locke’s theory, the universal 
morality of natural law would have to be derived from certain substantial and 
general characteristics of human nature. This view is advanced by Hans Aarsleff, 
but argued most extensively by John Colman.246 He suggests that we should turn 
to Locke’s account of the state of nature in the Two Treatises of Government, 
which aim to provide concrete political solutions to the problems of the state of 
nature to understand how we might correctly compose moral concepts.247 
According to Colman, Locke’s method for the definition of moral concepts would 
be a kind of conjectural history. This enquiry would establish man’s character, 
needs and desires in the state of nature, and on the basis of these traits 
determine the proper moral concepts for natural man, stripped from all the 
particularities and conventions of society. These ‘natural’ moral concepts that 
concur with human nature could then be used in demonstrations to deduce 
natural morality.248 Colman thereby ascribes to Locke’s a method of moral 
epistemology somewhat similar to that of Hobbes.  
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Yet we may identify several objections to this interpretative approach. To 
begin with, it is doubtful whether Locke thinks that human nature actually has 
any universal character, desires, needs, or aims. Rather, Locke notes that 
individuals have widely diverging predilections, and consequently take pleasure 
in different kinds of experiences and activities. This disparity in aims and 
inclinations would preclude any attempt of defining a specific moral guideline 
that would lead individuals to a circumscribed notion of happiness. Accordingly, 
Locke agrees with his predecessor Hobbes that there is no such thing as a 
summum bonum, a universal notion of the Good, derived from a substantive 
conception of human nature, towards which all humans should strive to become 
virtuous and happy.249 As Locke maintains that humans have widely diverging 
aims and desires, he thinks that they also disagree on what constitutes felicity. 
Locke therefore states that individual happiness is not attained by any specific 
aims or pursuits, but rather simply by the durable satisfaction of any desires we 
might have and the consequent achievement of pleasure.250 
In response to this objection, Peter Schouls has maintained that despite 
Locke’s rejection of the notion of a summum bonum, his account of human 
nature may nonetheless provide a solid foundation for natural law.251 Schouls 
points out that Locke states that human beings are not only characterised by a 
desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, but also by free will and a capacity for 
reasoning.252 According to Schouls, these fundamental properties of human 
nature would provide sufficient basis to construct a concrete theory of 
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morality.253 Yet while Locke certainly considers these properties intrinsic to 
human nature, it is difficult to see how this narrow conception of human nature 
could in fact lead to any concrete normative conclusions. It may lead us to the 
conclusions that to act morally is to pursue our desires in a rational way. Yet 
beyond this conclusion, Locke’s narrow conception of human nature tells us 
nothing about the question what it is to be rational – or by extension, what it is 
to be moral. Thus while Schouls provides a sensible interpretation of Locke’s 
conception of human nature, it is puzzling why he assumes that this conception 
could provide the basis for any substantial normative theory. 
Yet the most potent objection to the interpretations of Colman, Aarsleff, 
and Schouls originates in Locke’s epistemology. Above we have seen that Locke 
claims that human understanding is unable to penetrate the real essences of 
empirical objects. By contrast, Locke envisions that in the case of ideas of mixed 
modes, we do have the ability to grasp both nominal and real essences. This is 
the reason why we are able to arrive at knowledge as incontestable as 
mathematics through moral demonstration. As any attempt to formulate a 
conception of human nature is based on empirical observation, the resulting 
conception will be a complex idea of substance. The inability to grasp the 
essences of empirical objects therefore also extends to any investigation of 
human nature. If we would nonetheless establish our moral reasoning on the 
basis of an empirically constituted conception of human nature, the desired 
certainty of our deductions will be compromised due to our inability to know the 
real essence of substances. Just as we cannot use empirical investigation to 
formulate exact solutions to mathematical problems also conducted by means of 
ideas of modes, reasoning with ideas of substances cannot provide any 
completely certain or accurate answers to ethical questions. 
Indeed, Locke himself explicitly warns against using ideas of substances 
in moral reasoning. When defending his claim for the possibility of a moral 
science as certain as mathematics, Locke states: 
 
Nor let any one object, that the names of Substances are often to be made use of in 
Morality, as well as those of Modes, from which will arise Obscurity. For as to 
Substances, when concerned in moral Discourses, their divers Natures are not so 
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much enquir’d into, as supposed; v.g. when we say that Man is subject to Law: We 
mean nothing by Man, but a corporeal rational Creature: What the real Essence or 




In this passage, Locke explicitly states that the concept of ‘man’ to be used in 
moral demonstrations should not be a complex idea of substance that attempts – 
but will inevitably fail – to describe the essence of human nature. The idea of 
man to be used in moral deductions is a mixed mode – an archetype constructed 
by the mind independent from the facts of empirical reality.255 For Locke, this 
archetype comprehends nothing more than the properties he attributes to 
human nature in the Essay: rationality, free will, and desire for pleasure and 
aversion to pain. And as we have seen above, these properties of human nature 
provide an insufficient basis for any substantial normative conclusions. 
 Ultimately, Locke’s dichotomy between ideas of substances and ideas of 
modes is the most compelling reason why he cannot derive natural law from a 
conception of human nature. As we have seen, Locke’s taxonomy of ideas 
classifies moral concepts together with mathematical notions as ideas of modes 
which are constructed by the mind at will. As mixed modes do not depend on any 
unknown real essences but are rather the mind’s own constructions, Locke 
thinks that the mind has full insight into the composition and relations of these 
moral concepts it has itself created. This is then the main reason why Locke is 
convinced that like mathematics, reasoning with moral concepts is capable of 
achieving demonstrative certainty. Yet we have seen that by itself, Locke’s 
account of mixed modes as ideas created by the mind would suggest that moral 
concepts are simply conventional. Furthermore, we have seen that Locke’s own 
examples of moral demonstrations with mixed modes are ultimately nothing 
more than analytic explications of terms. To avoid the conclusion that mixed 
modes are either conventional or vacuous, Locke thus requires an external 
normative standard in which moral concepts could be modelled. Colman, 
Aarsleff, and Schouls, maintain that a conception of human nature would be able 
to function as this external normative standard. Yet we have seen that in the 
Essay, Locke himself prohibits this approach, as the introduction of a substantial 
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conception of human nature, which is a complex idea of substance based on an 
unknown essence, into moral demonstrations would abrogate their 
demonstrative certainty. The interpretations of Colman, Aarsleff, and Schouls, 
therefore disregard Locke’s distinction between ideas of substances and of 
modes.  
Our combined investigation of Locke’s epistemology and ethics has 
thereby also shown that the dichotomy between ideas of substances and of 
modes prohibits Locke from employing the approach, employed by Hobbes 
among others, of constructing a theory of natural law on the basis of a 
conception of human nature derived from empirical observation. As this 
dichotomy between ideas of substances and of modes precludes deriving 
normative conclusions from empirical facts, Locke thereby anticipates Hume’s 
law that prohibits inferring values from facts.256 Of course, unlike Hume, Locke 
does not develop this particular consequence of this dichotomy of ideas into an 
explicit formulation of the is/ought distinction. In fact, the interpretations by 
Colman, Aarsleff, and Schouls, illustrate that this dichotomy between facts and 
values is hardly a conspicuous element of Locke’s epistemology. Nonetheless, our 
investigation of Locke’s moral epistemology has shown that before Hume, Locke 
already arrived at the position that values cannot be derived from empirical facts. 
This is perhaps not surprising, as the is/ought dichotomy has been almost 
universally accepted among modern moral philosophers – at least among those 
working within the empiricist tradition and its successor of analytic 
philosophy.257 Following Hume’s law, these thinkers then attempt to identify 
basis of normativity that does not rely on any empirical facts. Yet in the 
remainder of this chapter, we will discover that Locke does not yet succeed in 
identifying a clear alternative source of normativity. 
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From Hedonism to Moral Consequentialism 
Apart from the reading that Locke aimed to derive morality from a conception of 
human nature, a second major line of interpretation presents Locke’s account of 
human motivation as the source of normativity in his moral epistemology. Like 
Hobbes before him, Locke maintains that all human actions and thoughts are 
ultimately motivated by the desire for pleasure and aversion of pain. A person 
without desires or aversions would lack any impetus for thought or action, 
thereby being reduced to a state of lethargy.258 More importantly, Locke also 
follows Hobbes in his claim that on the level of the individual subject, the 
perception of good and evil is the consequence of our assessment of the 
propensity of things to cause pleasure or pain in us: 
 
Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain. That we call Good, 
which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; or else to procure, 
or preserve us the possession of any other Good, or absence of any Evil. And on the 
contrary we name that Evil, which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish 




Locke thereby clearly adopts a hedonistic position that, from the perspective of 
the individual at least, equates good to pleasurable and evil to painful 
experiences. Consequently, Locke maintains that ‘Happiness then in its full extent 
is the utmost Pleasure we are capable of, and Misery the utmost Pain.’260  
Like Hobbes, Locke suggests that this happiness is may be pursued by 
carefully deliberating our actions.261 According to Locke, we may evaluate our 
passions by trying to foresee the good or evil consequences of pursuing the 
objects of our desires. This ability to foresee the consequences of our actions in 
turn relies on our knowledge and capacity for reasoning.262 Locke thereby 
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appears to arrive at a theory of subjective normative judgment that resembles 
that the account of Hobbes we have encountered above in that it is both 
consequentialist and intellectualist. In view of Locke’s hedonist conception of the 
Good and resulting consequentialism, some interpreters have therefore proposed 
that for Locke, the main purpose of morality is ultimately to facilitate individuals 
in their aim for happiness, conceived as the maximisation of pleasure. These 
scholars thereby interpret Locke as ultimately a consequentialist or proto-
utilitarian thinker.263 This interpretation is not only supported by Locke’s 
hedonism and consequentialism, but has the added benefit that it does violate the 
dichotomy between facts and values that follows from Locke’s epistemology.264  
Nonetheless, this reading faces the difficulty that it is not as easily 
reconciled with Locke’s adherence to the notion of morality as a natural law 
decreed by God. Locke not only believes that natural law has a Divine origin, but 
also that we are punished or rewarded for our obedience to God’s law of nature 
in life after death.265 For Locke, these Divine retributions and rewards are in line 
with his hedonistic presupposition – they are nothing more than the ultimate 
instances of pleasure and pain following our actions in life.266 But Locke’s belief 
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in Divine judgment also entails that the pleasures and pains of this life are only 
secondary to those experienced in the afterlife. Therefore the most important 
goal of morality is not merely to direct us to happiness in this life. While it does 
not necessarily exclude enjoyment of life on earth, natural law primarily serves 
to guide us towards pleasure in the eternal afterlife. Yet this raises questions 
about how the content of this natural law decreed by God may be ascertained. Is 
the pursuit of happiness in this life a reliable means of securing salvation in the 
afterlife? In other words, is the natural law decreed by God synonymous with a 
prudential rule that indicates the most durable and effective means of satisfying 
our desires during life on earth? Or does Locke think that salvation requires 
virtues other than the prudential pursuit of our desires? 
Finding an answer to these questions is further complicated by the fact 
that Locke is generally interpreted as retaining a so-called voluntarist conception 
of natural law.267 This voluntarism entails that for Locke natural law is a direct 
product of God’s will, has an independent existence, and no necessary relation to 
the nature of things. Locke’s position can be contrasted with that of 
intellectualists like Grotius or Leibniz, who held that natural law is a rational rule 
that can be derived from the nature of things or ascertained with the help of an 
innate and intuitive faculty or reason.268 While they believed that God was 
ultimately responsible for this rational rule simply because He had created the 
universe, the intellectualists denied that natural law is a separate moral decree 
that God has imposed on an otherwise morally neutral universe.269 On the basis 
of this position, Grotius famously stated that even if God would not exist, the 
precepts of natural law would still remain true because they are grounded in the 
nature of things rather than Divine will.270 But for Locke, this position is 
unacceptable – and not only because it obviates God’s role to natural law. Even if 
there would be a rational rule inherent in the nature of things, our epistemic 
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limitations would make it inaccessible to us, as we are unable to know the real 
essences of substances. Consequently, our inability to grasp the true nature of 
things would make it impossible to use it as a basis for the definition an 
unquestionable moral guideline.271 This reading of Locke’s voluntarism therefore 
suggests that the natural law decreed by God need not be reflected in any 
properties of empirical reality. Like other voluntarist conceptions of natural law, 
Locke’s theory therefore faces the objection that if morality is solely the 
consequence of God’s will, it is not clear how human beings could ascertain the 
content of this law.272 Accordingly, it becomes even more doubtful whether 
happiness in this life is a reliable indicator of the Divine decree that is enforced 
by the rewards and punishments of the afterlife. 
Scholars in favour of a consequentialist reading of Locke’s ethics have 
proposed several ways to neutralise this objection. Thus Leo Strauss has simply 
claimed that the inconsistencies that result from Locke’s adoption of both 
hedonism and voluntarism ‘are so obvious that they could not have escaped the 
notice of a man of his rank and sobriety.’273 According to Strauss, Locke’s claim 
that natural law is a Divine decree is insincere and merely intended to make his 
controversial hedonist doctrine palatable to his contemporaries by retaining the 
theological status of morality. A more promising line of interpretation that aims 
to resolve the tension between Locke’s hedonism and his voluntarism is proposed 
by Israelsen and Tuckness among others, who maintain that while Locke indeed 
considered natural law a divine decree, his voluntarism does not necessarily 
entail that God could have devised natural law arbitrarily or independent from 
the rest of creation. To support this reading, these scholars claim that for Locke, 
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God is essential to natural law not because He is responsible for its promulgation, 
but rather because its enforcement requires His rewards and punishments in the 
afterlife.274 Furthermore, Locke’s belief in God’s benevolence would preclude the 
possibility that God has prescribed humans a moral law that is not reflected in 
His own creation and would require humans to act in contradiction with their 
own nature.275 This would suggest that despite his voluntarism, Locke thinks that 
certain salient properties of human nature reflect God’s purpose for man’s life on 
earth. Indeed, Locke sometimes tries to explain properties of human nature, such 
as the limitation of the mind to understanding the secondary qualities of 
empirical objects, as the consequence of God’s conscious design.276 
This particular reading of Locke’s voluntarism would then allow for the 
reconciliation of Locke’s hedonism with his conception of natural law as a divine 
decree. It suggests that Locke does not believe that God could have imposed an 
arbitrary natural law that would conflict with the natural abilities and 
inclinations of his creatures. Rather, His benevolence entails that there must be 
some level of conformity between human nature and God’s moral law. Israelsen 
has therefore proposed that since God designed humans with the desire for 
pleasure and aversion of pain, these passions must be an indicator of His 
intentions for our life on earth. Thus while morality still has the metaphysical 
status of a natural law instituted by God, we need only inquire into the 
consequences of actions – the extent they cause pleasure or pain – to deduce their 
morality. Accordingly, Israelsen ascribes to Locke the view that natural law may 
be ascertained simply by maximising pleasure and avoiding pain.277 Yet while 
Israelsen’s consequentialist interpretation succeeds in identifying a possible 
source of normativity in Locke’s theory, it is also contradicted by several of 
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Locke’s suggestions on how to achieve eternal bliss in the afterlife. Thus Locke 
maintains that the pleasures and pains of this life bear no proportion to those of 
the afterlife, and that we should aim to secure eternal bliss rather than transient 
pleasures.278 Furthermore, Locke postulates that the practise of virtue does not 
always lead to happiness during life on earth, and is sometimes only truly 
rewarded in the afterlife.279 Both these suggestions indicate that Locke in fact 
sees no necessary connection between man’s worldly passions and Divine 
punishment and reward. 
 Locke thus appears to retain the view that natural law is a Divine decree 
that cannot simply be equated with a prudential guideline for the maximisation 
of pleasure during life on earth. Accordingly, it appears that Locke holds that not 
all desires and pursuits conform to God’s intentions for humankind, and thereby 
to the law of nature He has decreed to guide us in our conduct. A recent 
interpretation by Elliot Rossiter in fact adopts this position as its premise in a 
renewed attempt to reconcile Locke’s hedonist consequentialism with his notion 
of morality as a divine law. According to Rossiter, Locke indeed thinks that the 
pleasures and pains of this earth are designed by God to be indicative of those in 
life after death. Yet this does not necessarily entail that pleasures and pains are 
entirely equal. Thus Rossiter claims that Locke makes a distinction between 
transitory corporeal delights, and more lasting intellectual pleasures that 
accompany sociable conduct. According to Rossiter, this distinction between 
transitory delights and lasting pleasures functions as a signpost of divine intent. 
Locke would therefore hold that these sociable pleasures are a reliable indicator 
of God’s intentions for us, and thereby of natural law.280  
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 While Rossiter’s reading provides a novel perspective on the 
interpretation of Locke’s moral philosophy, it also faces at least two objections. 
To begin with, Rossiter’s reading is only marginally supported by textual 
evidence. Thus one of Rossiter’s central claims, that Locke applies an essential 
distinction between transitory delights and intellectual or sociable pleasures, 
relies almost entirely on a brief remark in the Ethica, a fragmentary work that 
remained unpublished during Locke’s lifetime.281 The notion that these sociable 
pleasures are an indicator of natural law is then distilled from Locke’s remark 
that God has ensured a connection between private virtues and public 
happiness.282 Yet even in the Ethica itself, Locke concedes that depending on the 
circumstances, sociable and intellectual pursuits may not always lead to 
happiness, while doing evil may sometimes bring us pleasure. Locke claims that 
divine punishment and reward is necessary precisely because there appears to be 
no inherent connection between practising virtue and achieving happiness, 
conceived as ‘the utmost Pleasure we are capable of.’283 Furthermore, Rossiter’s 
interpretation ascribes to Locke the view that not all desires are equally 
conducive to happiness. Yet above we have seen that Locke denies that there is 
any inherent distinction between various pursuits. Rather, Locke claims that due 
to different predilections, humans will have divergent desires and may attain 
happiness through diverse forms of pleasure. Accordingly, we have seen that 
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Locke rejects the notion of a summum bonum, or a universal good to which all 
humans should aim to attain happiness. By contrast, Rossiter claims that Locke 
does make an inherent distinction between desires in view of their propensity to 
lead us to happiness. His interpretation would therefore also ascribe to Locke a 
notion of a universal good that is clearly rejected in the Essay. 
 In the end, neither Rossiter nor Israelsen thus entirely succeeds in their 
attempt to reconcile Locke’s hedonism with his conception of morality as a divine 
decree. On the one hand, Locke claims that as all our thoughts and actions are 
occasioned by the desire for pleasure and aversion of pain, happiness is nothing 
but the utmost pleasure we may achieve. Yet on the other hand, we have seen 
that Locke clearly does not believe that there is a necessary connection between 
the pleasures of this life and the moral rule decreed by God and enforced in the 
afterlife.284 Despite his hedonism, Locke therefore continues to hold that true 
virtue is something other than mere prudence, and that the most important 
consequences of following or trespassing natural law are only experienced in the 
afterlife. Yet while there are legitimate reasons to dispute the interpretations of 
both Rossiter and Israelsen, their contributions are nonetheless valuable because 
they highlight the proximity of Locke’s moral philosophy to a more consistently 
consequentialist and utilitarian position. When stripped of its eschatological 
element, Locke’s moral philosophy clearly classifies as a consequentialist theory. 
For this reason, Locke is often identified by scholars as one of the major 
forerunners of the utilitarian moral theory developed during the latter half of the 
eighteenth century by Bentham and Helvétius among others.285 
 
Conclusion 
In the end, we must conclude that it is not feasible to present an entirely 
coherent and convincing interpretation of Locke’s moral epistemology if we 
intend to do justice to all of his philosophical commitments and presuppositions. 
It would therefore appear that ultimately, Locke does not entirely succeed in 
demonstrating his claim that ‘Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well as 
Mathematicks.’ Indeed, it appears that later in life Locke himself became less 
optimistic about the possibilities of establishing morality through reasoning 
alone. Thus in the Reasonableness of Christianity, published some five years after 
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the Essay, Locke wrote that it may be ‘too hard a task for unassisted reason to 
establish morality, in all its parts, upon its true foundations, with a clear and
 convincing light.’286 Yet Locke’s self-confessed failure to provide a coherent 
moral philosophy should not deter us from studying it. In fact, the problems in 
Locke’s moral epistemology highlighted in our investigation reveal some of the 
most important questions and challenges faced by all early-modern moral 
philosophers who rejected both scholastic essentialism and the Cartesian notion 
of innate ideas, and came to embrace an empiricist account of human 
understanding. 
 Throughout our discussion, we have seen that many of the perplexities of 
Locke’s moral philosophy are then ultimately a reverberation of his own theory 
of knowledge. Previously, natural law theorists had either supported their 
conception of morality with a version of Scholastic essentialism, or they had 
argued that human beings simply have an innate faculty of normative judgment. 
Yet we have seen that Locke dismisses both approaches to grounding morality, as 
his empiricism rejects both essentialism and any form of innatism. Furthermore, 
Locke rejects the approach, applied by Hobbes among others, of deriving 
morality from a substantive conception of human nature. We have seen that for 
Locke, this approach is unsound because it violates the dichotomy between ideas 
of substances and moral concepts that is in integral part of his epistemology. 
Accordingly, we have established that Locke already proposes a distinction 
between facts and values that most commonly associated with David Hume.  
As Locke’s epistemology prohibits many of the strategies of grounding 
morality employed by his predecessors, his philosophy is left with only three 
possible sources of normativity. Firstly, Locke recognises that morality is a social 
construct transmitted by and contained within conventional language. Secondly, 
true to his empiricist principles, Locke binds morality to a normative component 
of experience – the feeling of pleasure and pain. Thirdly, Locke at the same time 
remains attached to the notion that natural law is not mere prudence, but rather 
a divine decree enforced by the punishments and rewards of the afterlife. As 
Locke is convinced that mere convention is inadequate as a source for morality, 
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he is left with the latter two sources of normativity. Yet we have seen that Locke 
glosses over the question how these two disparate foundations of morality relate 
to each other in his moral philosophy. Throughout our discussion, we have 
encountered many scholarly efforts to reconcile Locke’s hedonism with his 
eschatology. Yet rather than aiming to provide a fully coherent interpretation, 
our own reading has sought to highlight the fissures and tensions on Locke’s 
moral philosophy. Accordingly, we may conclude that Locke’s consequentialism 
and hedonistic account of human motivation clearly prefigures the utilitarian 
conception of morality that would be developed during the eighteenth century by 
thinkers like Helvétius. At the same time, we must recognise that Locke holds 
fast to an older notion of virtue, according to which morality is not mere 
prudence, but rather a moral law ultimately derived from God. By diagnosing 
rather than resolving this fundamental tension in Locke’s thought, we may 
recognise that his theory as representative of a crucial juncture in the history of 
moral philosophy, as it exemplifies the transformation of a teleological 











   
 
 




John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding was extremely influential 
throughout the eighteenth century – especially so among the French 
philosophes.287 Among these French thinkers, the Abbé Étienne Bonnot de 
Condillac (1714-1780) was clearly Locke’s most dedicated follower. Yet while his 
thought has sometimes been considered little more than ‘a supplement to Mr. 
Locke’s Essay,’ Condillac in fact devised his own philosophy, offering new 
perspectives while accommodating it to contemporary debates.288 To begin with, 
Condillac devised an original theory of human nature, which is particular notable 
for its conception of the mind as shaped by habit and structured through 
language. Condillac thereby expels any remaining notion of innate properties 
from his theory of human understanding. Instead, he claims that man’s cognitive 
faculties are nothing but habits acquired by means of experience. Condillac 
thereby conceives human nature as even more flexible and dependent on 
external factors than his predecessors had done. 
In addition, Condillac claims that the more advanced abilities of human 
understanding, including scientific and normative reasoning, can only be 
developed through the use of language. To be sure, we have seen that Hobbes 
had made a similar point. In addition, Locke’s philosophy of language equally 
suggests a close connection between language and thought – especially in moral 
matters. Yet Condillac expands upon their position by concluding explicitly that 
due to the inextricable connection between language and thought, human 
reasoning is determined by the particular composition of language. With respect 
to morality, this would entail that human beings compose moral concepts on the 
basis of the conventional signification of moral terms. Consequently, the 
normative reasoning of individuals would reflect the conventions of the language 
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prevalent in their society. Condillac therefore concludes that the progress of 
knowledge – including knowledge of morality – requires the wholesale reform of 
language itself. 
 In subsequent chapters we will see that this conception of human nature 
as flexible and shaped through language also became influential among other 
French philosophes more exclusively focused on ethical questions.289 Thus 
Helvétius’s theory, discussed in our next chapter, that human nature is entirely 
determined by experience was clearly inspired by Condillac’s philosophy. 
Furthermore, reflecting Condillac’s proposal for the perfection of language, 
Helvétius also maintained that moral reform could not succeed without revising 
and consolidating the conventional signification of moral terms. In a different 
manner, Condillac’s views on language and its role in the dissemination of ideas 
– and in particular ideas of morality – clearly inspired Rousseau’s reflections on 
language and the transformation of natural man into a civilised being. In view of 
this influence on contemporary philosophes, a major purpose of our present 
discussion of Condillac will be to provide a background to our subsequent 
exploration of Helvétius’s and Rousseau’s philosophies. As they were primarily 
interested in morality rather than epistemology, Helvétius and Rousseau 
borrowed many elements from their account of human understanding from 
Condillac. Especially our subsequent investigation of Rousseau's conception of 
human nature will therefore benefit from an understanding of Condillac’s theory 
of the mind as shaped by experience and language. 
 Yet apart from providing a context to our subsequent discussions, the 
present chapter will also aim to present an original interpretation of Condillac’s 
philosophy. We will thereby apply the same approach as in previous chapters and 
inquire how Condillac thinks human beings may understand morality by means 
of reasoning. Condillac maintains that the question how to acquire true and 
accurate ideas can only be answered by understanding how we acquire ideas in 
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the first place – in other words, by studying the mind and its operations. As 
Locke before him, Condillac thereby derives normative conclusions about how to 
reason from a descriptive account of the operations of the mind.290 Furthermore, 
Condillac does not consider reason as some innate faculty, but rather as ‘nothing 
other than our knowledge of the manner in which we must govern the 
operations of the soul.’291 In order to discover how Condillac believes we may 
ascertain morality, we will thus have to ascertain how he thinks human beings 
should conduct their mental operations. We will then first reconstruct Condillac’s 
theory of human understanding as developed by means of experience and 
language. Following an exploration of Condillac’s conception of human nature, 
we will then be in the position to reconstruct his account of moral judgment. We 
will find that while Condillac provides an account of moral judgment that on 
some points diverges from that of Hobbes and Locke, his moral philosophy as a 
whole declines to confront several ethical questions that had seemed crucial to 
his predecessors. Finally, during our investigation of Condillac’s account of 
human understanding, we will find that he thinks that human knowledge has 
been disfigured by prejudices and unsound cognitive habits disseminated in 
society by means of language. We will then discover why Condillac maintains 
that the advance of judgment in both empirical science and morality requires the 
wholesale reform of both education and the conventions of language.  
 
Expanding and Revising Locke’s Theory of Human Understanding 
Condillac himself acknowledges that John Locke’s Essay is the primary source of 
inspiration for his theory of human understanding.292 Even if many of Condillac's 
conclusions ultimately diverge from those of his illustrious predecessor, he 
acquires his fundamental presuppositions from Locke’s philosophy. Thus 
Condillac firmly rejects the concept of innate ideas, noting that Locke may in fact 
have spent too much time and effort on refuting the doctrine.293 Condillac also 
agrees with Locke that all our ideas are therefore derived or composed from 
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simple ideas acquired through either sensation or reflection.294 In addition, 
Condillac adheres to Locke’s essence agnosticism – the claim that the real 
essences of substances are inaccessible to human perception.295 Although 
Condillac does not stress this doctrine as much as Locke had done – possibly 
because by the middle of the eighteenth century its acceptance no longer 
required elaborate argumentation. Finally, Condillac largely adopts Locke’s 
classification of ideas, subdividing them into complex ideas of substances and of 
modes, both composed of simple ideas acquired through experience. Yet 
Condillac appears to discard Locke’s category of ideas of relation, as he declines 
to mention it at all. 
 Yet while Condillac follows Locke in his most fundamental 
presuppositions, he does reject an important assumption of his English 
predecessor. In our previous chapter, we have seen that Locke tacitly assumes 
that the mind naturally has the ability to compose, recall and relate the ideas it 
has acquired.296 According to Condillac, Locke thereby relies on the 
unsubstantiated position that man’s cognitive abilities are somehow innate to the 
mind. Alternatively, Condillac maintains that these cognitive abilities are nothing 
but habits acquired through experience: 
 
Thus this philosopher [Locke] is content to recognize that the mind perceives, thinks, 
doubts, believes, reasons, knows, wills, reflects; that we are convinced of the 
existence of these operations because we find them in ourselves, and that they 
contribute to the progress of our knowledge; but he did not suspect that they could be 
only acquired habits; he seems to have regarded them as something innate, and he 
says only that they are perfected through use.
297
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Our cognitive faculties are thus not properties natural to the understanding that 
merely need to be perfected through exercise. Instead, Condillac thinks that the 
abilities to compose, decompose, and relate ideas are in fact nothing more than 
habits, acquired gradually by experience. This position leads Condillac to the 
conclusion that: ‘Judgment, reflection, desires, passions, and so forth are only 
sensation itself differently transformed.’298 Condillac thereby adheres 
uncompromisingly to the metaphor of the mind as a tabula rasa. When Locke 
described the mind as a blank slate at birth, he merely intended to portray it as 
devoid of ideas. Condillac takes the metaphor more literally and claims the mind 
naturally contains neither ideas nor the cognitive faculties to process ideas 
received through sensations. 
 In order to substantiate this claim, Condillac describes at length how an 
individual may acquire the cognitive faculties peculiar to human beings. As we 
will see, this account shows some surprising similarities to Hobbes’s theory of 
human cognition as outlined in the first chapter – an affinity that is 
acknowledged neither by Condillac himself nor by any modern interpreters.299 
Like Hobbes, Condillac thinks that besides the capacity for sense-perception, the 
mind is naturally endowed with three fundamental properties. The first is 
reminiscence – the ability to store sensations and ideas for later recollection. Yet 
while it enables the retention of ideas, by itself reminiscence does not allow the 
mind to recall stored sensations at will and may only recall previous sensations 
when present experience provides occasion for recollection.300 Secondly, 
Condillac claims the mind naturally has the capacity to discern the difference and 
similarity of ideas, giving rise to the ability called judgment.301 Finally, like 
Hobbes and Locke before him, Condillac thinks sensations are always intermixed 
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with feelings of pleasure and pain. According to Condillac, the desire for pleasure 
and aversion to pain are then the impetus to all thought and action.302 
  Like Hobbes before him, Condillac maintains that these three elemental 
abilities of the mind – reminiscence, judgment and the feeling of pleasure and 
pain – allow for the development of basic cognitive functions. In his Treatise on 
Sensations, Condillac further demonstrates his theory by conducting a thought-
experiment, imagining the creation of an animated statue that is somehow 
endowed with these same elemental properties of the human mind. Condillac 
then conjectures what would happen if the senses of the statue would be 
gradually enabled. Thus he envisions that the statue is roused into action as soon 
as its sense of smell is activated. Immediately the statue will start to seek out 
pleasant smells, while avoiding disagreeable odours. As reminiscence will enable 
it to recall previous sensations, the statue will gradually learn how and where to 
satisfy its desire for pleasurable scents. Subsequently, Condillac describes how 
the gradual activation of the other senses incites the statue to search for other 
types of pleasurable sensations. Finally, it is the sense of touch that makes the 
statue realise that its sensations are actually occasioned by objects external to 
itself.303 
 Following the cognitive development as outlined the Treatise on 
Sensations, the statue will have desires, a will, some form of judgment and it will 
probably able to take care of its own preservation. But the thought experiment of 
the animated statue clearly does not describe the development of the more 
advanced cognitive abilities of human beings. Accordingly, Condillac has 
sometimes been accused of providing an incomplete account of human 
understanding. As Condillac claims that the mind is entirely devoid of innate 
properties and solely conditioned by experience, his account in the Treatise on 
Sensations would present the mind as merely a passive entity and would 
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therefore be insufficient to account for the complexity and variety of human 
thought and experience.304 Yet this critique fails to appreciate that Condillac did 
not intend his thought experiment of the animated statue as an account of the 
full development of human cognition. Condillac explicitly states that the statue is 
limited to what he calls ‘practical knowledge,’ and lacks the means for theoretical 
investigation.305 The statue therefore possesses what Condillac refers to as 
‘instinct’ and is therefore more comparable to an animal than to a human 
being.306 The statue is not yet capable of abstract or universal reasoning, nor is it 
a social being that can live together with others.307 Like Thomas Hobbes before 
him, Condillac thinks that the development of both abilities depend entirely on 
the use of language. 
 
Words and Ideas 
Condillac describes three ways by which more advanced forms of thought are 
made possible by connecting ideas to linguistic signs. First of all, Condillac 
reiterates Locke’s suggestion that words have an important structural function in 
the composition of ideas. Especially in the case of more complex aggregates of 
ideas, such as universals, abstractions and moral concepts, linguistic signs are 
required to make these mental constructions stable and accessible to the mind: 
 
The mind is so limited that it cannot recall a large quantity of ideas so as to make 
them the object of reflection all at the same time. Nevertheless the mind must often 
consider several of them together. It does that with the help of signs which, by uniting 
them, makes it possible for it to regard them as if they were a single idea.
308
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Linguistic signs thus provide unity to complex notions constructed from 
otherwise disparate simple ideas. As we have seen in our previous chapter, Locke 
had maintained that this structural function of words was especially crucial in 
the case of mixed modes. Yet while Condillac agrees that moral ideas cannot be 
conceived without signs, he claims that the same applies to complex ideas of 
substances. Criticising Locke for failing to appreciate this last point, Condillac 
states that all complex ideas – both purely intellectual concepts as well as ideas 
derived from experience – depend on signs for stability and accessibility to the 
understanding.309 Condillac thereby takes a position very similar in practice – 
although not identical in theory – to Hobbes’s nominalism regarding universals 
and abstractions.310  
 Secondly, Condillac claims that by connecting ideas to conventional 
signs, the mind acquires control over its own operations. Above we have seen 
that without the use of language, the animated statue cannot recall and inspect 
ideas at will, but only recollect ideas and formulate judgments when experience 
provides occasion. In this sense, the mind of the statue as described in the 
Treatise on Sensations appears to be a passive entity. While it certainly has some 
ideas, and it is motivated by a disposition to attain pleasure, the statue does not 
yet have the ability to recollect, scrutinise and connect ideas at will – at least not 
without any concrete external stimulus. Condillac maintains that to attain this 
ability, the statue will have to acquire the use of linguistic signs. Condillac thus 
concludes that it is only through signs that a person becomes able to direct its 
own attention and to consider its ideas as it pleases.311 Condillac’s conclusion is 
very similar to Hobbes’s view that it is only by means of signs that the mind may 
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direct its attention beyond present sensations, thereby acquiring the ability for 
independent thought. 
Finally, Condillac claims that it is only through signs that the mind may 
establish relations between ideas. These relations enable the mind to associate 
and compare ideas at will – thereby facilitating reasoning. In the previous 
chapter, we have seen that Locke maintained that these relations between ideas 
are themselves registered by a distinct type of ideas – so-called ideas of relation. 
Yet Condillac discards this category of ideas and assumes that by themselves, 
ideas are nothing but isolated collections of memorised sense impressions. 
Instead, Condillac maintains that ‘Ideas connect with signs, and it is, as I will 
show, only by this means that they connect among themselves.’312 Condillac thus 
maintains that it is only by learning a language – or more accurately, by 
acquiring the use of signs – that the mind gains the ability to establish and 
perceive relations between ideas. Again, we have seen in our first chapter that 
Hobbes had also maintained that the ability of the mind to establish relations 
between ideas depends on the use of language.313 
Following his revision of Locke’s philosophy, Condillac thus accords 
language a much more prominent role in his theory of the understanding. In fact, 
language has such a crucial function in Condillac's theory of epistemology that it 
becomes largely responsible for the organisation of the mind. Above we have 
seen that Condillac denies that the mind has any innate structure and claims that 
its cognitive faculties are nothing but habits acquired through experience. Yet it 
turns out that especially in the development of the higher cognitive abilities, 
                                                          
312 
Condillac, Essay Introduction p.5. Cf. I.ii.107 p.69. Cf. François Duchesneau, ‘Condillac et le 
principe de liaison des idées’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 1 (1999) 53-79. 
313 
In fact, Condillac’s position omits an important element of Hobbes’s account. In our first 
chapter we have seen that Hobbes maintains that the use of signs allows the mind to establish 
relations between ideas at will. Yet according to Hobbes, humans and animals alike may already 
establish relations of causality between successive objects of experience even before the acquisition 
of language. This ability, later described by David Hume as an instinctive habit, then allows for a 
prudential understanding of causal relations, enabling both animals and humans without the use of 
words to ensure their own preservation. It appears that Condillac's thought experiment in the 
Treatise on Sensations ascribes a similar ability to the sensitive statue. Nonetheless, Condillac states 
unequivocally that the mind may only establish relations between ideas by means of signs. Possibly, 
Condillac thereby merely means, with Hobbes, that the mind may only establish relations between 
ideas at will. Yet it is more likely that the discrepancy follows from the limitations of the Lockean 
theory of causality adopted by Condillac and later dissected by Hume in his Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding IV p.25-39 which does not provide a clear explanation of the method by 
which the mind establishes causal relations between objects of experience. 
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these habits rely on the cognitive functions of language. Thus language provides 
the mind with a network of signs that allow it to structure, memorise and 
connect its ideas, thereby enabling higher cognitive faculties including reason. 
Rejecting the assumption that the mind has an innate structure or natural 
faculties, Condillac presents language as an alternative mechanism organising 
the mind. Thus while Condillac claims the faculties of the mind are accumulated 
gradually through experience, they are facilitated and expressed only with the 
help of the linguistic signs that comprise a language.  
 
Linguistic Relativism? 
Evoking Hobbes’s views on the cognitive use of language, Condillac thus 
conceives an inextricable connection between words and ideas, stating that ‘the 
art of reasoning reduces to the art of speaking well. To speak, to reason, to 
formulate general or abstract ideas, are thus fundamentally the same thing.’314 
Condillac even maintains that language not only determines our reasoning, it 
even regulates the imagination – and as such influences our creative and artistic 
expression.315 Yet even if Condillac follows Hobbes in his theory that the use of 
signs is crucial to the development of human understanding, he draws different 
conclusions from this position. In our first chapter we have seen that Hobbes 
showed only limited interest in the question whether, in view of the cognitive 
function of signs, language may not only enable but also influence or even 
determine our thoughts. To be sure, Hobbes was concerned that persons are 
often swayed by rhetorical or insignificant speech. Yet we have established above 
that Hobbes did not present any substantial account of how the signification of 
terms is regulated by a standard of common use. Accordingly, we concluded that 
Hobbes did not suppose that the ideas in the minds of individuals may be 
determined by the conventions of language. 
 Condillac, on the other hand, does maintain that language may influence 
or determine the composition of our ideas. He arrives at this conclusion by 
combining an approximation of Hobbes’s position on the relation between words 
and ideas with Locke’s reflections on the role of common use in regulating 
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signification. Following Locke, Condillac presents language as a set of socially 
constructed conventions upheld by tacit consent. As Condillac considers language 
an inherently communal institution, it is non-existent in completely solitary 
individuals, who Condillac considers comparable both socially and intellectually 
to the statue-man described in the Treatise on Sensations.316 According to 
Condillac, language is thus not only the occasion for, but also the product of 
social intercourse.317 For Condillac, as for Locke, each language is thus a 
particular socially constructed artefact. In our previous chapter we have seen that 
while Locke was sensitive to the conventional nature of language, he avoids 
explicit linguistic relativism by supposing a more diffuse connection between 
words and ideas. Thus Locke seems to suggest that despite the relation between 
words and ideas, it always remains possible – and generally even desirable – to 
reason independent of linguistic convention. Yet as Condillac presents words and 
ideas as necessarily connected, reason becomes almost inextricable from 
language and its conventions. 
Combining Hobbes’s position on the relation between words and ideas 
with Locke’s reflections on the status of language as a tacitly upheld social 
convention, Condillac thereby arrives at an explicit formulation of linguistic 
relativism. As language is a communal institution upheld by tacit consent, ideas 
in the minds of individuals tend to reflect the conventions of their language.318 
Through the medium of language, the mind therefore acquires a conventional 
structure and set of terms with annexed concepts that are largely shared with 
other members of the speech-community. Condillac thereby presents the mind as 
a socialised entity shaped by the conventions of the language it has learned. Yet 
Condillac maintains that the linguistic conventions may not only determine the 
composition of individual ideas, but also that the structure of language may 
influence our train of thought in other ways. Thus Condillac claims that due to 
their overall structure, some languages are more suitable for certain forms of 
thought and expression than others. For instance, Condillac maintains that 
ancient languages more perfectly facilitated poetic expression, while modern 
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languages like French are more suitable for scientific investigation and 
communication.319 This last theory is then lends additional weight to the 
conclusion that Condillac thought that the conventional structure of languages 
has the potential of determining or influencing the thought of individuals.320 
 
The History and Imperfections of Language 
The inextricable connection between language and thought in Condillac’s theory 
is particularly significant in light of his conception of language as a historical and 
fluid construction. Condillac thereby develops another of Locke’s suggestions, 
namely that language is the product of a long and somewhat haphazard historical 
development. Thus we have seen that Locke worries that linguistic conventions 
have been created in a bygone era by people largely indifferent or ignorant of 
scientific or philosophical concerns. For this reason, Locke notes that 
commonplace linguistic conventions are often unsuitable for use in scientific or 
philosophical discussions.321 Yet while Locke had briefly touched upon this 
subject, the historicity of language becomes a major preoccupation for Condillac, 
as he constructs a conjectural history of the origin and early development of 
language. Condillac maintains that language first arose out of the spontaneous 
cries and gestures of natural man. These first signs constituted what Condillac 
calls ‘the language of action’ and served to communicate natural man’s primary 
needs and sentiments.322 Building upon the language of action, primitive man 
gradually instituted conventional signs to denote experiences and purely 
intellectual concepts in ever greater detail – thereby slowly developing the 
language of civilised man.323  
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Thus, Condillac – again echoing Locke – stresses the fact that language 
was first developed by men largely unconcerned with its accuracy. The natural 
cries and gestures of the language of action had been adequate representations of 
the sentiments they signified. But when primitive man, incited by his passions, 
ventured to construct signs not directly related to securing his survival: 
 
Then men felt less and less the need to analyse. Soon, they felt only the desire to 
speak, and they spoke before having any idea what they wanted to say. Judgment was 
no longer naturally put to the test of experience. They did not have the same stake in 
making sure that the things they judged were as they had supposed. They wanted to 
believe them without examination. Judgments that had become habitual become 





According to Condillac, language thus has been developed carelessly, without 
taking into account all the facts of experience. He singles out figurative and 
allegorical expressions as especially common sources of error, as they are often 
taken literally once their original meaning is forgotten.325 Nonetheless, Condillac 
postulates that over the course of recent history, languages may have become 
more precise due to the general progress of enlightenment. Incidentally, this is 
also the reason why modern languages are more suitable for scientific discourse, 
                                                                                                                                              
of language was a gradual and haphazard process, Rousseau inquired how natural man could have 
possessed the intellectual abilities to develop language if the required reflection and reasoning 
depend on language itself. On the face of it, Rousseau makes a fair point – although probably this 
boot-strapping problem is ultimately more damaging to the hypothesis that language and thought 
are inextricably linked than to Condillac’s rendering of the history of language. Yet it is not obvious 
that Condillac considered language – or at least language as it had developed naturally – as the 
product of careful reflection. Instead, he emphasised that language was the product of a long 
evolution, in which chance and contingency had contributed as much as conscious design. See 
Rousseau, Second Discourse in: The Discourses and other early political writings ed. and trans. by 
Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambirdge University Press 1997) 145-149; Cf. Hans Aarsleff, 
‘Pufendorf and Condillac on Law and Language’, Journal on the Philosophy of History 5 (2011) 308-
321, 318-319 and Avi Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford 2012) 26-29 for a discussion of Condillac’s account of the evolution of language 
and Rousseau’s critique. 
324 
Condillac, Logic II.iii p.393. 
325
 Condillac, Essay II.i.10§104 p.166. Cf. McNiven Hine, A Critical Study of Condillac’s Traité des 
systemès 192. 
126  3. Condillac  
 
 
while ancient languages, full of metaphors and figurative expressions, lend 
themselves more perfectly to poetic expression.326  
Yet despite these advances, many of the imperfections accumulated 
throughout history prevail in modern languages. What is more, Condillac 
deplores the fact that even today, linguistic conventions are continuously revised, 
more often making language less rather than more precise: 
 
Mais on ne déterminera pas la signification des mots : on l’altérera, on la changera 
sans raison : une métaphore, une comparaison paroîtra répandre la lumière ; et, pour 
expliquer une expression qu’on n’entendra pas, on en imaginera d’autres qu’on 
n’entendra pas davantage. C’est de la sorte que d’un langage confus naissent des 
opinions ; et que de ces opinions naît un autre langage, qui, tout aussi confus que le 
premier, produit de nouvelles opinions, pour produire bientôt de nouveaux langages 




This passage displays Condillac at his most pessimistic. Human beings may have 
created the extraordinarily useful institution of language as a method for both 
communication and the extension of thought. Yet apparently, a majority of 
people cannot be bothered to use this method correctly. Not merely disregarding 
established usage, they are often completely unconcerned with establishing 
representative and precise linguistic conventions. Over time, language has 
therefore become a very inaccurate – even misleading – representation of 
empirical reality.328 This situation is especially distressing in view of the close 
connection between language and thought in Condillac’s epistemology. It invites 
the kind of question Rousseau would later pose: whether the deceptions and 
inconsistencies of the conventional language of civilised man might not 
ultimately derogate its usefulness. 
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The Method of Analysis 
Yet Condillac himself is not as pessimistic as his friend from Geneva, as he thinks 
that both individuals and society as a whole are be able to either circumvent or 
rectify the errors and imprecisions of language. Thus Condillac claims that 
individuals would be able to avoid the deception of words by employing what he 
refers to as the method of analysis. Noting that linguistic conventions are often 
misguided, Condillac first of all maintains that simply consulting the 
conventional definitions of terms is not a reliable method for determining the 
composition of our ideas.329 Alternatively, Condillac maintains that in order to 
reason well, an individual must correlate their ideas to experience rather than 
rely upon words and take their conventional or assumed signification at face 
value:  
 
Consequently, the only means of acquiring knowledge is to return to the origin of our 
ideas, follow their generation, and compare them in terms of all their possible 




Before employing our ideas in reasoning, we should thus decompose them into 
their constitutive parts to find out their precise structure and mutual relations.331 
Subsequently, Condillac states that we should ‘return to the origin of our ideas.’ 
As Condillac believes that our sensations of empirical reality are ultimately the 
only reliable source of ideas, we should compose or recompose our ideas with the 
help of experience. Besides advocating the scrutiny of received opinion and the 
conventional signification of words, Condillac’s method of analysis and directive 
to ‘return to the origin of ideas’ thereby entails the rigorous empirical 
investigation of reality.332 
 Condillac contrasts his own method of analysis with the methodology 
employed by many seventeenth century philosophers including Descartes, 
Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz. According to Condillac, these thinkers used 
the method of synthetic reasoning rather than analysis to construct elaborate 
                                                          
329
 Condillac, Logic II.i p.386; Essay II.ii.2 §19 p.203; II.ii.2 §11 p.200; Cf. Essay I.iii. §11 p.74 for 
Condillac’s reservations about definitions. 
330 
Condillac, Essay I.ii.7 §67 p.49; Cf. II.ii.3 §39 p.213-214. 
331
 Condillac, Grammaire I.iii OPh I p.435-436. 
332 
Cf. André Joly, ‘De la théorie du langage { l’analyse d’une langue’, in: Sgard (ed.), Condillac et 
les problèmes du langage 243-256 for a more elaborate discussion of Condillac’s analytical method. 
128  3. Condillac  
 
 
philosophical systems. Following the methodology of geometry, they predicated 
their reasoning on a collection of fundamental axioms that, in Condillac’s view, 
are often assumed rather distilled from experience.333 In addition, Condillac 
criticises seventeenth century philosophers for using terms denoting abstract 
ideas – such as ‘substance’ or ‘essence’ – without sufficiently determining and 
specifying their meaning with the help of experience. In fact, following his 
rejection of innate ideas, Condillac accuses his illustrious predecessors of simply 
inventing these abstract ideas fundamental to their philosophy, describing them 
as products of the imagination rather than investigation.334 Providing a detailed 
refutation of the philosophy of Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes in his Treatise on 
Systems, Condillac concludes that due to their adoption of synthetic method and 
reliance on unsubstantiated abstract ideas, these thinkers created an intricate 
philosophical edifice that upon further inspection turns out to have no relation to 
empirical reality.335 
According to Condillac, his analytical approach will preclude the mistake 
made by both these seventeenth century philosophers and primitive man 
developing the conventions of language – the unprincipled and unsubstantiated 
composition of ideas. Our foremost priority is therefore the scrutiny of the ideas 
and relations we attach to signs and employ in our thoughts. Only after we have 
adequately recomposed our ideas in reference to experience, are we in a position 
to reason accurately by perceiving the relations between ideas. Staying as close to 
experience as possible, we will not be tempted in our scientific and philosophical 
investigation to adopt or devise fanciful notions on topics beyond the reach 
human understanding.336 Condillac thereby advocates proceeding from the 
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particular facts of reality towards general and abstract ideas, rather than to 
perceive and explain empirical phenomena with the help of preconceived 
abstract notions, like many seventeenth-century philosophers had supposedly 
done.337 Condillac’s method of analysis thus turns out to be a form of empiricism 
not too dissimilar from Locke’s epistemology. As Locke before him, Condillac 
concludes that individuals should not rely on the conventional signification of 
words, but rather remain as close to experience as possible in their reasoning. 
However, it is not clear if Condillac’s method of analysis complies with 
his position that thought and language are interdependent. As we have seen, 
Condillac maintains that complex ideas cannot be conceived without the use of 
linguistic signs. Therefore any form of thought that exceeds the level of mere 
instinct requires the use of language. As the method of analysis described by 
Condillac clearly qualifies as a higher form of cognition, the process of 
consciously deriving ideas from experience while ignoring or rectifying the 
meaning of words must itself rely on language and its cognitive function. This 
raises an issue familiar to many philosophers arguing in favour of linguistic 
relativism. If we do not possess any autonomous or innate faculty of the mind, 
and our thought is indeed enabled and shaped by language, how would we be 
able to escape its influence? Following Condillac’s method of analysis, we may try 
to ignore the conventions of language and formulate our ideas in reference to 
experience. Yet due to Condillac’s disavowal of Locke’s tacit assumption that 
ideas are composed with the help if an innate faculty of the mind, it is doubtful 
whether his epistemology still allows for this approach of thinking outside 
linguistic conventions. For in the absence of an innate cognitive faculty, the 
method of analysis itself would have to depend on complex ideas integrated with 
terminology with a conventional signification. 
 
The Analysis of Moral Concepts 
In our previous chapter, we have seen that while Locke advocates composing 
ideas of substances by means of experience, he does not present a clear method 
for the composition of moral concepts. As Condillac’s method of analysis is 
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modelled on Locke’s epistemology, this raises the question whether Condillac in 
fact does provide a consistent approach for the formation of moral notions. To 
begin with, the fundamentals of Condillac’s moral epistemology are again 
borrowed from Locke. Thus Condillac presents moral judgment as the outcome 
of reasoning based on moral concepts. Condillac also retains Locke’s category of 
ideas called mixed modes – ideas made freely by the mind without regard to the 
objects of empirical reality.338 Furthermore, Condillac restates Locke’s contention 
that as the mind itself composes these ideas of modes, it may perceive all possible 
relations between ideas and reason with absolute certainty on moral matters.339 
Finally, Condillac maintains that like any other kind of idea, moral concepts 
depend on linguistic signs for structural stability and the establishment of mutual 
relations between ideas. In fact, with moral concepts, this dependency on words 
is even stronger, as mixed modes do not depend on any examples in nature, 
making them especially reliant on linguistic signs.340 Accordingly, Condillac 
envisions that the conventional signification of moral terms appears as the most 
immediate standard from which individuals often derive their moral concepts.341 
 Yet as in the case of ideas of substances, Condillac thinks that the 
standard of common use is often an unsuitable guideline for the composition of 
moral concepts. In fact, Condillac maintains that the greater dependency of 
morality on language has caused a particularly serious confusion in our moral 
notions.342 Accordingly, it seems that of all ideas, mixed modes are particularly in 
need of scrutiny through the method of analysis. Yet it is not immediately clear 
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how Condillac thinks ideas of morality are to be analysed and reconstructed. He 
reiterates that individuals should first examine precisely the ideas they attach to 
certain terms and be ready to specify their usage to their interlocutors.343 
Condillac’s method of analysis subsequently requires individuals to scrutinise the 
composition of their ideas and revise them if necessary. But as mixed modes do 
not depend on models in nature, the question arises in what manner they may be 
rectified. Condillac’s offers a somewhat enigmatic answer, as he suggests that 
our moral concepts may nonetheless be refined through experience: 
 
With these details about mixed modes, it is easy to understand that it is entirely up to 
us to fix the meaning of their names, because it is our task to decide on the simple 
ideas which we have ourselves put together in the collections. We also understand 
that other people will share our thoughts, provided they are placed in the 
circumstances in which the same simple ideas are the object of their minds as of ours, 





Condillac seems to suggest that when placed in similar circumstances, 
individuals are exposed to the same sensations, and consequently will be induced 
to construct their moral concepts in comparable ways. Despite the fact that these 
moral concepts are not based on concrete models in nature, they are nonetheless 
somehow based on experience. Far from clarifying the process for the analysis of 
moral ideas, this passage raises the question how experience alone could 
constitute the basis for the reliable formulation of moral concepts. 
To answer this question, we should briefly reconsider Condillac’s account 
of the properties of experience. While Condillac maintains that by providing 
sense-data about the objects of empirical reality, experience is the sole reliable 
source of ideas, he also claims our sensations are necessarily intermixed with 
feelings of pleasure or pain. As we have seen, Condillac subsequently claims that 
these feelings of pleasure and pain provide the underlying motivation both for 
our actions as well as for the development of knowledge and our intellectual 
faculties. In addition, Condillac maintains that the fulfilment of the desire for 
pleasurable sentiments is our goal in life, while happiness consists of the 
achievement of this goal. Thus Condillac states that: ‘on est heureux, toutes les 
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fois qu’on chasse un besoin par des sentimens agréables.’345 Following Hobbes 
and Locke, Condillac thereby unmistakably retains a hedonist conception of the 
good. Accordingly, the ultimately the goal of moral guidelines from the 
perspective of the individual would be to steer us away from pain and achieve 
pleasure. For this reason, some commentators have in fact classified Condillac as 
an early proponent of utilitarianism, ascribing to him the view that the purpose 
of morality is simply the maximisation of pleasure among individuals.346  
 Yet a closer examination of Condillac’s moral thinking reveals that his 
position that individuals are necessarily motivated by the passions does not 
necessarily lead him directly to the conclusion that the purpose of morality and 
society is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Rather, following 
Hobbes’s example, Condillac presents the fact that individuals are motivated by 
passions as an argument for the necessity of instituting morality and centralised 
authority. Thus Condillac points out that our goal to maximise pleasure and 
avoid pain is most effectively obtained – at least in the long run – by acting 
sociable and taking the pleasures and pains of others into account: 
 
L’expérience ne permet pas aux hommes d’ignorer combien ils se nuiraient, si 
chacun, voulant s’occuper de son bonheur aux dépens de celui des autres, pensait que 
toute action est suffisamment bonne dès qu’elle procure un bien physique à celui qui 
agit. Plus ils réfléchissent sur leurs besoins, sur leurs plaisirs, sur leurs peines, et sur 
toutes les circonstances par où ils passent, plus ils sentent combien il leur est 
nécessaire de se donner des secours mutuels. Ils s’engagent donc réciproquement ; ils 
conviennent de ce qui sera permis ou défendu, et leurs conventions sont autant de lois 





Condillac’s theory that humans are motivated by the desire for pleasure and 
aversion of pain thus leads him to the conclusion that man most optimally 
achieves the satisfaction of his needs and appetites by living together in society 
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and providing mutual assistance.348 This conclusion is likely inspired by the 
conception of sociability proposed by Samuel Pufenderof, which was particularly 
influential in eighteenth century France.349 Pufendorf maintained that a rational 
consideration of our needs, faculties, and circumstances would lead humans to 
conclude that providing mutual assistance and living in society is in their 
collective best interest. Rejecting the notion that humans are a social beings by 
nature, Pufendorf rather claimed that man’s sociability is the consequence of 
prudential reasoning.350 
Even if Condillac appears to borrow his account of sociability from 
Pufendorf, he diverges from his predecessor in his description of the method by 
which humans learn to become sociable. Whereas Pufendorf, as well as Hobbes 
and Locke before him, had all claimed that natural law is accessible to human 
reason, Condillac states in the passage quoted above that it is experience that 
teaches humans that their well-being depends on following a set of rules that 
allows them to live together.351 But what does this entail? As we have seen, 
experience is for Condillac not limited to the perception of empirical objects, as 
feelings of pleasure and pain are always intermixed with sensations. As the 
objective of morality is to guide us in acquiring or avoiding precisely these 
feelings, it follows that to some extent, moral precepts may be learned by trial 
and error – through experience: 
 
Les conditions, que ces conventions renferment, sont les premières lois des sociétés. 
On les peut nommer lois naturelles, parce que l’homme n’a pas besoin de méditer 
pour les découvrir. Tout lui apprend qu’il ne doit pas nuire, s’il ne veut pas qu’on lui 
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nuise : et qu’il doit secourir s’il veut être secouru. L’expérience suffit pour lui 




Of course, Condillac affirms that the experience of pleasure and pain should be 
subject to reflection, enabling a more methodical and comprehensive formulation 
of moral precepts. Nonetheless, Condillac maintained that the experience of 
pleasure and pain provides an elementary indication of morality and natural law. 
Accordingly, Condillac states that ‘pleasure and pain are our first teachers. They 
enlighten us because they inform us whether we are judging badly or well.’353  
 Condillac’s theory that a conception of morality may be derived from the 
experience of pleasure and pain ultimately remains somewhat equivocal. 
Condillac seems to suggest that humans simply acquire a conception of morality 
from an accumulated experience of pleasure and pain. Yet this theory leaves 
several ethical questions largely unanswered. Thus if individuals acquire a 
complete understanding of morality merely by means of sensation, why do 
humans often tend to diverge from the prudential guidelines experience has 
provided them with? More importantly, as Condillac thinks that morality is 
derived from personal experience, he presents morality largely as an 
individualistic prudential guideline. This raises the question how morality would 
be able to regulate the behaviour of individuals living together in society. Thus 
given the variety of experience among individuals, how could their presumably 
diverging feelings of pleasure and pain give rise to a moral code common to all 
members of society? Unfortunately, Condillac leaves these questions largely 
unanswered. 
 
The Reform of Education 
In the preceding, we have seen that Condillac thinks that the ideas of both 
substances and of morality in the minds of individuals are at least to some extent 
determined by the conventions of language. We have also seen that Condillac 
presented his method of analysis as an alternative means to acquire ideas, 
thereby circumventing the generally imprecise or inaccurate standards of 
common use. Yet there is some indication that Condillac realised that by itself the 
method of analysis is not sufficient to circumvent the pernicious influence of 
language. Thus Condillac presents two proposals to minimise – or even eradicate 
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– the potential of language to deceive and misinform individuals and society as a 
whole. Firstly, Condillac maintains that the advancement of knowledge requires 
the reform of education. Condillac’s preoccupation with education is evidenced 
above all by his Cours d’études, a collection of study books in thirteen volumes, 
written in the years 1767-1773 for the young Ferdinand of Parma, grandson to 
Louis XV.354 Of course, many early-modern empiricist philosophers including 
Locke, Helvétius and Rousseau were also preoccupied with education – and 
perhaps not surprisingly. The position that all our ideas are acquired externally – 
either through experience or linguistic communication – almost immediately 
raises a concern for exposing individuals to the right kind of ideas. 
 In his philosophical writings, Condillac had already discussed this same 
issue. As an empiricist, Condillac denies that human beings possess an innate 
faculty of reason that would allow them to perceive eternal truths independent 
from experience. Consequently, the scope and outcome of our reasoning is 
constrained both by our intellectual habits and the ideas we retain or acquire. As 
Condillac thinks that many of our ideas are learned from others in childhood, we 
are prone to make the same mistakes as our teachers: 
 
Because in childhood, we get out thoughts from others, we adopt all their prejudices. 
When we reach an age where we believe we think for ourselves, we still continue 
thinking second hand, because we think according to the prejudices they have 
bequeathed us. Under these conditions, the more progress the mind seems to make, 
the further afield it strays, and errors pile up from generation to generation. When 
matters reach this point, there is only one means of restoring order to the faculty of 
thought – to forget everything that we have learned, to take up our ideas again at 





Furthermore, as prejudices are not only transferred through language, but 
actually inhere in the very linguistic conventions themselves, Condillac concludes 
that instruction through speech and writing may ultimately do us more harm 
than good. As children have not yet developed sufficient capacity for analysis – 
which in itself requires the use of language – they will not be able to scrutinise 
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and correct the notions acquired through instruction.356 Condillac claims that 
many of these notions – and the linguistic signs that transfer them – 
accommodate error and prejudice. Through education, these prejudices become 
ingrained to the point that they are often conceived as self-evident truths or 
innate ideas.357 
 Yet Condillac is not merely apprehensive about the prevalence of 
prejudice and error in both the curriculum and in language. Following his 
position that cognitive faculties are not innate but gradually acquired, Condillac 
is also concerned that current educational practice inculcates the wrong 
intellectual habits, noting that ‘our mind becomes used to this lack of care about 
correctness by the way we grow into language.’358 Thus Condillac claims that 
initially, infants acquire their ideas through experience. It is only when learning 
the use of language that children become used to receiving ideas through the 
inaccurate and confusing conventions of signification, subsequently contracting 
the habit of thinking upon words rather than ideas.359 According to Condillac, it 
is therefore crucial that pupils are taught to reason according to the guidelines of 
his method of analysis – by scrutinising terms and acquiring ideas from 
experience. As he wrote a two-part instruction manual as part of his Cours 
d’études on the proper conduct of the understanding entitled L’art de penser and 
L’art de raisonner, Condillac believed that older pupils, who had acquired 
sufficient reflection, are to be instructed in the use of the method of analysis. 
Younger children however, should not be taught any subjects that are beyond the 
comprehension of their age. Prefiguring a theme further developed by Rousseau 
in his Émile, Condillac therefore maintains children should be encouraged to 
acquire ideas not through formal instruction, but rather by experience, through 
interacting playfully with people and the objects of empirical reality. It is only by 
this method that they acquire the intellectual habit of referring to experience 
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The Perfection of Language 
While the reform of education may be able to reduce the spread of the most 
obvious prejudices, it leaves the conventions of language itself largely intact. As 
we have seen, Condillac maintains that these conventions are often inaccurate 
and confused representations of empirical reality. With his method of analysis, 
Condillac presents a method by which individuals can scrutinise and – if 
necessary – correct their ideas independent from the conventions of language. 
Yet not everyone is equally willing or able to apply analysis consistently to each 
and every idea acquired. Condillac therefore maintains that the most effective 
means to ensure the dissemination of accurate knowledge would be to reform 
language itself: 
 
I have observed that to attain true knowledge we should start afresh in the sciences 
without allowing ourselves to become biased in favour of trusted opinions, and for 
this reason it has seemed to me that to make the language exact, we must reform it 




Due to its constitutive role in the formation of the mind and its ideas, the 
accuracy of our knowledge becomes inextricably linked to the constitution of our 
language. According to Condillac, any attempt to improve or enlarge scientific 
knowledge or philosophical insight, should therefore be accompanied by a 
rigorous reform of our linguistic conventions. 
 Condillac’s declaration that language should be reformed was not merely 
an idle claim. Later in life, he developed his proposal into a concrete program for 
the perfection of language. As part of his Cours d’études for the Prince of Parma, 
Condillac not only wrote a comprehensive Dictionnaire des synonymes, he also 
presented a manual for the analysis and reform of language in his Grammaire. 
The main object of this reform is to fashion language into an accurate and 
ordered – rather than confused and misleading – signification of our ideas: 
 
Les langues ne se perfectionnent qu’autant qu’elles analysent ; au lieu d’offrir { la fois 
des masses confuses, elles présentent les idées successivement, elles les distribuent 
avec ordre, elles en font différentes classes ; elles manient, pour ainsi dire, les 
élémens de la pensée, et elles les combinent d’une infinité de manières ; c’est { quoi 
elles réussissent plus ou moins, suivant qu’elles ont des moyens plus ou moins 
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Condillac’s ultimate objective is thus to reform language to reflect the results of 
an analysis of our ideas. After examining our ideas and mutual relations, we 
should revise the conventions of language to conform to the organisation of the 
ideas in our mind. The result will be a well-formed language, in which signs will 
precisely signify ideas and clearly indicate their relations. Consequently, language 
itself will become a reliable method of analysis. Condillac presents algebra as an 
example of such a well-formed language, as each sign exactly represents a well-
defined idea and the connections between its signs are immediately apparent, 
thereby also displaying the relations between associated ideas. In his Langue des 
calculs, unfinished at his death and published posthumously only in 1798, 
Condillac finally attempted to put his proposal into practice, by designing a 
flawless language modelled on algebra.363  
This comparison of his perfect language with algebra has led some 
interpreters to claim that later in life Condillac diverged from his empiricism and 
intended to reform language in line with universal logical principles.364 Thus, 
John O’Neal claims that in view of Condillac’s preoccupation with the perfection 
of language – which he shared with Leibniz and Bacon among others – we would 
be justified to classify him as a ‘rationalist’ thinker.365 Yet a number of other 
commentators have rightly questioned both this latter characterisation and the 
notion that later in his career, Condillac departed from his empiricist principles 
to become more interested in formal logic.366 They point out that Condillac may 
have had the goal of devising a universal language that would encapsulate 
universal logical rules, thereby perfecting the function of human understanding. 
But these logical rules are not derived from a set of abstract principles or criteria. 
Rather, these rules should be deduced from experience – they are the 
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consequence of exterior phenomena well analysed.367 Ultimately, Condillac’s goal 
was therefore to create a language that would precisely and flawlessly reflect and 
represent the ideas in the mind of speakers, which in turn should be derived 
from the facts of experience. His proposal for reform is to be carried out by 
subjecting both language and our ideas to analysis – the empiricist method 
Condillac himself had laid out. Even Condillac’s later attempt to design a perfect 
language based on the example of algebra was therefore perfectly in line with his 
position that all ideas should be scrutinised with the help of experience.  
 Yet in the end, Condillac’s plan for the perfection of language raises the 
same question as his method of analysis. We have seen that according to 
Condillac, language plays a defining role in the structuring ideas and 
development of our cognitive faculties, thereby giving rise to the ability for 
reasoning. Yet the question is how the scrutiny and reform of language could be 
undertaken if not with the help of rational reflection, which according to 
Condillac’s theory, again depends on language – precisely the object to be 
reformed. To be sure, Condillac maintains that this reform of language should be 
conducted in reference to experience, rather than through purely reflective 
reasoning. Yet even the interpretation of experience requires a certain analytical 
method. And as we have seen, Condillac claims that language itself functions as 
this analytical method. In order to reform or scrutinise language on the basis of 
experience, one would therefore require the ability of thinking independent of 
the conventions of the language one is trying to reform. This kind of purely 
mental, non-linguistic reasoning is still accommodated in Locke’s theory of the 
understanding. But the whole point of Condillac’s philosophy had been to show 
that reason is not an innate faculty; that it is a habit developed out of sensation 
and depends on language as an analytical method. Condillac thus ascribes to 
language such an integral role in the establishment of reasoning that it is difficult 
to conceive how his objective of scrutinising and perfecting language could be 
achieved, as it turns out that linguistic conventions themselves are a necessary 
prerequisite to the procedure of their own reform.  
Ultimately, Condillac’s insistence that the mind has no innate cognitive 
faculties, but that its abilities are merely habits developed through sensation and 
with the help of language, creates a fundamental tension within his philosophy. 
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On the one hand, this position allows Condillac’s philosophy to be interpreted as 
leading to a form of linguistic determinism according to which all human actions 
are occasioned by the interaction between sensations and accumulated 
experience organised through language. Yet on the other hand, the fact that 
Condillac urges us to transcend and remedy the conventions of language means 
that he somehow still assumes that humans possess a reflective faculty that 
functions independently or beyond the collection of ideas structured through 
language. Yet as he claims that our reflective faculty actually comprises nothing 
more than ideas acquired through sensation structured through language, it 
remains unclear how Condillac is able to account for such a cognitive faculty in 
his philosophy.  
 
Conclusion 
In the preceding, we have seen that while Condillac derives many of his theories 
from Locke, he nonetheless revises the philosophy of his illustrious predecessor 
on at least two crucial points. On the one hand, Condillac dispenses with Locke's 
tacit assumption that the mind is an autonomous entity conducting mental 
operations by apprehending or manipulating its ideas. Presenting the mind as 
devoid of any innate faculties, Condillac rather maintains that all forms of 
thought are ultimately nothing but cognitive habits established by means of 
experience. On the other hand, Condillac adopts Locke's suggestion that words 
have an important function in enabling reason, extending it to the point that 
language becomes responsible for all higher forms of cognition. Subsequently, we 
have seen that the theory that language enables human cognition then leads 
Condillac towards the conclusion that the conventions of our language may in 
fact influence or determine our thoughts. Yet we have discovered that by 
simultaneously eradicating all innate cognitive faculties and presenting language 
as the primary explanation for human reason, Condillac has introduced a 
fundamental tension into his philosophy. We have seen that Condillac maintains 
that as modern language has been disfigured by prejudice, linguistic conventions 
provide defective standards for reasoning. Yet as Condillac claims that human 
cognition is entirely dependent on language, it is unclear whether his philosophy 
would in fact allow humans to reason independent from these conventions of 
language.  
 Despite this tension, Condillac’s philosophy does provide novel ideas and 
perspectives that would influence a number of subsequent thinkers. For instance, 
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we will see in our next chapter that Helvétius adopted Condillac’s conception of 
human understanding as devoid of any innate faculties and concluded that the 
mind is nothing than the collection of its ideas. Condillac’s philosophy is 
therefore an important step in the development of empiricism from the Lockean 
position that all ideas are derived from experience towards the reductionism of 
philosophes like Helvétius and d’Holbach, who claim that all human cognition is 
nothing more than sensation in different forms. Furthermore, in our final 
chapter we will see that Condillac’s philosophy also had a profound influence on 
Rousseau, who adopts the theory that man’s cognitive faculties and moral 
outlook are the combined product of experience and the use of signs and 
concludes that like language, human nature must also have had a history. For 
this reason, it would not be an exaggeration to maintain that without Condillac’s 
inspiration, Rousseau would not have conceived his conjectural history of the 
development of human nature as outlined in the Second Discourse. 
 
   
 
   
 
 




Claude Adrien Helvétius develops his philosophy on empiricist principles almost 
identical to those of Locke and Condillac.368 Thus Helvétius employs the same 
methodology as his predecessors, approaching the question how we may gain an 
accurate understanding of both morality and empirical reality by describing how 
human beings acquire knowledge in the first place. This is the reason why 
Helvétius, who appears to be primarily interested in politics and morality, 
nonetheless starts both his main treatises with discussions of epistemology and 
psychology. Helvétius thereby presents a simplified version of empiricism largely 
adapted from Locke and Condillac. Thus like his predecessors, Helvétius 
maintains that all ideas derive from sensation, stating that the mind is a tabula 
rasa at birth. Helvétius also thinks that the mind is completely devoid of innate 
ideas or cognitive faculties – thereby continuing the trend already visible in 
Condillac of eradicating all innate properties from the mind. Finally, Helvétius 
also follows his empiricist predecessors with his hedonistic account of human 
motivation and theory of the good. 
 Helvétius was far from the only French Enlightenment thinker to adhere 
to these empiricist principles. In fact, many Philosophes as well as the moderate 
Jesuits in control of the universities embraced a form empiricism inspired by 
Locke’s Essay.369 Therefore perhaps surprisingly, Helvétius’s writings were 
almost universally criticised, rejected or even ridiculed upon publication by 
Philosophes and conservatives alike. Thus in 1758 Helvétius’s first and most 
famous publication entitled De l’esprit caused a scandal that ended with the 
public burning and proscription of the work, while Helvétius himself only 
ensured his personal safety through his connections at court. Meanwhile, De 
l’esprit was refuted in the more conservative journals, whereas Helvétius’s fellow 
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philosophes declined to come to his aid.370 Partly the scandal over De l’esprit had 
been caused by the circumstances of its publication. Rather than publish the 
controversial work clandestinely, Helvétius had deceived an inexperienced censor 
into granting permission for official publication, which was promptly withdrawn 
when the contents of the book became more widely known. Helvétius’s actions 
not only upset the authorities, it also angered the Philosophes. The scandal over 
De l’esprit called attention to the incendiary nature of philosophical publications, 
right at a time that the Encyclopédie was in danger of being censored for its 
controversial positions.371 Madame du Deffand, a well-connected socialite and 
hostess of a salon frequented by several Philosophes, expressed this angle in her 
remark that Helvétius had upset many because he had revealed everyone’s 
secret.372 Deffand’s remark confirms the view that Helvétius’s views were widely 
discussed in the private environment of the salon, but that they could not be fully 
expressed publicly without upsetting the authorities. 
 Yet the uproar over Helvétius’s treatises was most likely not the 
consequence of any theoretical innovations, but rather of the subversive purpose 
of his philosophy. Thus Helvétius’s philosophical works are interspersed with 
critiques of both ecclesiastical and royal authorities, as well as contemporary 
moral conventions. For this reason, it would appear obvious to interpret his 
thought not primarily in a philosophical context, but rather in the context of 
contemporary debates on political and social issues. We would then conclude that 
Helvétius’s primary intention was to criticise the politics of the Ancien régime 
and the authority of the Catholic Church. This reading would see Helvétius’s 
philosophy – including his theory of human nature and ethics – mainly as a 
prelude to his long diatribes against prejudice and ignorance. His philosophy 
would then be portrayed not primarily as an autonomous contribution to 
intellectual discussion, but rather as the conceptual framework to an intervention 
in contemporary public debate on political and social issues. In fact, there have 
been several scholars who have interpreted Helvétius using such a contextual 
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approach.373 Yet even if our own discussion of Helvétius will not entirely ignore 
the social and political debates in which he sought to intervene, our primary aim 
will be to provide an interpretation of Helvétius philosophical ideas. We will then 
see that Helvétius’s philosophy functions not merely as a theoretical prelude to 
his polemical writings, but in fact provides the basis for many of his moral and 
political views.  
 Helvétius derived this theory of human understanding and motivation 
almost entirely from other empiricist philosophers – in particular Locke and 
Condillac. Yet we will see that while Helvétius derived his fundamental principles 
from his empiricist predecessors, his account of human nature lacked much of 
the nuance and sophistication of the theories of Locke, Hobbes, and Condillac. To 
begin with, Helvétius simplifies Locke’s axiom that all ideas are constructed from 
simple ideas acquired through sensation or reflection into the claim that all of 
our ideas are simply acquired externally – thereby seemingly denying that the 
mind itself has considerable liberty in how it composes it complex ideas and 
mixed modes. Helvétius therefore presents the mind as little more than a passive 
receptacle of ideas, rather than an autonomous entity capable of thinking or 
reasoning. In addition, Helvétius ignores the account of practical deliberation 
presented by Hobbes and Locke and consequently depicts human beings as 
determined immediately by their desire for pleasure and aversion of pain. 
Consequently, we will see that Helvétius’s psychology and epistemology present a 
reductionist account of human nature, depicting man as entirely determined by 
his passions and environment – an account that was criticised by several of 
Helvétius’s fellow Philosophes, including Diderot, Rousseau and Voltaire.  
The main objective of our present discussion will then be to outline the 
ways in which Helvétius’s moral and political philosophy follows from his theory 
of human nature. We will then start our investigation by examining Helvétius’s 
theory of human nature, devoting particular attention to his conception of the 
mind and his account of human motivation. Throughout this discussion, we will 
highlight some of the similarities and differences between Helvétius’s philosophy 
and that of his empiricist predecessors. In addition, we will present several 
points of critique voiced against Helvétius by his contemporaries. Subsequently, 
we will be able to trace the consequences of Helvétius’s account of human nature 
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for his moral and political philosophy. In the second part of this chapter, we will 
thus explore how Helvétius’s hedonistic conception of the Good not only leads 
him to a consequentialist conception of morality, but arguably to an early 
formulation of the utilitarian position in ethics. Finally, we will also see that 
following his adoption of a reductionist form of empiricism according to which 
the mind is nothing but a collection of ideas acquired by means of either 
experience or language, Helvétius concurs with Condillac and Rousseau that the 
transformation of morality and society requires the reform of both education and 
the conventional signification of moral terms. 
 
Sensibility and Ideas 
Like many of his contemporary philosophes, Helvétius constructs his philosophy 
upon three fundamental Lockean notions: the sensory origin of ideas, the mind 
as a tabula rasa and the hedonistic theory of human motivation. In fact, Helvétius 
sometimes refers explicitly to his authoritative predecessor to account for his 
positions.374 Yet we will see that Helvétius’s subsequent theories of epistemology, 
psychology and morality both simplified and revised Locke’s empiricism. The 
most important of these revisions of Locke’s theory had been prefigured by 
Condillac, whom Helvétius had undoubtedly read, but declines to mention in his 
writings.375 Helvétius thus embraces Condillac’s view that the mind is completely 
devoid of an innate organisation. Taking the notion of the mind as a tabula rasa 
as his fundamental proposition, Helvétius maintains that minds are originally 
completely identical, and that all intellectual differences between individuals are 
the consequence of the accumulation of diverging experiences.376 Although a 
materialist, Helvétius denies that the physical organisation of the brain affects 
our cognitive faculties – unlike contemporary materialists like Diderot and 
d’Holbach.377 Following Condillac, Helvétius subsequently maintains that the 
mind, completely devoid of any inborn characteristics, possesses three 
fundamental abilities. Thus the mind naturally has the ability to perceive the 
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world through sensations, while its experiences are necessarily attended by 
feelings of pleasure and pain. Helvétius agrees with Hobbes, Locke and Condillac 
that the desire for pleasure and aversion of pain provides the impetus for all 
thought and action. Secondly, the mind can distinguish the similarities and 
differences between ideas, thereby giving rise to what Condillac referred to as 
judgment. Thirdly, the mind has the ability to memorise and recall its 
experiences.  
Subsequently Helvétius claims that all our cognitive processes and 
faculties are the consequence of these three fundamental abilities of the mind: 
sensation, memory and the feeling of pleasure and pain. Dismissing the notion 
that humans possess innate cognitive faculties, Helvétius sees the mind as 
nothing more than the collection of its ideas derived from experience, stating: 
‘Qu’est-ce dans l’homme que l’esprit ? l’assemblage de ses idées.’378 Helvétius 
therefore simplifies the commonplace empiricist principle that human 
understanding does not extend beyond things of which we may have determined 
ideas into the notion that the mind itself is nothing but the collection of ideas 
acquired through sensation.379 At the same time, Helvétius describes all thought 
processes as nothing more than the perception of differences and similarities 
between multiple ideas retained by the mind:  
 
Ce principe posé, je dis encore que c’est dans la capacité que nous avons d’apercevoir 
les ressemblances ou les différences, les convenances ou les disconvenances qu’ont 
entr’eux les objets divers, que consistent toutes les opérations de l’Esprit. Or cette 




Helvétius thereby adopts the principle posed by Locke and Condillac that all 
mental operations ultimately consist of the perception of relations between ideas 
by comparing them and discovering their similarities and differences.381 Yet in 
Helvétius’s view, there is no essential difference between having a single 
sensation and perceiving two ideas at the same time while paying attention to 
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their differences and similarities.382 Consequently, Helvétius maintains that 
thinking or judging is ultimately not different from sensation itself, concluding 
that ‘toutes les opérations de l’esprit se réduisent { des pures sensations.’383 
Yet for Helvétius, human sensibility not only enables judgment of the 
similarities and differences between ideas, but also includes the experience of 
feelings of pleasure and pain necessarily conjoined with sensations. Like 
Condillac, Helvétius maintains that these feelings rouse the otherwise mind 
passive mind into action, and have a defining influence on how it conducts its 
operations: 
 
Il résulte de ce Chapitre que tous les jugemens occasionnés par la comparaison des 
objets entr’eux, supposent en nous intérêt de les comparer. Or cet intérêt 
nécessairement fondé sur l’amour de notre bonheur, ne peut être qu’un effet de la 
sensibilité physique, puisque toutes nos peines et nos plaisirs y prennent leur source. 
Cette question examinée, j’en conclurai que la douleur et le plaisir physique est le 




Following Condillac, Helvétius claims that without a personal interest derived 
from feelings of pleasure and pain, the mind is at a complete standstill.385 
Personal interest therefore directs our attention, as the mind naturally focuses on 
ideas most relevant to its purpose to attain pleasure and avoid pain. But our 
desire for pleasure and aversion of pain also produces the will. Clearly following 
Hobbes, Helvétius then states that it does not make sense to apply the word 
‘liberté’ to the notion of ‘volonté,’ as the will is always causally determined by the 
interaction between passions and sensations.386 Yet Helvétius does not reiterate 
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Hobbes’s extensive account of practical deliberation that describes how human 
beings are motivated by desires and aversions, but may nonetheless choose to 
ignore certain passions on account of their foreseen consequences. Helvétius in 
fact claims that personal interest has such a strong impact on mental operations 
that it directly impacts our judgment.387 Thus Helvétius thinks that as the mind 
does not have any autonomy in judgment, its perception of the relations between 
ideas may often be determined by its passions and interests. Self-interest even 
makes men contradict self-evident truths, such as the maxim ‘do unto others 
what you would have them do to you.’388 This claim therefore leads Helvétius to 
the conclusion that passions not only instigate thinking, they also influence the 
outcome of our judgments. As Helvétius thus portrays human beings as 
substantially and inevitably directed by their passions in both thought and action, 
he relinquishes the notion that humans may transcend their immediate passions 
and identify with the common good through their capacity for reasoning.389 
 
The Mind as Passive 
With this conception of human understanding as a collection of ideas endowed 
with sensibility, Helvétius discards the last vestige of the notion that the mind is 
an active and autonomous entity.390 Thus we have seen that while Locke 
maintained that the mind solely acquires its simple ideas through sensation or 
reflection, he nonetheless assumed that the mind is active, and has considerable 
liberty in the way it structures simple ideas into more complex aggregates and 
then connects these to each other. This assumption also applies to mixed modes 
– the type of ideas used in moral reasoning. Locke therefore considered the mind 
an entity independent from both its ideas and sensations. Yet despite Locke’s 
extensive account of the operations of the understanding, he never truly explains 
the origin or properties of this autonomous mind. Consequently, Locke seems to 
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retain an almost Cartesian notion of the mind as a thinking thing, but without 
openly acknowledging or explaining its role in higher cognitive functions.391  In 
the previous chapter, we have seen that Condillac had already dismissed Locke’s 
implicit assumption that the mind is an autonomous entity with innate cognitive 
faculties as incoherent. Instead, Condillac maintained that our cognitive 
operations are nothing but habits developed through sensation and the use of 
language.  
With his conception of the mind as nothing but a collection of ideas 
endowed with sensibility, Helvétius thus follows Condillac in the rejection of 
Locke’s tacit assumption that the mind would have innate cognitive faculties. Yet 
Helvétius does not adopt Condillac’s alternative explanation of man’s cognitive 
faculties as developed through language. To be sure, we have seen in the 
previous chapter that Condillac’s theory is not without its own problems. But at 
least Condillac’s account of the cognitive uses of language provides some 
explanation of how human understanding can advance beyond the level of mere 
instinct. By contrast, Helvétius’s theory of language is limited to the recognition 
that moral concepts are tied to terms with a conventional signification. 
Accordingly, Helvétius presents a very reductionist theory of the human mind as 
nothing more than a collection of ideas endowed with sensibility – a theory 
sometimes classified by modern scholars as a form of ‘sensationism.’392 Yet 
without Condillac’s account of the role of language in cognition, Helvétius’s 
theory of the mind has difficulty explaining how human beings can possess the 
higher cognitive faculties that distinguish them from animals.  
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Helvétius nonetheless attempts to render his theory more convincing by 
providing alternative explanations for certain properties of human nature. 
Firstly, in view of his claim that the mind is not free to make its own judgments, 
but instead merely senses the similarities and differences between ideas, 
Helvétius must explain how it is possible that humans unquestionably and 
continuously err in their judgments. Helvétius considers errors of judgment not 
as mistakes in reasoning made by an autonomously reflective mind, but rather as 
the accidental cause of external factors: 
 
J’ai montré les vraies causes de nos faux jugemens; j’ai fait voir que toutes les erreurs 
de l’esprit ont leur source ou dans les passions, ou dans l’ignorance, soit de certains 
faits, soit de la vraie signification de certains mots. L’erreur n’est donc pas 
essentiellement attachée { la nature de l’esprit humain ; nos faux jugemens sont donc 
l’effet de causes accidentelles, qui ne supposent point en nous une faculté de juger 




Claiming that errors do not originate in the nature of the mind itself, Helvétius 
identifies three external causes for its mistakes. Thus faulty conclusions may 
simply be caused by an insufficient grasp of the facts of empirical reality, and 
therefore by ignorance rather than error of judgment. In addition, Helvétius 
claims that the passions may subvert the accurate perception of the relations 
between ideas – a position we have already encountered in our discussion of the 
role of self-interest in cognition. Thirdly, following Condillac’s exploration of the 
role of language in cognition, Helvétius agrees that errors of judgment may also 
be caused by ignorance of the proper signification of words. As we will see in our 
subsequent discussion of Helvétius’s ethical theory, the role of language as a 
source of error is especially significant to reflections on morality – a subject 
entirely conducted through concepts tied to linguistics terms without a direct 
connection to empirical reality. 
Secondly, Helvétius must concede that, despite his conception of the 
mind as devoid of any innate characteristics, individuals nonetheless display a 
distinct disparity in their intellectual abilities. As he denies that these disparities 
may be caused by differences in physical or mental organisation, Helvétius 
maintains that this disparity can only be explained by the fact that all minds are 
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comprised of different ideas, as no two individuals experience entirely the same 
sensations:  
 
D’où provient donc l’extrême inégalité des esprits ? de ce que personne ne voit 
précisément les mêmes objets ; ne s’est précisément trouvé dans les mêmes 
positions ; n’a reçu la même éducations ; et de ce qu’enfin le hazard qui préside { 
notre instruction ne conduit pas tous les hommes à des mines également riches et 
fécondes. C’est donc { l’éducation prise dans toute l’étendue du sens qu’on peut 
attacher { ce mot, et dans lequel même l’idée du hazard se trouve comprise qu’on 




Rejecting any form of innatism, Helvétius claims that all the manifest differences 
between individuals – in intellectual capacities as well as personal character – are 
solely the consequence of differences in the collections of ideas that comprise 
their minds. As Helvétius thinks that the mind itself consists of nothing but the 
ideas it acquires through experience, he concludes that there is only one method 
to compose a sound mind: acquire the right ideas. Subsequently, we will see that 
this conclusion is at the basis of Helvétius’s insistence on the importance of 
education. 
 Ultimately, Helvétius simplifies the main tenets of previous empiricist 
thinkers to the extent that his philosophy arguably no longer presents a 
satisfactory theory of human nature.395 Following Helvétius’s repudiation of any 
form of cognitive autonomy, it is questionable whether according to his theory 
human beings could still be said to think or reason. In addition, Helvétius accords 
the passions an inescapable influence over human thought and action. 
Consequently, Helvétius depicts the mind as nothing more than a collection of 
ideas, while its cognitive processes and abilities are nothing more than the blind 
interaction of its ideas, set in motion and even controlled by its passions and 
sentiments. According to this conception of the mind, human nature is thus 
entirely determined by instinct. In many ways, Helvétius’s conception of man is 
reminiscent of the sensitive statue depicted in Condillac’s Treatise on Sensations, 
or of human nature as described in de la Mettrie’s L’homme machine. In fact, 
Helvétius himself invites this comparison when he states that: ‘L’Homme est une 
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machine qui mise en mouvement par la sensibilité physique doit faire tout ce 
qu’elle exécute.’396 
  
Self-Interest and Morality 
In the preceding section, we have seen that Helvétius’s epistemology discards all 
autonomous faculties of the mind and claims that all cognitive processes are 
occasioned by the interaction of ideas acquired through experience and directed 
by the passions. Accordingly, Helvétius follows Locke in rejecting the notion that 
human beings would have some innate faculty of reason that would allow them 
to distinguish right from wrong. Yet Helvétius also explicitly dismisses the idea – 
first mentioned by Shaftesbury and subsequently developed by Hutcheson, 
Rousseau and Hume among others – that human sensibility not only includes 
sensations of empirical objects imbued with pleasure and pain, but also certain 
moral sentiments.397 Instead, Helvétius constructs his entire system of ethics on 
the only remaining normative element of human nature – the interest to attain 
pleasure and avoid pain: 
 
Si l’Univers physique est soumis aux lois du mouvement, l’Univers moral ne l’est pas 
moins { celles de l’intérêt. L’intérêt est sur la terre le puissant enchanteur qui change 




According to Helvétius, humans are ingrained with such an unavoidable 
tendency to promote their self-interest that any theory of morality seeking to 
regulate their actions would have to take this tendency as its starting point. 
Helvétius subsequently attempts to demonstrate that all our actions can indeed 
be explained as the consequence of the interest to attain pleasure and avoid 
pain.399 For instance, in order to explain why humans sometimes display selfless 
behaviour ostensibly motivated by compassion or benevolence, Helvétius claims 
that even these sentiments are ultimately nothing but a modification of our own 
self-interest, as we expect our benevolent actions to be rewarded in some way or 
another. Helvétius thus takes a rather cynical view of human nature, as even the 
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most noble and altruistic acts, including parental love, turn out to be attempts to 
satisfy our passions and desires.400  
The hedonistic account of human motivation is a preconception common 
to many enlightenment thinkers. Thus some scholars have described Helvétius’s 
hedonism as part of a much broader revival of the Epicurean position in ethics, of 
which La Rochefoucauld, Gassendi, Mandeville, and La Mettrie are often 
considered the primary proponents.401 Yet some of Helvétius’s contemporaries 
considered his uncompromising position that all human thoughts and actions are 
occasioned by a desire for pleasure or aversion of pain as too reductionist an 
account of human motivation. Thus Diderot, who agreed that human beings are 
often motivated by their desires and aversions, nonetheless called out Helvétius 
on his simplistic theory of human motivation:  
 
Hé bien, Mr. Helvétius, tous les projets d’un grand roi, toutes les fatigues d’un grand 
ministre ou d’un grand magistrat, toutes les méditations d’un politique, d’un homme 
de génie, se réduisent donc à foutre un coup le matin et à faire un étron le soir. Et 




Diderot’s objection is that despite the fact that individuals are commonly 
motivated by desires or aversions, not all human behaviour can be explained as 
directly their consequence. For Diderot, some thoughts or actions are not simply 
the product of immediate self-interest, but are occasioned by ulterior 
motivations, such as the love of beauty, truth, virtue or justice. Diderot further 
explores this question of human motivation in several of his other works, such as 
in the Le neveu de Rameau, a fictional dialogue between a high-minded 
philosopher with a love of truth and virtue, and the nephew of the famous 
composer – a scoundrel who sees the pursuit of pleasure as his sole objective.403 
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Yet as neither interlocutor succeeds in presenting a convincing case for their 
view of human nature, the dialogue ends in aporia – perhaps signifying that 
Diderot himself would not take a definitive position on the question of the origins 
of human motivation.404 
As Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac also ascribed to a hedonistic account of 
human motivation, Diderot’s objection may also apply to their moral philosophy. 
Indeed, David Hume raised an objection similar to that of Diderot against what 
he perceived as Hobbes’s account of human motivation.405 Yet beyond their 
similarity in presuppositions, there is an important difference between 
Helvétius’s theory and the moral philosophy of either Hobbes or Locke. Thus in 
previous chapters, we have seen that both Hobbes and Locke ascribed to 
individuals the ability for careful deliberation, by which a person may ascertain 
whether it would be prudent to pursue or ignore a certain passion. Thus 
according to Hobbes, human beings may use their ability for reasoning – which is 
itself developed through the use of language – to ascertain the long-term 
consequences of their actions. Although we have seen that Locke’s account of 
moral reasoning is less straightforward, he too ascribes to human beings the 
ability to determine the prudence of their actions. This capacity for prudential 
reasoning not only ascribes to human beings the ability to go beyond personal 
experiences and immediate desires by reflecting on their long term interests, but 
also to identify a rule of morality that would safeguard the well-being of 
themselves as well as society as a whole.  
Yet in view of Helvétius’s theory of the understanding, it is not clear to 
what extent he would ascribe to human beings the same ability for practical 
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deliberation and moral reasoning. This issue first emerges in his account of the 
origin of society. Evoking Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, Helvétius 
maintains that before the establishment of society, all individuals seek to satisfy 
their passions and desires without regard for each other, leading to widespread 
conflict.406 In the absence of laws, there is no rule of justice and consequently ‘Ce 
n’est ni l’équité, ni même l’apparence de l’équité qui juge entre le foible et le 
puissant ; mais la force, le crime et la tyrannie.’407 As Helvétius claims that in the 
state of nature the right of the strongest reigns, he criticises the claim that 
human beings have a natural tendency for sociability as unintelligible and 
speculative.408 But Helvétius then maintains that sociability will nonetheless 
develop out of the concern for self-interest of individuals: 
 
L’intérêt et le besoin sont le principe de toute sociabilité. Ce principe (dont peu 
d’Ecrivains ont donné des idées nettes) est donc le seul qui unisse les hommes 
entr’eux. Aussi la force de leur union est-elle toujours proportionnée à celle et de 




Echoing Pufendorf’s as well as Condillac's accounts of the origin of sociability, 
Helvétius maintains that at some point humans in the state of nature realised 
that their self-interest would be better served if they pursued it in coordination 
rather than in competition with each other.410 It is this insight that is at the basis 
of the emergence of both morality and the state.  
 Yet upon Helvétius’s own theory of human understanding, it is not clear 
how this insight would occur to man in the state of nature, without any previous 
experience of society. First of all, Helvétius’s theory lacks an account of practical 
deliberation by which human beings can foresee the long-term consequences of 
their actions. As we have seen, Helvétius’s conception of human nature is similar 
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to that of Condillac’s animated statue – a being immediately impelled by its 
desires and aversions. In the absence of the ability for long-term prudential 
reasoning, it is unclear how such a being could foresee the benefits of society 
without ever having experienced sociable existence. Secondly, Helvétius’s theory 
of the understanding also fails to explain how human beings are capable of 
devising moral concepts – ideas not directly acquired through experience. 
Consequently, it is difficult to see how Helvétius could explain that human beings 
in the state of nature acquire or construct the various moral concepts required 
for the institution of society. In view of these deficiencies, Helvétius’s account of 
the origin of society is especially susceptible to Rousseau’s critique, discussed 
more extensively in our next chapter, that moral philosophers often presuppose 
civilised man, in possession of extensive foresight as well as moral concepts, for 
natural man in their account of the state of nature. 
  
Self-Interest and Utilitarianism 
After considering the origin of society, Helvétius turns to the question of the 
purpose of the state. Concerning this issue, Helvétius again follows Hobbes at 
first, but nonetheless introduces a novel element into his political theory. Thus 
starting out from the assumption that all humans seek to satisfy their desires, 
Hobbes maintains that the primary purpose of the sovereign is to regulate 
conflicts among citizens that result from the self-interested pursuit of their 
desires. Helvétius does not dispute Hobbes’s point, stating that public interest 
requires citizens ‘s’enchaîner par des Loix sages, et se mettre dans l’heureuse 
impuissance de se nuire.’411 This legislation would then not merely dole out 
punishments for the self-serving, it would also reward self-sacrifice in service of 
the common good.412 Yet besides restraining and rewarding citizens, Helvétius 
thinks that laws should also provide society with favourable circumstances for its 
inhabitants: 
 
Des Loix sages pourroient sans doute opérer le prodige d’une félicité universelle. Tous 
les Citoyens ont-ils quelque propriété ? Tous sont-ils dans un certain état d’aisance, 
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peuvent-ils par un travail de sept ou huit heures subvenir abondamment à leur 




For Helvétius, the role of morality and the state is thus not merely to provide 
security by preventing and mediating conflicts among citizens. The state is also 
expected to take a more active role in securing the happiness of its citizens – for 
instance by securing an even distribution of wealth. Thus Helvétius states that 
the immediate objective of morality and the state is to secure ‘le bonheur du plus 
grand nombre.’414 
By adopting this principle, Helvétius clearly prefigures Jeremy Bentham’s 
famous principle that the objective of morality is ‘the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number.’415 Some historians of moral philosophy have therefore 
identified Helvétius as Bentham’s precursor and thereby as one of the first 
thinkers to formulate a consistent and unmitigated theory of utilitarianism – 
even if these historians often do not discuss his philosophy at length and focus on 
the development of the theory in Britain during the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.416 In fact, the similarities between the two eighteenth-
century utilitarian thinkers had already been recognised by John Stuart Mill, who 
noted that ‘the premises of Bentham are all clearly given by Helvétius.’417 There is 
certainly a kernel of truth in this analysis – albeit with two caveats. First of all, 
the difference between Helvétius’s utilitarianism and Hobbes’s position on the 
role of the state is in emphasis rather than principle. Thus Hobbes would not 
have denied that ultimately, the function of the sovereign is to secure the well-
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being of its subjects. Helvétius merely accords the state a more active role in 
guaranteeing the happiness of its citizens. 
Secondly, Helvétius was not the only eighteenth century French thinker 
to prefigure later formulations of utilitarianism. Thus many Philosophes, 
including Diderot, d’Holbach, Voltaire, Condillac and arguably even Rousseau, 
employed utilitarian arguments in their critique of contemporary political and 
social practices.418 For example, in his Supplément au voyage de Bougainville, 
Diderot claimed that French sexual mores and marriage laws promoted neither 
private nor public happiness, and should therefore be revised.419 The same 
method is also employed by Helvétius, who supports his endless diatribes against 
the Ancien régime and the Catholic Church with the argument that they both 
obstruct individuals in the pursuit of their self-interest and harm the public good. 
Seen in this light, Helvétius’s utilitarianism could be considered as much as a 
convenient starting point for his critique of public affairs, as an innovation in 
moral philosophy. Nonetheless, there is at least one major difference between 
Helvétius’s theory and that of contemporary Philosophes. Whereas the latter 
often employed utilitarian arguments, Helvétius was the only French thinker to 
take ‘le bonheur du plus grand nombre’ as the fundamental principle of his moral 
philosophy. Arguably, this is sufficient reason to designate Helvétius the first 
thinker to present an unambiguous formulation of moral utilitarianism. 
 
The Reform of Society 
Starting out from this utilitarian principle, Helvétius subsequently maintains that 
current legislation and moral convention often conflict both with the private 
interests of individuals and with the public good of society as a whole, lamenting 
that ‘la morale actuelle, comme je viens de le dire, n’est qu’un tissu d’erreurs et 
de contradictions grossieres.’420 The main problem is that the moral conventions 
currently prevalent in society are antiquated and often privilege certain groups 
over society as a whole. Both the law and public morality are thus full of these 
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préjugés – moral or legal conventions that contradict Helvétius’s utilitarian 
principle of morality as the greatest good of the greatest number. Yet unlike 
Bernard Mandeville, who also believed that prevailing moral conventions often 
pervert the common interest, Helvétius does not conclude that the notion of 
public morality may never be anything other than a scam, invented and 
promoted by skilful politicians ‘that they might reap the Fruits of the Labour and 
Self-denial of others’421 Mandeville maintained that in the absence of a morality 
of the common good, the private vices of individuals would in fact lead to public 
benefits, claiming that man’s ‘vilest and most hateful Qualities are the most 
necessary Accomplishments to fit him for the largest, and according to the 
World, the happiest and most flourishing Societies.’422  
Helvétius agreed with Mandeville to the extent that he recognises that 
certain passions conventionally considered as vices in private individuals, such as 
the desire for luxury, may turn out to be beneficial to the public interest. Yet for 
Helvétius the unbridled pursuit of individual passions would certainly lead to 
excessive conflict among individuals and therefore subvert the public good. 
According to Helvétius, the goal of securing the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number is then accomplished not simply by restraining the passions of 
individuals, but rather by redirecting them towards the public good: 
 
Je dis que tous les hommes ne tendent qu’{ leur bonheur ; qu’on ne peut les 
soustraire à cette tendance ; qu’il seroit inutile de l’entreprendre, et dangereux d’y 
réussir ; que par conséquent, l’on ne peut les rendre vertueux qu’en unissant l’intérêt 




The purpose of morality and legislation is thus to harness the passions of 
individuals and align their private interests with the common good, leading to 
self-interested behaviour that nonetheless benefits society as a whole.424 Far 
from denying the necessity of virtue and morality, Helvétius thus maintains that 
established morality and legislation should be reformed, cleansing it of 
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accumulated prejudice favouring the interests of factions and re-aligning it with 
the public good.425 Consequently, Helvétius states that: ‘par ce mot de vertu, l’on 
ne peut entendre que le desir du bonheur général ; que, par conséquent, le bien 
public est l’objet de la vertu.’426 Helvétius subsequently presents public debate as 
the most suitable method for the identification of the public interest.427 
Yet Helvétius also thinks that a reformed utilitarian morality should be 
actively promoted and fostered among citizens in society. Helvétius therefore 
presents two proposals for the implementation of reformed morality that clearly 
conform to his theory of the mind as a passive entity. The first element of this 
plan is to educate – or indoctrinate – individuals with proper moral ideas. We 
have already seen that following his eradication of all innate properties from his 
conception of the mind, Helvétius maintains that the thoughts of human beings 
are merely the consequence of the perception of relations between ideas already 
present within the understanding. This principle equally applies to ideas of 
morality, which in Helvétius’s view are ultimately merely conventional. The 
moral outlook of individuals is therefore wholly determined by ideas acquired 
from their social environment.428 In Helvétius’s view, the moral outlook of his 
contemporaries is therefore shaped by the prejudices pervading society. To 
remedy this situation, Helvétius maintains first of all that proper moral education 
is crucial for the implementation of a morality in line with the common interest. 
For instance, Helvétius proposes a secular catechism to be taught to school 
children, expounding and inculcating a morality conducive to the common good 
– thereby prefiguring Mably’s Catéchisme du citoyen, published two years before 
the French Revolution.429 
Yet this reform of morality through education would have to go hand in 
hand with a revision of moral terminology. Following Locke and Condillac, 
Helvétius maintains that moral reflection and judgment is conducted through the 
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consideration of moral concepts attached to certain conventional terms. 
Furthermore, these moral ideas are peculiar in that they are not acquired directly 
through experience of empirical reality, but rather transmitted through language. 
According to Helvétius, this has caused widespread confusion in the moral 
concepts prevalent in society: 
  
Faute d’une éducation saine, les hommes n’ont de la bonté morale que des idées 
obscures. Ce mot bonté arbitrairement employé par eux, ne rappelle à leur souvenir 
que les diverses applications qu’ils en ont entendu faire ; applications toujours 
différentes et contradictoires, selon la diversité, et des intérêts et des positions de 
ceux avec lesquels ils vivent. Pour convenir universellement de la signification du mot 





In this passage, Helvétius adopts the perspective on the role of language in 
cognition that was developed by Condillac out of Locke’s reflections on language 
in book III of the Essay. In the preceding chapter, we have seen that Condillac 
worried that the imprecision and inaccuracy of linguistic conventions would 
affect the composition of ideas, thereby determining our reasoning. Helvétius 
agrees with Condillac that over the course of history, language has gradually 
become a defective method of communication.431 Particularly terms regarding 
politics, metaphysics and morality have become flawed and imprecise in 
signification. Helvétius subsequently echoes Condillac’s suggestion that language 
should be reformed wholesale, with a more modest proposal for the definition of 
moral terminology. 
 In previous chapters, we have seen that Locke and Condillac had also 
advised the reform of both education and linguistic conventions – in particular 
with regard to moral terminology. Ultimately, Helvétius’s proposals for the 
reform of education and language do not seem fundamentally different from 
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those of his predecessors. Yet when placed in the broader context of his 
philosophy, Helvétius’s proposals turn out to have greater implications. Thus we 
have seen that Helvétius conceives the mind as nothing more than a receptacle of 
ideas without any cognitive autonomy. According to Helvétius’s theory, this 
entails that our moral outlook is entirely determined by the moral conventions 
prevalent in our social environment.432 Consequently, Helvétius seems to think 
that humans are not naturally moral beings, but can only be made virtuous by 
inculcating them with moral concepts in line with the common good.433 Unlike 
Hobbes and Locke, Helvétius does not claim that individuals may use their reason 
to perceive the moral guidelines that would lead them to felicity. Rather, 
Helvétius sees morality as a conventional rule disseminated through education 
and language that would direct citizens towards the common good. The result is 
a conception of society in which the state is responsible both for the elimination 
of prejudice and the dissemination of a morality that directs its citizens to the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen that Helvétius proceeds from the same presuppositions as his 
empiricist predecessors including Hobbes, Locke and Condillac. Consequently, 
Helvétius’s thought displays several characteristics that we have also 
encountered in our previous chapters. Thus like other empiricists, Helvétius’s 
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hedonist conception of the Good leads him to a consequentialist notion of 
morality. Helvétius then employs this conception of morality as his fundamental 
position for his critique of contemporary society. In addition, Helvétius also 
follows his empiricist predecessors in their refusal to ascribe human 
understanding any innate ideas or properties, leading him to the conclusion that 
the content of the mind is entirely derived from sensation. Like Locke and 
Condillac, Helvétius then concludes that the moral outlook of individuals is 
therefore dependent upon both proper education and a correct understanding of 
the conventional meaning of moral terms. This conclusion then provides 
Helvétius with the theoretical framework for his proposed reforms of society. 
 At the same time, we have seen that Helvétius simplifies the theories of 
his empiricist predecessors, leading to a reductionist conception of human 
nature. Thus Helvétius presents man as an instinctual being, driven by desires 
and entirely determined by the ideas that happen to comprise his mind. 
Helvétius’s simplified conception of human nature then also magnifies many 
positions in his moral and political philosophy. Thus in previous chapters we 
have seen that their hedonist conception of the Good had led Hobbes, Locke and 
Condillac to a consequentialist theory of morality. Yet it is only Helvétius who 
draws the unmitigated utilitarian conclusion from this premise that it is the 
purpose of morality and the state to cater to the desires and aversions of 
individuals. Furthermore, we have previously seen that following their 
empiricism, both Locke and Condillac considered it crucial that human beings are 
exposed to the right kind of ideas – hence their interest in the reform of both 
language and education. Yet following his theory of the mind, Helvétius takes 
these concerns to a whole new level. Thus for Helvétius, man can only become 
virtuous by being inculcated with moral ideas that direct him towards the 
common good. As Helvétius appears to suggest that it is ultimately the 
responsibility of the state to disseminate the right moral notions among its 
citizens, this position inadvertently leads him to what may be described as a 
totalitarian conclusion. 











































    
 
 
5. From Empiricism to Perfectibility: Rousseau on the Flexibility 
of Human Nature and Morality 
 
Introduction 
Like the thinkers discussed in our previous chapters, Rousseau bases his moral 
and political philosophy on a theory of human nature that describes man’s 
intellectual abilities and explains the various motivations behind human 
behaviour.434 Yet in many respects, Rousseau’s theory of human nature exceeds 
that of his predecessors. To begin with, Rousseau clearly had profound insight 
into human psychology, providing explanations for the behaviour of individuals 
as well as groups of people compelling enough that they are still referenced in 
order to explain contemporary social and political developments.435 Yet the most 
important innovation of Rousseau’s theory of human nature compared to that of 
his predecessors is that he no longer viewed human nature as universal and 
largely fixed, but rather as fluid and subject to historical development largely 
determined by external factors. In Rousseau’s own words, his predecessors had 
failed to appreciate that human nature is ‘perfectible.’ 
 Yet while this idea of the perfectibility of human nature is clearly an 
innovation, we will discover that Rousseau’s theory of human nature is 
nonetheless elaborated on preconceptions largely adopted from Hobbes, Locke, 
and Condillac. Thus we will see that a crucial component of Rousseau’s theory of 
the perfectibility of man is the idea, derived from Locke and above all Condillac, 
that reason is not innate to human nature, but rather an ability acquired 
gradually and dependent upon the development of language. Concurring with his 
empiricist predecessors that the composition of complex ideas requires the use of 
words, Rousseau also thinks that the human intellect has only developed beyond 
the level of that of other animals with the invention of language. Accordingly, 
Rousseau thinks that the simultaneous development of language and human 
understanding is the cause for the evolution of all other perfectible properties of 
human nature. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that Rousseau, influenced by 
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Hobbes’s account of practical deliberation, maintains that man’s passions have 
expanded in proportion to the development of reason. Finally, we will see that 
Rousseau ascribes to human nature two properties not encountered in the 
philosophies of his predecessors with an important role in the constitution of 
morality, namely the sentiment of pity and the development of amour propre or 
self-esteem. Yet we will show that even these two properties are modified by the 
perfection of human understanding. 
 Our purpose in this chapter will be threefold. First of all, we will 
demonstrate the extent of Rousseau’s indebtedness to preceding empiricist 
thinkers, and in particular to the philosophers discussed in our preceding 
chapters. We will then see that Rousseau not only borrowed both his 
methodology as well as many of his preconceptions from his predecessors, but 
also that Rousseau develops some of his theories from ideas already implicit in 
the philosophies of Hobbes and Condillac. Secondly, we will also discuss various 
ways in which Rousseau’s conception of human nature provides the basis for his 
moral and political philosophies – thereby pursuing a line of inquiry also 
prominent in our previous chapters. Finally, as a result of this investigation of 
Rousseau’s conception of human nature and its relation to his ethics, we will also 
be in the position to engage with scholarly interpretations of Rousseau moral and 
political philosophy. For instance, our investigation of Rousseau’s moral 
epistemology will lead us to contest a reading of Rousseau’s moral philosophy as 
a form of Platonism. Furthermore, our account of Rousseau’s conception of 
human nature will also allow us to contextualise the political philosophy of the 
Social Contract, presenting it not merely as a theory of popular sovereignty, but 
rather as a plan for the revival of two properties of life in the state of nature that 
had accorded natural man a felicitous existence: liberty and equality. Finally, our 
interpretation will accept Rousseau’s own contention that his thought forms a 
consistent unity.436 As Rousseau’s coherence is sometimes questioned by modern 
scholars, our own reading will also try to show that his philosophy may be 
interpreted without having to question this contention.437 
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 Rousseau expounds his conception of human nature in two separate yet 
related accounts. On the one hand, Rousseau provides a theoretical description of 
the properties and abilities of human nature. Like previous empiricist 
philosophers, Rousseau thus provides an account of the origin of man’s ideas, the 
motivations of his actions, and the development of the faculties of the mind. On 
the other hand, Rousseau also provides a historical account of the concurrent 
development of human nature and society. Following his conception of the 
perfectibility of man, Rousseau presents a conjectural history of the development 
of human nature following the invention of language, institution of society, and 
resulting expansion of human understanding. Our discussion of Rousseau’s 
theory of human nature will begin with a concise overview of this latter 
conjectural history of the development of human nature. Subsequently, we will 
provide a more detailed exploration of Rousseau’s conception of man by 
discussing his theoretical account of human nature. We will investigate 
Rousseau’s epistemology, his theory of the passions and account of practical 
deliberation, as well as his ideas on how the feeling of amour propre and 
sentiment of pity influence man’s behaviour.  On the basis of our detailed 
investigation of Rousseau’s conception of human nature, we will ultimately be in 
the position to provide a distinct perspective on his moral and political 
philosophy. 
 
The State of Nature and the Perfectibility of Man 
Following Hobbes, early-modern moral philosophers often commenced their 
discussion with a version of the thought experiment of the state of nature. In our 
first chapter, we have seen that Hobbes constructs his moral philosophy upon the 
premise that the state of nature is a state of war, caused by man’s fear of death 
and desire for power to fulfil incessant appetite, leading to a scramble over 
resources and a conflict of rights. Hobbes then presents the erection of the 
sovereign as the only viable solution to these problems of life in the state of 
nature. While subsequent thinkers, such as Locke and Pufendorf, amend 
Hobbes’s account on some points, they also conduct a thought experiment of the 
state of nature in order to exhibit why, in view of certain properties of human 
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nature, life in the state of nature is beset with difficulties, and to demonstrate 
that these may only be resolved by the institution of society and centralised 
authority. 
 Rousseau also accords the thought experiment of the state of nature a 
prominent place in his philosophy. But both the purpose and the conclusions of 
his account are fundamentally opposed to those of his predecessors. In fact, 
Rousseau’s depiction of the state of nature is almost entirely the inverse of 
Hobbes’s account. The fundamental premise of Rousseau's account is that human 
beings are naturally good, and that consequently the state of nature is almost 
entirely peaceful.438 Rather than tormented by ever expanding desires, 
Rousseau’s natural man is content with bare necessities. In addition, Rousseau 
contends that natural man does not have any notion of death, and consequently 
does not fear it.439 Furthermore, Rousseau maintains that natural man is for the 
most part a solitary being that only encounters other human beings by chance.440 
Rousseau thinks that these occasional meetings would generally have a peaceful 
outcome, as natural man is moved by a sense of pity that has been almost 
entirely stifled in civilised man.441 Elsewhere, Rousseau concedes that an 
encounter between humans in the state of nature may sometimes lead to a 
confrontation. But he thinks that in an abundance of resources, human beings in 
the state of nature generally coexist peacefully.442 Accordingly, Rousseau's 
account of life in the state of nature neither calls for the institution of society nor 
of any form of centralised authority. 
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 The antithesis between Rousseau’s and Hobbes’s characterisations of life 
in the state of nature follows from a fundamental disagreement on the 
conceptualisation of human nature. To be sure, Rousseau’s objection against 
Hobbes and other moral philosophers including Pufendorf and Locke is not that 
they have employed the wrong methodology in analysing human nature. Like 
Hobbes, Rousseau also employs introspection and observation of human 
behaviour as his primary methods. Neither does Rousseau deny that the 
conceptions of human nature of his predecessors aptly characterise the 
behaviour of modern humans. Rather, Rousseau’s objection against his 
predecessors is that following their method of introspection, they had accepted 
the characteristics of their own mind and of others living in modern society as 
the original properties of human nature. For Rousseau, the primary error of 
Hobbes and his followers had been to simply assume that human nature is both 
universal and static. Yet Rousseau thinks that their efforts have only exhibited 
the characteristics of human nature as it is today, after it has been both perfected 
and disfigured by the concurrent development of reason and society. According 
to Rousseau, Hobbes and his followers therefore did not succeed in 
conceptualising human nature is it had been in the state of nature.443  
Rousseau thus maintains that the shift from the state of nature to society 
not only involved the emergence of morality and the institution of political 
authority, it also caused a transformation of human nature itself. To begin with, 
Rousseau maintains that humans in the state of nature would have had an 
intellect equal to other animals of similar size. Furthermore, Rousseau postulates 
that natural man did not yet have the use of language. In addition, man in the 
state of nature also lacked any sense of morality, as moral concepts are 
inconceivable without the use of words.444 Finally, Rousseau maintains that 
modern man’s incessant desire for pleasure, power, and esteem develop only 
with the advent of society, and that natural man is content to satisfy only his 
most basic urges. Thus Rousseau maintains that Hobbes ‘improperly included in 
Savage man’s care for his preservation the need to satisfy a multitude of passions 
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that are the product of Society and have made Laws necessary.’445 Describing 
natural man as more similar to animals than to modern human beings, Rousseau 
maintains that previous moral philosophers including Hobbes have not identified 
the properties of natural man, and rather ‘spoke of Savage Man and depicted 
Civil man.’446 Accordingly, Rousseau maintains that human nature is flexible and 
has changed dramatically over the course of history. Rousseau himself uses the 
term ‘perfectibility’ to refer to the flexibility of human nature. This term may 
suggest that Rousseau considered human nature as proceeding from primitive 
origins towards a certain form of perfection. Yet Rousseau does not retain a 
teleological conception of human nature. He merely thinks that human beings 
possess a number of latent faculties that remain dormant in the state of nature, 
but which can be developed in a variety of ways depending on external 
circumstances.  
 Rousseau presents the perfectibility of human nature as the most 
significant property distinguishing man from the animals.447 Yet Rousseau thinks 
that this perfectibility depends in turn on two properties unique to human 
nature. The first of these is human liberty. Rousseau’s statements on the question 
whether humans possess freedom of the will are somewhat ambiguous, giving 
rise to scholarly disagreement on the issue. On the one hand, Rousseau 
sometimes appears to defend metaphysical arguments in favour of the idea that 
human beings have free will.448 On the other hand, Rousseau elsewhere provides 
a largely mechanistic account of the process of the formation of the will, 
suggesting a compatibilist view on human liberty similar to that of Hobbes and 
Locke.449 Yet we will presently forego a more extensive discussion of this issue, as 
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the precise interpretation of Rousseau's conception of human liberty is not of 
crucial importance to our wider discussion.450 For our present purposes, it is 
sufficient to understand Rousseau’s conception of human liberty merely as the 
capacity of humans to adapt their way of life. Thus whereas the behaviour of 
animals is strictly regulated by instinct, both history and what today we might 
call anthropological evidence have shown that human beings are free to choose 
many different ways of living. Rousseau thereby presents man’s independence 
from instinct as empirical evidence for human liberty.451 At the same time, this 
independence from instinct is also an important precondition for the 
perfectibility of human nature. Rousseau thereby suggests that man’s 
perfectibility is only made possible by man’s liberty. 
 The second property of human nature Rousseau considers essential to 
man’s perfectibility is the ability – itself dormant in natural man – to acquire 
conventional language.452 According to Rousseau, language is not merely a means 
for communication essential to sociability, but it is also essential to the 
development of all of man’s other perfectible qualities. The main reason why 
Rousseau maintains that language enables man’s perfectibility is that, influenced 
by the empiricist philosophers we have discussed in previous chapters, he thinks 
that words are essential to the composition of complex ideas. This ability, unique 
to human beings, is in turn fundamental to all other of man’s perfectible 
properties. Among the complex ideas that human beings are able to construct 
through the use of words are abstract and universal ideas, as well as moral 
concepts. Consequently, Rousseau thinks that all of man’s perfectible qualities, 
including the capacity for intellectual reason, foresight, and the ability to live 
sociably according to shared moral conventions, are ultimately the consequence 
of the ability to construct complex ideas, which is in turn made possible by the 
use of words. 
 In the following, we will investigate Rousseau’s theory of the 
perfectibility of human nature in greater detail. Rousseau provides two separate 
accounts of the theory of human perfectibility. His first explanation, found in his 
Second Discourse, is a conjectural history of human development, detailing how 
through successive innovations natural man gradually evolved into the civilised 
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man of modern times. Yet in his educational treatise Émile, as well as scattered 
throughout the conjectural history of the Second Discourse, Rousseau also 
provides a more theoretical account of the perfectible properties of human 
nature.453 Our investigation will focus mainly on this theoretical description of 
human nature. Yet as both accounts are intertwined, we first require an outline 
of Rousseau’s conjectural history in order to fully understand his theory of 
human nature. We will therefore begin our discussion with a brief overview of 
Rousseau’s account of the state of nature and development of society, and 
afterwards turn our attention towards his theoretical account of human nature.  
 
From the State of Nature to Society 
Rousseau’s conjectural history subdivides human development into four different 
stages.454 As we have seen above, Rousseau thinks that in the state of nature man 
has a solitary and animal existence. This first stage is followed by a second era of 
slowly developing sociability. Rousseau recounts how natural man must have 
been forced to abandon his innocent and happy existence due to a shortage of 
resources following natural disasters and population growth.455 In the period that 
followed, human beings slowly settled into what might be called a tribal 
existence. Living in small bands the size of extended families, these tribal 
humans gradually learned to live together.456 The most important factor in this 
early development of sociability was the emergence of primitive language. It not 
only allowed tribal humans to cooperate, but also to form lasting and more 
extensive social and moral bonds. At the same time, primitive language also 
expanded man’s dormant intellectual abilities, as it allowed tribal man to 
compose ever more complex ideas, thereby gradually causing the development of 
reason.457 Rousseau thinks that most primitive tribes found in the modern world 
have attained this tribal stage of existence. Rousseau also considers this tribal 
stage the happiest period in human existence, during which man progressed 
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beyond a purely animal existence, while the conflicts and oppression that 
characterise subsequent eras are still largely absent.458 
 Rousseau locates the conflict and disorder that characterises previous 
descriptions of the state of nature, such as those of Hobbes, Locke and Pufendorf, 
only in the third era of his conjectural history of human development. During 
this period, man’s enhanced intellect enabled the invention of agriculture and 
metallurgy, prompting man to switch from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle. Yet 
the most important novelty of this period was a moral invention: the notion of 
property. Although not made with malicious intent, the invention of private 
property is in Rousseau’s view the principal origin of man’s subsequent 
hardships.459 In the period before the invention of property, humans had lived in 
equality, as both land and natural resources were considered common goods. 
Consequently, men had no reason to envy or desire each other’s possessions. Yet 
when some men converted to a sedentary lifestyle and started to consider their 
land and its yields as their own, they unwittingly instituted a form of inequality. 
This not only caused humans to envy and contest each other’s private 
possessions, but also required the propertied to actively defend their assets. As a 
result, Rousseau thinks that only during this third stage in human development 
the state of conflict arose that Hobbes locates in the state of nature.460 
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 Rousseau finally locates the institution of civil society and the state in the 
fourth era of his conjectural history of human development. Yet Rousseau does 
not follow Hobbes in portraying the institution of the state as the outcome of a 
voluntary social contract in which citizens subject to a sovereign in order to end 
the state of war detrimental to the interests of all. Rather, Rousseau thinks the 
state was created to protect the interests and property of the wealthy and 
privileged, thereby institutionalising the inequality that had developed during the 
third era of human development.461 Whereas previously there had only been 
natural inequality between human beings caused by differences in physical 
strength and intellectual capacity, the emergence of civil society introduced a 
moral inequality far more consequential. Furthermore, the maintenance of this 
inequality required the institution of a government that safeguarded the interests 
of the privileged rather than the common good of society as a whole. As a result, 
Rousseau thinks that as they have arisen historically, most modern states – 
including contemporary France – have developed into despotic societies.462 
 Rousseau’s conjectural history therefore does not portray the gradual 
emergence of society as a positive development. Yet by themselves, inequality 
and despotism are not even its most regrettable consequences. Even more 
lamentable is the fact that in concurrence with the emergence of society, human 
nature itself has been modified in such a way that modern man has become a 
contradictory and almost inevitably miserable being. Thus while man’s 
intellectual awakening has not only allowed him to acquire scientific knowledge 
and devise all kinds of ingenious inventions, it has also caused an inflation of his 
desires. Whereas natural man had been content with the satisfaction of his 
primary needs, civil man’s increased imagination and awareness of the 
incalculable forms of pleasure available in modern society has inflamed his 
passions far beyond his natural desires. As it is hardly ever possible to satisfy all 
these artificial passions, Rousseau thinks that civil man is doomed always to 
remain unhappy, as certain forms of luxury or achievement are bound to remain 
ever beyond his grasp. 
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 Yet the inflation of the passions of civilised man is not the only source of 
his misery. In addition, Rousseau thinks that by living together in society, human 
beings develop the urge to be esteemed and admired by their fellows. Rousseau 
maintains that human beings are naturally endowed with what he refers to as 
amour de soi – a benign form of self-love that induces man to care for his own 
preservation. Yet during the emergence of society, this self-love generally 
mutates into a form of self-esteem which Rousseau calls amour-propre. After 
natural man’s intellectual awakening, human beings become able to compare 
themselves to the people with whom they now live together. Consequently, the 
harmless amour de soi of natural man develops into amour-propre that causes 
civilised man to value himself over others. This self-esteem then causes civilised 
man to long for a confirmation of his significance in the form of the esteem of his 
fellows. Amour-propre is therefore the main reason for civilised man’s desire for 
honour and reputation, and thereby the primary cause of ambition. Yet Rousseau 
thinks that amour-propre is also an important cause of civilised man’s misery. As 
it induces us to value ourselves more than others, the demands of amour-propre 
can be met only if others also esteem us more than they value themselves. But 
because everyone in modern society is subject to the same form of selfishness, no 
individual will be able to obtain the desired esteem. 
Rousseau thus presents man’s development as the unfortunate 
progression from a simple yet innocent creature, content within its environment, 
into an intellectually more advanced yet covetous being in need of restraint by an 
oppressive sovereign. The perfectibility of human nature has therefore 
contributed more to the misery than the happiness of man.463 For this reason, 
Rousseau’s description has been interpreted by some scholars as a secular 
version of Christian theodicy.464 Like Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, 
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natural man has pursued things that may have seemed attractive or profitable at 
first, but which for various reasons turned out to make him decidedly unhappy – 
losing his innocence in the process. Yet unlike in the case of Christian theodicy, 
Rousseau’s account of the fall of man has been unknown until he uncovered it. 
The reason why others have overlooked the development from natural man into 
civilised man and considered human nature as fixed, is not merely the fact that 
the changes to man’s nature took place very gradually and over a long period of 
time. It is also because the nature of civilised man has been transformed to such 
an extent that it no longer exhibits any traces of natural man. Furthermore, 
modern man has been oblivious to the fact that civil society and the despotic 
state necessarily make him unhappy, as his predicament is legitimised by deeply 
ingrained moral conventions – or prejudices – acquired from childhood. In 
Rousseau’s view, it required a social and intellectual outcast like himself to see 
through these prejudices and beyond man’s artificial properties to uncover man’s 
true nature.465  
Rousseau’s conjectural history thus presents the transformation of 
natural into civil man as a predominantly negative development. To fully 
understand why Rousseau was so pessimistic about life in society, we will now 
proceed with a more comprehensive discussion of his theoretical account of 
human nature. This discussion will explain in greater detail why Rousseau thinks 
that the development of man’s faculties has had such unfortunate consequences. 
To be sure, Rousseau is not a primitivist, as is sometimes thought, who advocates 
a return to life in the state of nature.466 Rather, in his theoretical account of 
man’s perfectibility, Rousseau identifies several ways in which the development 
of human nature has backfired. While the development of man’s faculties 
dramatically increases his capabilities, it may also configure human nature in 
such a way that life in society will make human beings both unhappy and 
ignorant. And Rousseau maintains that unfortunately, the historical development 
of human nature has indeed ensured the misery of civilised man. In the 
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following, we will thus not only explore Rousseau’s theoretical account of human 
perfectibility, but also detail how Rousseau thinks that the development of man’s 
faculties has gone awry. Finally, we will also discuss some of the ways in which 
Rousseau thinks this situation may be remedied. 
 
Ideas, Judgment, and Reason 
Rousseau’s theoretical explanation of man’s perfectibility can be subdivided into 
three distinct accounts that each addresses a certain component of human 
nature. Subsequently, we will deal with Rousseau’s theory of practical 
deliberation as well as with his account of how amour propre and the sentiment 
of pity affect moral relations between humans. But we will begin by discussing 
his theory of the development of human understanding. Rousseau was by no 
means an original thinker on epistemology. Neither did he take the time to 
explain his theory of human understanding in any systematic way. Nonetheless, 
Rousseau’s interest in epistemology, particularly in relation to morality, has often 
been overlooked by commentators.467 In fact, one of the primary arguments of 
this chapter is that even if Rousseau was hardly interested in epistemology for its 
own sake, his theory of human nature, and by extension his moral philosophy, 
are nonetheless dependent upon a theory of human understanding derived from 
earlier empiricist philosophers. 
In his ideas on epistemology, Rousseau often relied on the empiricism of 
Locke’s Essay, which he had closely studied from his early education onwards.468 
Furthermore, as Rousseau himself confesses, he was also heavily influenced by 
Condillac, with whom he had been friends during his years in Paris.469 While 
Rousseau embraces some of Condillac’s innovations, he is also highly critical of 
the reductionist epistemology Helvétius developed on the basis of Condillac’s 
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theory.470 In response, Rousseau often remains closer to Locke’s positions.471 Yet 
while Rousseau borrows many of his epistemological preconceptions from his 
predecessors, we will see that a number of different conclusions lead him to an 
altogether different conception of human nature. In the following sections, we 
will first review Rousseau’s statements on human understanding, and 
subsequently discuss his views on the role of language in cognition. When we 
have acquired a solid grasp of his epistemology, we will be able to fully 
comprehend why Rousseau thought that the expansion of man’s cognitive 
faculties has not been a predominantly positive development. 
 Like any true empiricist, Rousseau takes the position that the mind is a 
tabula rasa at birth and that all ideas are acquired through the senses as his 
fundamental axiom.472 Rousseau thereby follows Condillac in discarding Locke’s 
notion that the mind may also acquire ideas of its own operations through a form 
of introspection called reflection. Like Condillac, Rousseau thus employs the term 
reflection to refer loosely to any form of reasoning.473 Furthermore, Rousseau 
adopts the distinction, introduced by Locke, between simple ideas of sensation 
and complex ideas created by the mind by compounding multiple ideas. Yet 
Rousseau does not take on Locke’s more subtle distinctions between different 
kinds of ideas. As he uses the terms complex or intellectual idea interchangeably 
to refer to any form of compounded idea, it is not always easy to determine 
precisely to which kind of ideas he is referring. It is clear though that moral 
concepts count as intellectual ideas, while Rousseau likely also considers what 
Locke would call abstract or universal ideas of substances as intellectual ideas. 
Another position that Rousseau seems to have borrowed from Locke is 
that ideas are the ‘Workmanship of the Mind.’474 Thus while it is clear that the 
content of our ideas is ultimately derived from experience, Rousseau thinks that 
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our ideas are not identical to sensations. Rather, Rousseau maintains that 
sensations merely provide the raw material out which the mind subsequently 
constructs its ideas: 
 
Dans la sensation, le jugement est purement passif, il affirme qu’on sent ce qu’on 
sent. Dans la perception ou idée, le jugement est actif ; il rapproche, il compare, il 
détermine des rapports que le sens ne détermine pas. Voila toute la différence, mais 





According to Rousseau, ideas are thus not just memorised sense impressions – or 
‘decaying sense’ in Hobbes’s words. Ideas are formed when mind analyses 
sensations and assembles them into ideas, meanwhile establishing connections to 
ideas it has previously compounded. The creation of ideas thus requires active 
judgment. Rousseau thereby explicitly contests Helvétius’s views that the mind 
itself is nothing more than a collection of ideas, that all operations of the mind 
can be reduced to physical sensitivity, and that what is often called judgment is in 
fact nothing but sensing.476 According to Rousseau, human beings are only able 
to proceed beyond the level of mere sensation because they possess a faculty of 
judgment that allows them to collect their experiences into ideas.477 
In this respect, Rousseau again appears to follow Locke, who had also 
maintained that complex ideas are compounded at will, thereby tacitly assuming 
that the mind is an entity separate from its ideas and contains a faculty of 
judgment beyond its ability for sensation.478 Yet unlike Locke, Rousseau does not 
assume that this faculty is innate to human understanding. Likely inspire by 
Condillac, Rousseau thinks that man’s cognitive abilities are habits that develop 
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only gradually and require the proper education to be perfected.479 Thus 
Rousseau repeats Condillac’s thought-experiment of the statue endowed with 
sensibility, inquiring what would happen if we would create a full-grown man 
with the mind of new-born infant. Rousseau’s answer is not merely that the 
mind of this man would be wholly devoid of ideas. He would also lack the 
judgment required to analyse his sensations and catalogue them into ideas. In 
fact, Rousseau maintains that at first, this infant man would not even be able to 
make sense of experience, as he lacks the capacity to distinguish one object from 
another.480  
As neither of these basic cognitive abilities is innate to human 
understanding, Rousseau follows Condillac in thinking that the ability to analyse 
sensation and compose ideas with the help of judgment develop only gradually.481 
To some extent, these abilities are acquired through experience itself. Thus 
Rousseau maintains that infants do not yet have the ability to reason, and that 
consequently their memory is filled with images rather than ideas.482 Rousseau 
subsequently outlines the lengthy process by which children learn to distinguish 
one object from another. He also thinks that at some point children will 
instinctively start to connect the ideas of objects that occur successively, thereby 
leading to the ability to perceive causal relations through induction.483 As human 
beings acquire by experience the ability to analyse sensations as well as at least 
some aptitude in judgment, they will also learn to interact with their 
environment. This is the reason why natural man can take care of his 
preservation, despite the fact that without any education or language, his 
intellectual development is entirely due to experience. 
 Rousseau maintains that by attaining greater aptitude in judgment – in 
other words, by becoming more skilled in compounding and relating ideas – 
human beings will increase their ability to reason. Like the empiricist thinkers 
we encountered in previous chapters, Rousseau therefore does not consider 
                                                          
479 
There may be a tension between the idea that man’s mental operations are nothing but habits, 
and the notion that man possesses a faculty of judgment separate from the ideas acquired through 
sensation – a tension that is left unresolved in Rousseau’s own writings.  
480 
Rousseau, Émile I p.280. Rousseau thereby implicitly takes sides in the debate over the 
Molyneux question, as he claims that the mind does not have the innate ability to distinguish the 
objects of sensation, but requires practice to acquire it. 
481 
Rousseau, Émile I p.247. 
482 
Rousseau, Émile II p.344. 
483 
Rousseau, Émile III p.482. 
  Ideas, Judgment, and Reason 183 
 
 
reason as an innate and autonomous faculty that may provide insight into eternal 
truths independent from experience.484 Rather, Rousseau follows his empiricist 
predecessors in describing reason as nothing but the composite of all other 
faculties of the mind.485 Reason is therefore not itself a faculty, but rather a term 
to indicate aptitude in analysing, compounding, and relating ideas. Accordingly, 
Rousseau maintains that: ‘sitôt que l’on compare une sensation à un autre on 
raisonne. L’art de juger et l’art de raisoner sont exactement le même.’486 In this 
sense, natural man and even animals can be said to possess some form of reason, 
as both are capable of comparing sensations. For Rousseau, the property that 
distinguishes man from the animals is thus not reason, but rather perfectibility, 
which in turn depends on the ability to construct complex ideas.487 Indeed, 
Rousseau maintains that with regard to the intellect, the difference between man 
and animals is one of degree.488 Accordingly, Rousseau uses the term ‘intellectual 
reason’ to refer specifically to man’s acquired ability to reason with complex 
ideas.489 Reason is thus not a faculty innate to human nature, but rather an 
aptitude in the comparison of ideas – a skill perfected only with much exercise.490 
Yet in order to proceed beyond the intelligence of the beast, natural man 
required an invention that serves both as a method of communication and a 
means to expand the scope of reason by enabling the composition of complex 
ideas. This invention was language. 
 
Language and Ideas 
As Rousseau thinks that the more advanced development of the faculty of reason 
requires the use of language, he thereby adopts an idea that we have encountered 
in all our previous chapters.491 In fact, Rousseau himself admits that his ideas on 
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this topic have been significantly influenced by the philosophy of Condillac.492 
Like Condillac, Rousseau views language as a uniquely human ability that is 
entirely responsible for man’s perfectibility and development beyond a purely 
animal state.493 Rousseau mentions two ways in which language enhances 
human cognition. First of all, Rousseau thinks that the structure of language 
supports human understanding, as he states that ‘Grammar exercises and 
facilitates the operations of the Mind.’494 Rousseau thereby appears to adopt a 
version of Condillac’s view that language allows the mind to extend and 
consolidate the connections between ideas, producing a cognitive network much 
greater than could have been created merely through experience. Unfortunately 
though, Rousseau’s statements on this issue remain somewhat cursory, making it 
difficult to establish whether he fully adopted this element of Condillac’s theory. 
Secondly, Rousseau adopts a view common to all the philosophers we 
have previously considered – namely the theory that at least to some extent, 
ideas depend on words. Again, Rousseau’s view appears to be closest to that of 
Condillac, as he states that the mind can only acquire or understand more 
complex ideas with the help of words: 
 
Besides, general ideas can enter the Mind only with the help of words, and the 
understanding grasps them only by the means of propositions. That is one of the 
reasons why animals could not form such ideas, nor ever acquire the perfectibility 




Rousseau maintains that the uniquely human ability to understand and construct 
general ideas, which are not acquired directly from experience but rather 
constructed by the mind at will, depends entirely upon the use of words. In 
passing, Rousseau thereby affirms that this ability to construct complex ideas is 
the reason why human nature is perfectible. For Rousseau, these kinds of ideas 
are thus so dependent upon words that they cannot be conceived without them. 
Rousseau therefore does not think, as Locke had done, that words merely aid the 
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mind by functioning as headings or knots tying simple ideas together to form a 
complex idea. Thus we have seen previously that Locke held a conceptualist 
position, which entailed that while the mind is certainly aided by the use of 
words when compounding and considering complex ideas, it was not absolutely 
dependent upon them and in theory could do the same without language. 
By contrast, Rousseau maintains in the passage quoted above that when 
considering complex ideas, ‘the understanding grasps them only by the means of 
propositions.’ The content of general ideas is therefore expressed in a definition 
which is itself again comprised of words. Rousseau therefore appears to adopt 
the nominalist position of Hobbes, which considers general ideas as purely 
linguistic entities whose meaning is circumscribed by a definition. This 
conclusion is further supported by Rousseau’s statement that: 
 
Every general idea is purely intellectual; if the imagination is involved, the idea 
immediately becomes particular. Try to outline the image of a tree in general to 




Although Rousseau’s terminology is again somewhat vague, he clearly defends 
the nominalist position we have also encountered with Hobbes. This view entails 
that a general idea is in fact nothing but a word with certain reference 
circumscribed by its definition, and that when the mind attempts to imagine this 
idea, it will always picture a particular object within the frame of reference of the 
general term. Consequently Rousseau states that abstract ideas are ‘conceived 
only by means of discourse.’497 Rousseau’s statement that ‘every general idea is 
purely intellectual’ therefore refers to the fact that general ideas depend upon a 
definition and are thus necessarily linguistic in nature. 
  
 
The Development of Language and the Perfection of Human Nature 
Rousseau’s account of the interaction of language and ideas thus closely 
resembles that of previous thinkers, including Hobbes and Condillac. Yet by 
itself, this theory is not sufficient to explain why Rousseau claims that human 
nature is perfectible. For this reason, we must discuss a notion that we have also 
encountered in our discussion of Condillac: the idea that language is itself a 
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human invention that developed gradually over the course of history. We have 
seen in a previous chapter that Condillac had maintained that in view of the 
dependence of ideas on words, the fact that language is a historical artefact 
entails that human knowledge must have had a history as well. The first 
component of Rousseau’s theory of human perfectibility could be considered an 
elaboration of this insight. Following Condillac’s suggestion, Rousseau then 
provides a more extensive account of how the historical development of language 
has gradually expanded human understanding and changed human nature 
 This history of human cognition begins with the figure of natural man, 
who lives before the invention of language and must therefore be solitary and 
stupid. Rousseau’s characterisation of natural man as having an animal existence 
may appear curious at first. But Rousseau’s description of natural man is in some 
ways anticipated in the philosophies of both Hobbes and Condillac. We have seen 
that in their discussions of human understanding, both thinkers explained that as 
the ability to form complex ideas depends entirely on the use of words, so do 
foresight and the faculty of reason. As we have seen in a previous chapter, the 
epistemological consequences of this theory are explored at length by Condillac 
in his thought experiment of the sensitive statue. As its senses are enabled, the 
statue will start to seek out sensations of pleasure and avoid pain. But lacking the 
use of words, the statue is limited to a purely animal existence in which it merely 
reacts to the external stimuli of sensation and the feelings of pleasure and pain. 
In many ways, Condillac’s statue-man serves as the model for Rousseau’s natural 
man, who is likewise limited to considering particular ideas and consequently 
has very limited reason and foresight.498 
Rousseau thus arrives at his figure of natural man by combining the 
theory that the development of human understanding requires language with the 
view that language itself is the product of a historical development. Rousseau’s 
conclusion that at the dawn of man, human beings would have been comparable 
to other animals then follows from his realisation that because language is an 
artefact devised by humans themselves, there must have been a time before the 
invention of language. At this time humans had neither the ability to 
communicate nor to employ words to construct complex ideas. This is then the 
reason why Rousseau begins his conjectural history of human development with 
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a description of man as naturally stupid and solitary. The theory that human 
beings require language to reason, which had previously been confined to 
discussions on epistemology and philosophy of language, is thus adopted by 
Rousseau as the preconception to his own revolutionary account of the 
development of human nature and the concurrent emergence of society and 
morality. In short, whereas empiricist philosophers had previously described the 
mind as a tabula rasa at birth, Rousseau maintains that human nature must also 
have been a blank slate at the dawn of mankind. 
Rousseau thinks that at some point natural man has been induced by 
external circumstances to leave his solitary and inane existence to form primitive 
societies. Consequently, nascent man also became subject to passions beyond the 
necessities of mere subsistence. Incited by the urge to satisfy these passions, 
nascent man devised a rudimentary form of language as a means to 
communicate his feelings and intentions to his fellows.499 Yet Rousseau admits 
that he cannot find an adequate explanation of how natural man would have 
been able to acquire the use of words without either education or example. 
Rousseau identifies two conundrums, which he presents as objections to 
Condillac’s account of the history of language, but which, as he himself admits, 
equally apply to his own theory. The first problem is that as a necessarily 
communal institution, language can only emerge among a group of people, while 
sociability – or the ability to live in a group – is itself only made possible by the 
use of language. The question is thus how natural man would have been able to 
devise a language while still solitary, and alternatively how natural man would 
have been able to be social without the use of language.500 Rousseau’s second 
problem takes a similar form. As the invention of language is clearly an 
intellectual achievement of the highest order, the question arises how it could 
have been accomplished by a creature whose intellectual abilities are still in its 
infancy. As natural man is entirely without the use of words, he also lacks the 
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ability to construct complex ideas – the very ability he would require to invent 
language.501 
Rousseau himself concedes that he does not have adequate solutions to 
these two problems, stating rather that ‘by means which I cannot conceive, our 
new Grammarians started to expand their ideas and generalise their words.’502 In 
addition, Rousseau thinks that the invention of language and simultaneous 
development of human understanding must have taken innumerable centuries to 
complete. Rousseau’s subsequent account of the development of language again 
closely follows that of Condillac. Rousseau describes how language emerged 
slowly as primitive humans began to live in small social groups and started to 
use cries and gestures to indicate their feelings. Gradually, these exclamations 
developed into conventional signs that could signify ideas. During this evolution, 
which again took innumerable centuries to complete, language became more 
precise, as words became differentiated by their grammatical function into 
nouns, verbs, pronouns, etc. Yet Rousseau thinks this progress also diminished 
the ability of language to convey the feelings that had been indicated by the cries 
and gestures of primitive man.503 This is the reason why rhetoric in modern 
languages such as French will never have the same rousing effect as the words of 
ancient orators speaking in Latin or Greek.504 
Yet while the evolution of language may have diminished some of its 
ability to convey feeling, it also increased the ability of words to signify ideas. 
Thus with the help of words, nascent man was now able to compose ever more 
complex ideas. This ability to compose complex ideas then gave humans two new 
abilities. First of all, words allowed humans to construct complex ideas of 
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empirical objects – or complex ideas of substances as Locke had called them – 
that allowed them to acquire a generalised, and ultimately even scientific, 
understanding of the world. Secondly, words allowed humans to construct 
complex ideas to regulate their conduct – in other words: moral concepts. The 
ability to compose these two new types of ideas, made possible by language, then 
allowed for the dramatic expansion of the cognitive powers of nascent man, as 
well as for his aptitude for sociability. As the invention that made the 
construction of complex ideas possible, language is therefore responsible for 
enabling these two perfectible properties of human nature. 
 
 
Language as the Medium for Prejudice 
While language enables humans to construct complex ideas, thereby causing the 
perfectibility of human nature, Rousseau thinks that this powerful tool also has 
the potential to lead mankind astray. As we have seen in previous chapters, this 
theme had been already explored by other philosophers. Many of Rousseau’s 
ideas on the potential detriment of language are thus adaptations from preceding 
thinkers, providing some different accents rather radical new insights. 
Rousseau’s main worry is that through language, flawed ideas may be composed 
and disseminated. Thus with the invention of words, man acquired the ability to 
construct complex ideas without any direct relation to experience, including 
moral concepts as well as abstract and universal ideas of empirical objects. As we 
have seen, Rousseau holds a nominalist view that entails that due to their 
indirect relation to experience, complex ideas are ultimately nothing more than 
words with a certain definition, and therefore linguistic in nature. But as words 
not only have a cognitive function, but are also used to communicate ideas, they 
also spread the ideas they signify throughout society. As a conduit for ideas, 
language therefore enables the distribution of concepts – both correct and 
mistaken. Rousseau then refers to the flawed concepts disseminated through 
language with the term of ‘prejudice.’505 
Although, true to his unsystematic style, Rousseau does not provide a 
formal definition of the concept of prejudice, we may discern two types of flawed 
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ideas that may be composed and spread by the use of words. The first type 
consists of words that do not have any discernable reference to empirical reality. 
Thus Rousseau reiterates the point, already made by Hobbes, that words allow 
man to construct metaphysical ideas that, upon closer inspection, do not have 
any basis in experience.506 Consequently, humans are prone to compose and 
believe in the most fantastical ideas that turn out to be completely absurd and the 
product of the imagination rather than reason. According to Rousseau, this 
propensity of metaphysical words to deceive human understanding then explains 
how modern man has come to believe so many unsound theological and 
philosophical notions. Possibly inspired by Condillac’s Treatise on Systems, 
Rousseau then singles out seventeenth century rationalism, and Descartes in 
particular, as an example of how the careless use of words can lead to misguided 
conclusions.507 
Yet while Rousseau reiterates the concern of previous philosophers for 
the abuse of metaphysical terms, he is ultimately more worried by the possibility 
that prejudice corrupts the moral concepts regulating the conduct of individuals 
in society. In fact, Rousseau thinks that the behaviour of humans living in 
modern society is almost entirely determined by prejudice:  
 
Toute nôtre sagesse consiste en préjugés serviles ; tous nos usages ne sont 
qu’assujetissement, gêne, et contrainte. L’homme civil nait, vit et meurt dans 
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l’esclavage : à sa naissance on le coud dans un maillot ; à sa mort on le clouë dans une 




In this passage Rousseau refers first of all to social practices subjecting civil man 
to oppression. But Rousseau also employs the term prejudice to refer to ‘nôtre 
sagesse’ – in other words, to our ideas that legitimise the subjection of civilised 
man. These moral prejudices are likewise sustained and disseminated through 
the use of words. As moral concepts like ‘property,’ ‘freedom,’ or ‘justice,’ have 
no clear reference to empirical reality, they are not only linguistic entities, but 
are also generally acquired from others by means of words. In practice, this 
means that the moral outlook of a society is determined by moral conventions 
established with the advent of society and spread by language. Yet as society has 
evolved into regrettable directions, Rousseau thinks that the moral conventions 
composed and spread with the help of language have enabled man’s sociability 
only by ensuring his oppression. 
  Although Rousseau thinks that as an unfortunate consequence of man’s 
perfectibility, prejudice is clearly introduced by means of language, he is 
somewhat unclear about the precise method by which words spread flawed 
concepts. The most obvious way by which language enables the dissemination of 
moral concepts including prejudice is through education. For this reason, the 
Émile, Rousseau’s treatise on education, argues for the limitation of the use of 
language in instruction. Above all, Rousseau prescribes that children should not 
be exposed to moral or metaphysical terms.509 This is not only because children 
are generally unfamiliar with these terms, inducing them to invent their own 
uninformed significations.510 Rousseau also thinks that when exposed to moral or 
metaphysical discourse, children will contract the prejudices of others. For this 
reason, Rousseau states that for a long time, his pupil would not be allowed to 
read any books – with the exception of Robinson Crusoe, as its protagonist is a 
largely solitary and self-sufficient creature.511  
 As an alternative to verbal or written instruction, Rousseau maintains 
that students should be encouraged to acquire ideas through their own 
experience. Rousseau therefore maintains that his own pupil would not be taught 
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scientific or moral knowledge, but would rather be provided the methods to 
acquire this knowledge himself.512 Rousseau’s model student Émile will then 
develop his judgment gradually through his own experience and independent 
from the authority and prejudices of others: 
 
Forcé d’apprendre de lui-même, il use de sa raison et non de celle d’autrui ; car pour 
ne rien donner { l’opinion il ne faut rien donner { l’autorité, et la pluspart de nos 




According to Rousseau’s method of education by experience, Émile will then 
acquire his own scientific knowledge by investigating natural objects.514 Yet 
Rousseau maintains that his pupil should acquire moral concepts by means 
experience as well, illustrating his point with an example. Thus Rousseau would 
teach Émile about the concept of property by encouraging him to plant beans on 
a tract of land which, as it turns out, belongs to someone else. Subsequently the 
rightful owner ploughs over Émile’s crops, which had been planted on a field 
where rare melons had been sowed. As Émile’s beans are destroyed, he 
experiences the infringement of his own property, meanwhile learning that he 
needs to respect the property of others. Following these experiences, Émile 
composes his idea of property himself, rather than acquiring it from others with 
the help of language.515 
 Furthermore, there is a possibility that Rousseau thought not only that 
language is responsible for the spread of flawed ideas through its use in 
education, but also that the linguistic conventions that comprise language itself 
accommodate prejudice. Like the philosophers discussed in previous chapters, 
Rousseau considers language as a system of signs with meanings upheld by tacit 
consent. In order to be understood, speakers are therefore compelled to employ 
words in line with the standard of common use.516 In previous chapters, we have 
seen that some scholars have ascribed to some early-modern thinkers including 
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Hobbes and Locke the position that in view of the cognitive connection between 
words and ideas, human beings not only accommodate the signification of terms 
used in communication to conventional standards, but also model the 
composition of their ideas – and in particular universal or abstract ideas and 
moral concepts – on common meanings. Yet we have also determined in previous 
chapters that this theory of linguistic relativism, according to which human 
cognition is determined or at least influenced by the structure and content of 
language, may only be properly ascribed to Condillac.  
 As Rousseau derives his theory of language and its role in cognition 
almost entirely from Condillac, we would also expect him to arrive at a position 
of linguistic relativism. Indeed, Rousseau certainly thinks that the conventions of 
language have a profound impact on the way in which individuals compose their 
ideas: 
 
Mais les langues en changeant les signes modifient aussi les idées qu’ils réprésentent. 
Les têtes se forment sur les langages, les pensées prennent la teinte des idiomes, la 
raison seule est commune, l’esprit en chaque langue en partie la cause ou l’effet des 
caractéres nationaux, et ce qui paroit confirmer cette conjecture est que chez toutes 





Like Condillac, Rousseau thus maintains that the conventions of language 
influence the composition of our ideas. Yet unlike Condillac, who was mostly 
concerned with the potential of linguistic conventions to interfere with our grasp 
of metaphysics and empirical reality, Rousseau immediately draws out the 
consequences of linguistic relativism for morality. Thus Rousseau maintains that 
the composition of language reflects the moral outlook of its speakers, and 
consequently that diverging linguistic conventions are an important reason for 
the moral diversity between nations.518 
 Yet in the end, we should be cautious to ascribe to Rousseau a full-
fledged theory of linguistic relativism. Certainly, apart from the passage quoted 
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above, Rousseau’s philosophy also incorporates several views that could be 
presented as circumstantial evidence for such a reading. Thus Rousseau’s idea 
that man’s reason has expanded gradually only with the help of the historically 
developed artefact of language, would also suggest that human cognition is 
determined to some degree by the way language has evolved. In addition, 
Rousseau’s rejection of moral universalism can be explained as following from 
the notion that moral concepts are linguistic entities tied to a confined set of 
conventional meanings.519 At the same time, the passage quoted above is the only 
instance in which Rousseau explicitly endorses the position of linguistic 
relativism. And unlike Condillac, Rousseau does not provide any more extensive 
account of how conventional standards of signification impact the composition of 
ideas by individuals – not even in his Essay on the Origin of Languages. Thus 
even if Rousseau at some point endorses a form of linguistic determinism, he 
appears not to consider the concept significant enough to merit it any further 
detailed examination.  
 
 
The Perfectibility of the Passions 
As we have seen, Rousseau maintains that the perfectibility of human nature 
relies on the ability to construct complex ideas, which is in turn made possible by 
the use of words. Above, we have discussed how this ability significantly 
enhanced human understanding of the natural world. In addition, we have seen 
that the ability to construct complex ideas also made it possible to regulate the 
conduct of members of society through the invention of moral concepts. The 
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scope of human reason is therefore greatly expanded by the acquired ability to 
construct complex ideas. Yet intellectual reason is not the only perfectible 
property of human nature. Rousseau maintains that man’s passions are 
augmented in equal proportion to his intellectual faculties. Thus Rousseau 
maintains that as human understanding developed during the transition from 
the state of nature to society, man’s passions expanded from the desire for things 
necessary to self-preservation to a craving for countless forms of pleasure. 
According to Rousseau this development is another unfortunate consequence of 
man’s perfectibility, as it is one of the primary causes of the misery of civilised 
man. 
 In order to explain why Rousseau thinks that man’s passions expand in 
conjunction to the development of his intellect, we will first need to understand 
how Rousseau thinks desires emerge and in what way they determine human 
actions. In other words, we will need to acquire an understanding of Rousseau’s 
accounts of human motivation and practical deliberation. As with many other 
elements of his theory of human nature, Rousseau’s version of these accounts is 
clearly inspired by ideas of the thinkers we have discussed in previous chapters. 
It appears that Hobbes’s theory was a particularly important source of 
inspiration, as Rousseau explicitly mentions and critiques the account of his 
predecessor.520 Yet while Rousseau adopts many of the preconceptions of 
Hobbes’s account of practical deliberation, he expands the theory of his 
predecessor in one crucial respect. Consequently, Rousseau maintains that for 
the most part, man’s passions and fears are not innate, but rather a perfectible 
element of human nature that is only developed with the evolution of mankind 
from the state of nature to society. 
 The fundamental thesis of Rousseau’s account of practical deliberation is 
that all human actions are ultimately motivated by certain desires or aversions – 
a position we have also encountered in our previous chapters on Hobbes and 
Locke. Rousseau also maintains that human thoughts are the consequence of our 
passions, as he states that: ‘we seek to know only because we desire to enjoy, and 
it is not possible to conceive why someone who had neither desires nor fears 
would take the trouble to reason.’521 What is more, Rousseau thinks that the 
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development of human understanding by means of the invention of language 
was itself occasioned by the desires and fears of nascent man. As we have also 
seen in previous chapters, the upshot of this position on the question of the 
origin of human motivation is that reason is no longer conceived as faculty that 
may independently induce our actions. In line with his conception of reason as 
the composite of all faculties of human understanding rather than independent 
faculty, Rousseau thus maintains that it is the passions rather than reason that 
ultimately motivate all our thoughts and actions.522 
  Yet the fact that all of man’s thoughts and actions are ultimately 
occasioned by certain desires or fears, does not entail that reason does not 
participate in determining our conduct. In our first chapter, we have seen that 
Hobbes explains that reason takes part in practical deliberation both by finding 
the means to our desires, and by foreseeing the consequences of pursuing our 
passions. Thus while reason cannot initiate actions without being prompted by 
certain desires or fears, it nonetheless determines which passions are worthwhile 
pursuing, and by what precise course of action they may be attained. Although 
Rousseau does not reiterate the details of Hobbes’s account, it is clear that he has 
similar ideas about the role of reason in practical deliberation. Thus Rousseau 
maintains that the development of reason by means of the invention of language 
has greatly expanded man’s foresight, which in turn has improved his ability to 
find the means to desires, as well as envision the consequences of his pursuits.523 
 In the first chapter of this thesis we have also seen that Hobbes thinks 
that for the most part, our desires and aversions do not arise spontaneously, but 
are rather occasioned by our train of thoughts. Hobbes maintains that apart from 
a few basic desires generated by physical necessities, our passions emerge only 
when the mind contemplates an idea of a certain object and considers the 
prospective pleasurable or painful consequences of pursuing this object. Thus 
while Hobbes thinks that reason is roused only by the passions, the objects of our 
desires and fears are nonetheless a consequence of the ideas present in our mind. 
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Again, without recapitulating the details of Hobbes’s account, Rousseau agrees 
with his predecessor: 
 
The Passions, in turn, owe their origin to our needs, and their progress to our 
knowledge; for one can only desire or fear things in terms of the ideas one can have 
of them, or by the simple impulsion of Nature; and Savage man, deprived of every 
sort of enlightenment, experiences only the Passions of this latter kind; his Desires do 




Rousseau thus agrees with Hobbes’s rather straightforward view that humans 
can only desire or fear things of which they already have ideas. Yet from this 
position, Rousseau draws a conclusion that is not made explicit by Hobbes 
himself – namely that man’s desires increase in proportion to his knowledge. The 
improvement of man’s foresight thus not only enhances our ability to find the 
means to his desires. The expansion of our ideas also multiplies the objects of our 
desire.525 
 This notion that desires and aversion develop in proportion with our 
ideas then leads Rousseau to the conclusion man’s passions are as perfectible as 
his ability to reason. Rousseau portrays natural man as an inane and docile 
creature not because he is wholly without passions, but because he is almost 
entirely without ideas of objects he may desire or fear. This is the reason why 
Rousseau maintains in the passage quoted above that the passions of natural 
man are limited to those necessary for his preservation. The passions of natural 
man do not extend beyond hunger, thirst, sleep, shelter and the desire to 
reproduce. Yet with the invention of language, nascent man acquired the ability 
to compose ever more complex ideas. In addition, by acquiring the use of words, 
nascent man also further expanded his ideas through communication with those 
with whom he had started to live in society. The resulting expansion of man’s 
ideas caused an inflation of his passions. Consequently, civilised man started to 
desire or fear things to which natural man had been oblivious. This is the reason 
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why Rousseau thinks that the passions apparent in modern human beings arose 
only with the concurrent development of language and society.526 
 The theory that both reason and the passions are not fixed but rather 
perfectible properties of human nature that develop concurrently, then leads 
Rousseau to his critique of Hobbes’s conception of human nature and the latter’s 
characterisation of life in the state of nature. As we have seen in our first chapter, 
one of the main reasons why Hobbes’s characterised life in the state of nature as 
a war of all against all, is that in absence of established authority, human beings 
come into conflict over the many things they desire. Following his theory that 
man’s passions expanded only with the development of reason, Rousseau retorts 
that Hobbes ‘improperly included in Savage man’s care for his preservation the 
need to satisfy a multitude of passions that are the product of Society.’527 
Rousseau rather maintains that the passions and fears that cause conflicts of 
interest among humans emerged only when they invented language and acquired 
the ability to construct complex ideas. Accordingly, Rousseau thinks that society, 
rather than the state of nature, is characterised by conflicts of interest. As natural 
man desires nothing but things necessary for his physical preservation, Rousseau 
thinks that without knowing it, humans in the state of nature abide by the 




The Passions and the Misery of Civilised Man 
Rousseau presents the inflation of desires that occurred during the development 
of man’s faculties as another lamentable consequence of human perfectibility. 
The reason why Rousseau considers the expansion of the passions as unfortunate 
is not merely because it has introduced a conflict of interests between human 
beings, thereby necessitating the institution of the state. Following the inflation 
of his passions, civilised man has become subject to so many desires and fears 
that he could not hope to satisfy them all. As we have seen, Rousseau maintains 
that improved foresight has not only improved man’s resourcefulness, but also 
greatly expanded his passions. For this reason, Rousseau thinks that the 
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expansion of foresight has not contributed to the happiness, but rather to the 
misery of civilised man: 
 
La prévoyance! La prévoyance qui nous porte sans cesse au-delà de nous et souvent 





In his typical elliptical style, Rousseau explains why increased foresight is often a 
curse rather than a blessing. Following the development of human 
understanding, civilised man becomes aware of opportunities for pleasure and 
prospects of pain so numerous he will never be able to appease all passions 
resulting from this improved foresight. Consequently Rousseau thinks that in the 
face of so many unfulfilled passions, civilised man will remain perpetually 
miserable.530 
 By arriving at this last conclusion, Rousseau implicitly rejects the 
conception of felicity retained by his predecessors including Hobbes. In our first 
chapter, we have seen that Hobbes, who thought that unrelenting passions are 
an inescapable part of the human condition, maintained that felicity consisted in 
the continuous satisfaction of successive desires. According to Hobbes, happiness 
is therefore a transient condition that depends on our ability to find the means to 
our passions as well as foresee the consequences of our actions. For this reason, 
Hobbes seems to suggest that felicity would be most effectively pursued through 
the development of reason leading to extended foresight. But Rousseau 
recognises that extended foresight not only allows us to satisfy our passions, but 
also makes us discover new objects of desire. Thus even if civilised man is adept 
at finding ways to satisfy his desires, his expanded foresight will generate ever 
more passions. He therefore finds it unlikely that expanding our reason will 
make us happy.531 Afflicted by unrelenting appetite, Rousseau thinks that the 
happiness of civilised man is not merely transient, but entirely non-existent. 
 As an alternative to Hobbes’s conception of felicity, Rousseau formulates 
his own account of happiness. To begin with, Rousseau agrees with Hobbes that 
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man will be miserable when unable to satisfy his passions and achieves 
happiness by fulfilling his desires. Yet Rousseau maintains that felicity is 
achieved not merely by simply extending foresight, but rather by ensuring that 
our passions do not exceed our power to satisfy them: 
 
Tout sentiment de peine est inséparable du desir de s’en délivrer ; toute idée de plaisir 
est inséparable du desir d’en joüir ; tout desir suppose privation, et toutes les 
privations qu’on sent sont pénibles ; c’est donc dans la disproportion de nos desirs et 
de nos facultés que consiste nôtre misére. Un être sensible dont les facultés 




For Rousseau, happiness thus consists in an equilibrium in which foresight is 
sufficiently developed to ensure the satisfaction of our present desires, but not 
amplified to the point of invoking passions beyond our grasp.533 Rousseau 
therefore states that happiness is achieved by ‘diminuer l’excés des desirs sur les 
facultés, et { mettre en égalité parfaite la puissance et la volonté.’534 
 Rousseau presents natural man as the archetype of a being endowed 
with powers equal to his desires. As we have seen, Rousseau maintains that 
natural man has very few ideas, and consequently desires nothing but the things 
absolutely necessary to his preservation. Furthermore, we have also seen above 
that Rousseau characterises the state of nature as a state of plenty in which 
natural man has little difficulty in obtaining the necessities of life. As the objects 
of natural man’s desire are all within his grasp, his passions are equal to his 
ability to satisfy them. Contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau therefore thinks that the 
state of nature is as close to happiness as man can get.535 Undisturbed by the 
various passions that will plague civilised man, natural man enjoys a state of 
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tranquillity in which he experiences nothing more than a sweet sentiment of 
existence.536 For Rousseau, the figure of natural man thereby functions as an 
ideal that we should try to approximate in order to achieve our own happiness.537  
 Conversely, Rousseau thinks that when leaving the state of nature, man 
will generally be unable to retain this state of felicity. We have already seen that 
the invention of language and concurrent development of man’s faculties 
expands his passions – generally beyond his powers. But Rousseau thinks that 
man’s pursuit of felicity is further impaired by living in society, as civilised man 
has become almost entirely dependent on society to obtain the objects he has 
come to desire. Unlike natural man, who had been self-sufficient in the 
satisfaction of his limited desires, civilised man requires the cooperation of his 
fellows in order to fulfil all his acquired passions. Often this cooperation will be 
difficult to obtain, further frustrating civilised man in the pursuit of his 
desires.538 In order to overcome this difficulty, civilised man has developed a 
desire for power, as it would seem to enable him to compel his fellows into 
cooperating in the satisfaction of his desires. Yet Rousseau recognises that the 
acquisition of power – in any form whatsoever – will never truly enable civilised 
man to escape the dependency on society. Not only is power never truly absolute, 
Rousseau also maintains that by exercising power, man will in fact become more 
dependent on those he subjugates.539  
In view of these properties of society, the question arises how Rousseau 
thinks felicity conceived as equilibrium between passions and foresight may in 
fact be achieved by civilised man. To begin with, Rousseau thinks it would be 
futile to attempt to simply suppress or ignore our passions, as he considers 
desires and fears as an unavoidable part of human nature.540 Nonetheless, 
Rousseau thinks there is at least one way in which passions and powers could be 
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balanced in civilised man. Rousseau presents this method in his Émile, where he 
describes a method of education according to which the pupil is to be fashioned 
according to the ideal of natural man. Rousseau aims to approximate this ideal 
first of all by shielding his pupil from the rest of society as much as possible, 
thereby limiting Émile’s ideas of objects he may otherwise had come to desire. At 
the same time, Rousseau aims to fashion Émile into a largely self-sufficient being, 
capable of acquiring for himself the objects of his limited passions. As a result, 
Émile will experience few artificial passions, while he will generally be able to 
satisfy his desires without depending on society.541 
 Ultimately it is not clear to what extent Rousseau himself thinks the 
education of Émile could be a viable method of bringing all humans living in 
society closer to the ideal of self-sufficient natural man.542 Consequently, it is not 
certain whether Rousseau thought that the ideal of achieving equilibrium 
between passions and abilities could ever be achieved by civilised man. Yet 
Rousseau's conception of felicity as the equilibrium between the passions and the 
power to satisfy them nonetheless has clear implications for his conception of 
morality and his views on the purpose of society. As Grace Roosevelt has noted, 
Rousseau's notion of felicity excludes both a consequentialist conception of 
morality and a utilitarian view on the purpose of society. Not only is it opposed to 
Hobbes’s view of morality as a prudential guideline to the most effective and 
durable satisfaction of desires. Rousseau's notion of felicity also provides grounds 
to question Helvétius’s conclusion that the purpose of society is to provide the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number, conceived simply as the 
maximisation of pleasure among its citizens. As we have seen, Rousseau 
maintains that happiness is not simply dependent on satisfying our passions, but 
also on limiting our desires to objects within our grasp. Thus while utilitarian 
and consequentialist conceptions of morality may direct man towards pleasure, 
they do not seek to prevent the inflation of the passions, thereby ultimately 
failing to secure man's felicity.543 
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From Amour de Soi to Amour Propre 
In the preceding sections, we have discussed Rousseau theory of the perfectibility 
of human nature by exploring the consequences of the expansion of man's 
intellectual faculties and the extension of his foresight. Yet Rousseau thinks that 
the emergence of society and concurrent development of reason also transforms 
the way in which individuals relate themselves to others. Following the 
development of sociability and social hierarchy, civilised man acquires a certain 
position or status relative to other members of society. In addition, as Rousseau 
maintains that reason or judgment enables man to make comparisons, the 
improvement of this ability also creates the capacity to compare his own standing 
to that of others. Conscious of his own station and motivated by self-love, 
civilised man will then be inclined to improve his status in comparison to that of 
his fellows by seeking honour and recognition. Yet Rousseau thinks that this 
pursuit will necessarily be frustrated, as civilised man will never receive 
recognition from society sufficient to appease his desire for honour and glory. 
Consequently, Rousseau maintains that the ability to appreciate moral relations 
is another unfortunate result of man’s perfection caused by the development of 
reason, as it contributes to the misery more than to the happiness of civilised 
man. 
 Rousseau himself describes the transformation described above as the 
development of amour de soi, or self-love, into amour propre – a term usually not 
translated, as there is no English equivalent that entirely captures its meaning. 
According to Rousseau, every animal, including natural man, is moved by a 
sentiment of self-love. This amour de soi is the origin of their desire for self-
preservation.544 Yet Rousseau maintains that in society, the benign sentiment of 
amour de soi is transformed into the harmful feeling of amour propre: 
 
Self-love is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend to its self-
preservation and which guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces 
humanity and virtue. Amour propre is only a relative sentiment, factitious, and born 
in society, which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by 
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By differentiating amour propre from amour de soi, Rousseau again describes 
certain qualities of civilised man as perfectible that had previously been 
considered by many as innate properties of human nature. Thus in our first 
chapter, we have seen that Hobbes maintained that in their pursuit of power, 
human beings are naturally disposed to desire glory and honour. Hobbes then 
identifies this desire for social advancement as a primary cause of the conflicts of 
the state of nature. By contrast, Rousseau maintains that man’s amour propre, 
and the resulting desire for social recognition, emerges only with the advent of 
society and development of reason.  
The most obvious reason why Rousseau thinks that only civilised man is 
subject to amour propre is that he describes natural man as an entirely solitary 
being. Consequently, natural man need not – and in fact cannot – concern 
himself with his social status in the eyes of his fellows. Secondly, Rousseau thinks 
that amour propre requires the development of reason. Rousseau does not 
explain in detail how amour propre is developed through reason. Yet Rousseau’s 
account of reason does provide us with an important indication why the ability to 
reason engenders amour propre. Thus above we have seen that Rousseau 
describes reason as the ability to determine the relations between ideas by means 
of comparison. Yet Rousseau thinks that man requires this same ability to 
ascertain his relations to other members of society and compare his own social 
status to that of his fellows. As the faculty that makes this comparison possible, 
Rousseau refers to reason as the guide of amour propre.546 
 According to Rousseau the development of amour propre out of amour de 
soi is another unfortunate consequence of man’s perfectibility. The first reason 
why the development of amour propre contributes to the misery of civilised man 
is already indicated in the passage quoted above, where Rousseau claims that 
civilised man is incited to compete for honour. Like Hobbes, Rousseau thinks that 
this competition for social status will be a primary cause for conflicts between 
individuals. But unlike Hobbes, who thought that these engagements would be 
especially prevalent in the state of nature, Rousseau thinks that the competition 
for social status and resulting conflicts would only develop with the advent of 
society, and therefore only affect civilised man. Secondly, Rousseau maintains 
that amour propre makes civilised man dependent upon the judgment of his 
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fellows.547 According to Rousseau, this desire for esteem also contributes to the 
misery of civilised man as the desire for social recognition can never be entirely 
satisfied: 
 
L’amour de soi, qui ne regarde qu’a nous, est content quand nos vrais besoins sont 
satisfaits ; mais l’amour-propre, qui se compare, n’est jamais content et ne sauroit 
l’être, parce que ce sentiment, en nous préférant aux autres, éxige aussi que les autres 
nous préférent à eux, ce qui est impossible. Voila comment les passions douces et 
affectueuses naissant de l’amour de soi, et comment les passions haineuses et 




Rousseau explains that in its essence, amour propre is a sentiment that causes us 
to value ourselves over others. In order to appease this sentiment, civilised man 
seeks signs of recognition that confirm his feeling of superiority. Yet as Rousseau 
notes, for this reason amour propre can only be pacified if others signify they 
value us above themselves. But this is unlikely to happen, as members of society 
are all equally subject to amour propre. Consequently, Rousseau thinks that signs 
of social recognition are never sufficient to entirely fulfil our desire for honour. 
 In Rousseau’s view, the development of amour propre has thereby 
contributed to the misery of civilised man much in the same way as the inflation 
of desires has done. Accordingly, Rousseau identifies the development of amour 
propre, together with the inflation of the passions, as the two primary causes of 
the misery of civilised man.549 On the one hand, amour propre has transformed 
us from self-sufficient creatures into beings dependent upon the social 
recognition of our fellows. On the other hand, like in the case of other passions, 
the desire for honour and social recognition will never be entirely satisfied, 
thereby impeding the happiness of civilised man. Rousseau’s solutions to the 
problems caused by the development of amour propre resemble those presented 
to counter the consequences of the inflation of the passions.550 Thus in the Émile, 
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Rousseau explains how the development of amour propre may be limited by 
shielding pupils from wider society until a certain age and making them 
unaccustomed to the esteem of others.551  
 
Pity and Conscience 
In previous chapters, we have seen that Hobbes, Locke, Condillac and Helvétius 
all presented morality as a prudential rule, found out by reason, indicating the 
most effective and durable means to satisfy our self-interested desires.552 Yet in 
our preceding discussion of Rousseau’s conception of felicity, we have seen that 
Rousseau does not think that by itself, the satisfaction of our passions will lead us 
to happiness. Accordingly, Rousseau rejects the notion of his predecessors that 
morality should be the product of prudential reasoning. In fact, Rousseau 
maintains that by itself, no form of reasoning may be able to establish genuine 
moral guidelines: 
 
Par la raison seule, indépendamment de la conscience, on ne peut établir aucune loi 
naturelle; et que tout le droit de la Nature n'est qu'une chimere, s'il n'est fondé sur un 




Rather, Rousseau thinks that reason may only be able to perceive morality when 
guided by a sentiment of pity that is somehow innate to human nature. This 
sentiment therefore performs a crucial function in Rousseau’s moral 
epistemology. According to Rousseau, the sentiment of pity is aroused when man 
perceives another suffering being. Due to this sentiment innate to human nature, 
man has the tendency to sympathise with the plight of others. Rousseau 
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therefore maintains that pity is generally the cause of various forms of virtuous 
behaviour554 
 Rousseau thereby appears to propose a version of moral sense theory, 
according to which morality is not the product of reason alone, but rather of a 
non-cognitive sentiment innate to human nature. Indeed, Rousseau was not the 
first early-modern thinker to hold this position. In fact, his theory of pity can be 
related to a wider early-modern tradition that considered morality as the product 
of innate sentiments. This school of thought includes British thinkers such as 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith.555 But as Helena Rosenblatt has 
pointed out, it is likely that Rousseau had also encountered versions of moral 
sense theory in the works of Swiss natural lawyers like Burlamaqui and 
Barbeyrac.556 Yet we will see in the following that despite its affinity with 
previous moral sense theories, Rousseau’s sentiment of pity is not simply an 
autonomous moral sense that would indicate man the morality of his actions – 
even if it has sometimes been interpreted as such by modern scholars. In fact, we 
will discover that Rousseau takes care to accommodate his theory of pity to his 
broader theory of human nature founded on the empiricist principles he derived 
from the authors we have discussed in previous chapters. Thus Rousseau thinks 
that in civilised man the sentiment of pity operates only in conjunction with of 
reason. But as pity relies on the perfectible faculty of reason, we will see that 
man’s moral sense or conscience turns out to be a perfectible faculty as well.  
 Unfortunately Rousseau’s remarks on the sentiment of pity and the way 
in which it governs our behaviour are somewhat disparate and therefore open to 
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interpretation.557 In some passages, Rousseau appears to maintain that the 
existence of the sentiment of pity entails that human beings are naturally 
endowed with a conscience that would indicate to them the morality of their 
actions: 
 
Il est donc au fond des ames un principe inné de justice et de vertu, sur lequel, malgré 
nos propres maximes, nous jugeons nos actions et celles d’autrui comme bonnes ou 




Some scholars take passages as the one quoted above at face value, and attribute 
to Rousseau the view that conscience is innate to human nature. The most 
notable version of this reading is proposed by David Williams, who ascribes to 
Rousseau a Platonic theory of morality. According to Williams, Rousseau’s 
conscience should be interpreted as a sentiment giving us knowledge of justice in 
a similar fashion as reason provides a transcendent idea of justice in Plato’s 
theory.559 Williams even goes so far as to claim that accordingly Rousseau is ‘the 
most consistent and greatest Platonist of the modern era.’560 This last statement 
should probably be read as exaggerated for rhetorical purposes. Yet even when 
Williams’ interpretation is read charitably, it remains problematic for at least 
three reasons.  
First of all, the differences between Plato’s and Rousseau’s moral 
philosophies are too substantial to warrant close identification. Thus while both 
certainly appear to ascribe to man some innate sense of morality, Plato maintains 
that it is accessible only by cultivating an innate faculty of reason, while 
Rousseau maintains that man’s sense of morality originates in a sentiment of pity 
that, as we shall see below, he thinks is in fact both stifled and perfected by the 
development of reason. Secondly, Williams’ reading is contradicted by Rousseau’s 
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unequivocal contention that morality or natural law is in no way innate to 
human nature, as well by the claim that by itself, the sentiment of pity does not 
provide us with any concrete knowledge of morality.561 Thirdly, Williams’ reading 
also relies heavily on passages of which it is not certain that they precisely 
represent Rousseau’s view. Thus the passage quoted above is taken from the 
Confession of the Savoyard Vicar, a section in the Émile where Rousseau not 
explicitly expounding his own theory, but rather presents the views of a fictional 
character identified only as a vicar from Savoy. Rousseau is equivocal about the 
question whether the vicar’s views are actually his own, giving rise to debate 
among modern scholars on the issue.562 On the one hand, Rousseau maintains at 
some point that the Confession provides an outline of his personal beliefs.563 Yet 
on the other hand, Rousseau also states in a passage directly following the 
Confession that he does not agree with everything the vicar had to say, 
suggesting that he disagrees with some of the details of the philosophy 
elaborated in the Confession.564  
Yet the most significant argument against William’s reading is the fact 
that elsewhere in his writings, Rousseau provides a different and more detailed 
account of the way in which conscience develops out of an innate sentiment of 
pity. Rather than as an autonomous moral sense, Rousseau here describes how 
pity gives rise to conscience in conjunction with man’s intellect: 
 
The social affections develop in us only with our knowledge. Pity, although natural to 
man’s heart, would remain eternally inactive without imagination to set it in motion. 
How do we let ourselves be moved to pity? By transporting ourselves outside 
ourselves; by identifying with the suffering being. […] think how much acquired 
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Rousseau here maintains that rather than a fully formed moral sense or 
conscience, it is only the sentiment of pity that is innate to human nature.566 Yet 
pity is only activated when man identifies with the suffering being he has 
encountered by putting himself in its place. Accordingly, the process of 
identification requires imagination, which in turn is developed only with the 
growth of knowledge – or the perfection of reason. Rousseau thus maintains that 
while the repugnance to seeing another being suffer is innate to the human 
heart, it is only truly activated when man acquires enough knowledge to imagine 
the suffering of those he encounters.567 
 Yet this conception of conscience as requiring both the sentiment of pity 
and the perfection of man’s intellectual faculties also raises an important 
question. At first glance, it would suggest that the development of reason would 
also cause the perfection of conscience. But then why is there no evidence that 
civilised man indeed has a conscience more developed than that of natural man? 
To begin with, Rousseau thinks that man’s development from the state of nature 
to society, and the intellectual awakening that accompanied it, have also 
interfered with man’s conscience in several ways. Thus Rousseau maintains that 
the conscience of civilised man is often suppressed by prejudices, which as we 
have seen are disseminated throughout society with the help of language.568 More 
importantly, Rousseau thinks that man’s conscience is also stifled by the 
development of amour propre, which makes civilised man care for his self-
interest more than the well-being of others. We have seen that Rousseau 
maintains that following the emergence of society, civilised man becomes 
concerned with his place in the social hierarchy and starts to desire the esteem of 
his fellows. Rousseau explains that the social hierarchy resulting from the 
emergence of society and the development of amour propre also reduces the 
scope of man’s conscience. Thus Rousseau thinks that man will have difficulty 
identifying with individuals situated at different rungs of the social ladder. Thus 
civilised man will generally have contempt for his inferiors, while envying those 
with greater achievements. In addition, he will generally be unfamiliar with the 
troubles that afflict those in other social classes. The development of amour 
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propre and the rise of social distinctions have therefore almost entirely silenced 
the sentiment of pity in civilised man.569 
 In addition, Rousseau thinks that the impact of the sentiment of pity is 
altered as the development of reason expands the scope of man’s conscience. 
Thus Rousseau explains that natural man may be moved by pity, but only by the 
suffering of individuals identical to himself.570 The development of reason and 
the growth of imagination causes civilised man to identify and commiserate with 
many more individuals, even those that show no immediate similarity to him. 
Furthermore, intellectual reason even allows man to commiserate with the evils 
in society as a whole. Yet Rousseau maintains that the sentiment of pity is only 
faintly aroused when instructed by reason. Thus Rousseau provides an example 
of a philosopher who is kept up at night by the problems of society, but who 
remains unmoved when someone is murdered beneath his window. According to 
Rousseau, the development of reason thus broadens man’s conscience, but may 
at the same time desensitise him to acts that would have been extremely 
repugnant to natural man. The conscience of civilised man is thus greatly 
expanded in scope, but at the same time it has lost much of its original force and 
vivacity. Rousseau therefore maintains that pity is ‘a sentiment that is obscure 
and lively in Savage man, developed but weak in Civilised man.’571  
 Our extended account of Rousseau’s theory of conscience thus indicates 
that it is not an autonomous moral sense, but rather a perfectible faculty that 
arises out of the combined effort of pity and the intellect. For this reason, it also 
follows that with man’s cognitive development and the institution of society, the 
operation of his conscience must have been modified as well. Indeed, Rousseau 
maintains that in the state of nature pity is still forceful enough to make natural 
man behave morally. Accordingly, Rousseau states that in the state of nature ‘pity 
takes the place of Laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage that no one is 
tempted to disobey its gentle voice.’572 Yet while the development of reason 
expanded man’s conscience in scope, the transformation from the state of nature 
to society and emergence of amour propre have also impaired the force of the 
sentiment of pity to the extent that it is easily ignored by civilised man. This 
weakening of pity coinciding with man’s development is then one of the primary 
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reasons why Rousseau thinks man is naturally good and has only become evil 
with the emergence of society. 
 Finally, our account of Rousseau’s conception of conscience as a 
compounded and perfectible faculty rather than an innate moral sense is also 
accommodated to his general theory of the perfectibility of human nature. 
Moreover, we have tried to show in the preceding that this theory was inspired 
to considerable degree by previous empiricist theories of human nature. Our 
reading presenting Rousseau’s conception of conscience not as an innate moral 
sense but as a faculty arising out of the combined operation of pity and 
imagination complies with one of the general predispositions of empiricism – the 
tendency to ascribe human nature as few innate properties as possible. Although 
Rousseau undoubtedly claims that the sentiment of pity is innate to human 
nature, the activity of this sentiment relies on the imagination – a cognitive 
faculty considered part of human nature by all empiricists. By describing pity 
merely as a repugnance to seeing other beings suffer, which is only developed 
into conscience with the help of the imagination, Rousseau therefore ascribes to 
man a form of moral sensitivity without departing too much from either the 
empiricist prohibition against assuming the existence of innate ideas, or from the 
inclination to ascribe to human nature as few natural faculties as possible. 
 
Human Nature and Morality 
At the end of our exploration of Rousseau’s theory of human nature, we are now 
in the position to outline how Rousseau’s conception of man provides the basis 
for his moral philosophy. In previous chapters we have seen that following 
Hobbes, Rousseau’s predecessors employed the thought experiment of the state 
of nature to demonstrate how in view of their theoretical account of human 
nature, individuals interact with each other without established morality or 
centralised authority. They subsequently concluded to a varying extent that life in 
the state of nature would be characterised by conflict and hardship. Again with 
their conception of human nature in mind, Hobbes and his followers 
subsequently designed prudential rules that would remedy this situation, thereby 
ensuring the collective safety and prosperity of mankind. In our discussion of 
Rousseau’s account of human development at the start of this chapter, we have 
already seen that Rousseau considers these efforts of his predecessors as 
misguided. Rousseau has many objections, but his most important reason to 
reject their accounts of the state of nature is that he thinks human nature is 
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perfectible and has transformed fundamentally during the development from 
nature to society. 
  Yet this does not entail that Rousseau rejects the thought experiment of 
the state of nature as a useful approach in the search for a theory of morality. 
Instead, Rousseau reformulates the thought experiment to account for his 
conception of human nature as perfectible rather than static and universal. As we 
have seen, Rousseau considers the state of nature not simply as a condition 
without society, law, and centralised authority. Rather, he describes it as man’s 
original station, not only predating the emergence of society, but also the 
concurrent development of language and man’s perfectible faculties. We have 
seen above that Rousseau thinks that in the state of nature mankind must have 
had a simple yet felicitous existence. Tacitly assuming that Nature or God would 
not have created man unsuited to his natural state, Rousseau seems to suggest 
that life in the state of nature is also suited to man’s nature.573 For Rousseau the 
thought experiment of the state of nature therefore no longer serves to 
demonstrate the rules necessary to contain man’s destructive tendencies for the 
collective welfare – simply because these tendencies are not yet present in 
natural man. Instead, Rousseau’s state of nature displays a type of existence 
suited to man’s nature. For this reason, Rousseau’s moral philosophy presents 
the properties and way of life of natural man as an ideal that human beings in all 
states of development should strive to emulate.574 
 Yet this notion of natural man as an ideal raises another question: in 
what way can man in his natural state provide an ideal for the morality of 
civilised man, whose nature has been irreversibly altered? We have already seen 
that in contrast to what some of his contemporary critics may have suggested, 
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Rousseau does not simply intend man to return to his primitive condition.575 
Rather, Rousseau identifies the properties of natural man that made life in the 
state of nature peaceful and felicitous, and subsequently devises a moral 
philosophy that attempts to rediscover, revive, or reconstruct these properties in 
civilised man. Accordingly, Rousseau presents his moral philosophy as 
recapturing two properties of natural man suppressed following the development 
of reason:  
 
Meditating on the first and simplest operations of the human Soul, I believe I perceive 
in it two principles prior to reason, of which one interests us intensely in our well-
being and our self-preservation, and the other inspires in us a natural repugnance to 
seeing any sentient Being, and especially any being like ourselves, perish or suffer. It 
is from the cooperation and from the combination our mind is capable of making 
between these two Principles, without it being necessary to introduce into it that of 
sociability, that all the rules of natural right seem to me to flow; rules which reason is 
subsequently forced to re-establish on other foundations, when by its successive 




Rousseau maintains that before the development of reason, natural man is 
motivated solely by self-love and has not yet acquired amour propre. Accordingly, 
Rousseau also thinks natural man still experiences the sentiment of pity when he 
sees other humans suffer. We have already seen that Rousseau maintains that 
consequently, natural man unconsciously behaves in accordance with natural 
right. In the passage quoted above, Rousseau suggests that it is the task of reason 
or philosophy to reformulate these natural properties into a theory of morality 
for the benefit of civilised man. 
 But what does this entail in practice? Throughout our preceding 
discussion, we have already encountered some measures by which Rousseau 
intends to reform civilised man and negate some of the negative effects of living 
in society. These measures can be categorised into two distinct projects, each 
providing a different solution to the problems that have arisen following the 
perfection of human nature and development of society. The first of these 
projects, presented in the Émile, provides various means by which infants may be 
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educated to become moral, self-sufficient and felicitous human beings in modern 
society. As man’s perfectibility has enabled the transformation of human nature 
with the development of language and advent of society, this same perfectibility 
also allows Rousseau to devise a method of education that avoids or counteracts 
many of the defective habits and prejudices usually contracted by children 
growing up in modern society. Throughout our discussion, we have encountered 
several examples of measures by which Rousseau intends to shield his pupil from 
prejudice, stimulate the development of conscience, as well as limit the 
development of amour propre. As a result, Émile will become a human being 
moved by pity, but motivated by neither the desire for the esteem of others, nor 
by passions inflated beyond his ability to satisfy. Just like natural man, Émile will 
then become self-sufficient, conscientious and content with the necessities 
required for survival.577 For this reason, Rousseau claims that his goal is to 
fashion Émile into ‘un sauvage fait pour habiter les villes.’578 
 
The Political Solution of the Social Contract 
Apart from his program for the reform of the individual by means of education 
outlined in the Émile, Rousseau also provides a solution to the problems of 
civilised life that may be applied to society as a whole. The most comprehensive 
statement of this solution may be found in Rousseau's On the Social Contract. 
There is a tendency among scholars to interpret the Social Contract as solely a 
treatise on political theory, thereby isolating it from the context of Rousseau’s 
philosophy as a whole. These interpretations therefore provide a rather limited 
understanding of the purposes of Rousseau's political theory. For instance, Zev 
Trachtenberg has claimed that the Social Contract describes a society in which 
citizens have become sufficiently rational to recognise that it is in their interest 
not merely to attend to their own well-being, but rather to secure the common 
good of society as a whole. According to this reading, Rousseau’s concept of the 
general will would then be an expression of this socialised rational self-
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interest.579 Another common reading, defended by Neuhouser among others, 
ascribes to Rousseau the view that the self-interested proclivity of civilised man 
may be overcome through public debate. By exchanging rational arguments, 
individual citizens would become inclined to transcend the self-interested bias of 
their own rational faculty and collectively attend to the public interest. The 
outcome of their discussion would then produce the general will.580 
 These readings of Rousseau's Social Contract are vulnerable to a number 
of objections.581 Yet our present aim is not to provide a comprehensive 
interpretation of Rousseau's political theory or even of his concept of the general 
will. Instead, we will try to show that while the Social Contract may be read as 
primarily a treatise on the mechanics of popular sovereignty, Rousseau's political 
theory also suggests a number of measures by which the problems of modern 
society may be resolved by reconstructing the properties of life in the state of 
nature, thereby leading civilised man towards a more felicitous existence. To 
begin with, Rousseau maintains that the goal of the constitution of the Social 
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Contract is to revive two conditions that had also been characteristic of the state 
of nature: 
 
If one seeks to define precisely what constitutes the greatest good of all, which ought 
to be the end of every system of legislation, one will find that it comes down to these 




For the modern reader, Rousseau's emphasis on freedom and equality as the 
ultimate purpose of the state may appear commonplace. Yet this position was 
shared neither by Rousseau's predecessors, nor by many of his 
contemporaries.583 In the remainder of this chapter, we will try to show that 
Rousseau’s call for liberty and equality is not simply a fundamental axiom, but is 
in fact an attempt to relieve the predicament of civilised man by recreating some 
of the conditions of the state of nature in modern society. 
 To begin with, Rousseau’s ideal state aims for equality among its citizens 
in order to recreate some of the conditions that accorded natural man a felicitous 
existence. Thus in the state of nature, humans had been equals simply because 
they had been solitary and without any durable moral relations. Rousseau states 
that in his ideal republic, this natural equality would be substituted by a moral 
equality that would negate the physical inequality that may nonetheless persist 
among its citizens. Rousseau thereby explicitly compares the equality of the state 
of nature with the moral equality ensured in his ideal society.584 To be sure, this 
moral equality does not encompass total economic equality, even if Rousseau 
states that excessive disparities in wealth are to be avoided.585 Rather, Rousseau 
conceives moral equality as equality of rights, which above all entails the 
abolition of privilege and class distinctions. While clearly an appeal to reform 
contemporary society, Rousseau’s advocacy for moral equality is also motivated 
by his theory of human nature. Thus we have seen above that Rousseau thinks 
that inequality in society stimulates the development of amour propre, as citizens 
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will covet the position and esteem of their superiors. At the same time, we have 
also seen that this inequality and associated development of amour propre will 
also impede the operation of man’s conscience, as class distinctions will prevent 
citizens from identifying with each other. Consequently, citizens will tend to 
pursue their self-interest, thereby undermining the consensus on the common 
good required if self-government through the general will is to succeed. 
Conversely, moral equality is an essential requirement if citizens are expected to 
commiserate with their fellows as well as identify with the common good.586 
The second objective of the political theory of the Social Contract is the 
recreation of liberty. Rousseau’s advocacy for political liberty may simply 
originate in a conviction that despotism and slavery are incompatible with 
human nature.587 Yet Rousseau also provides a more extensive argument why, by 
recreating the conditions of life in the state of nature, liberty is an essential 
prerequisite to human happiness. According to Rousseau man living in the state 
of nature has the right to anything he can get. As natural man is a solitary being, 
his liberty is therefore constrained solely by necessity.588 By contrast, following 
the advent of sociability and institution of the state, the liberty of civilised man is 
constrained both by mutual dependence and laws devised by despotic 
government, thereby losing the capacity for self-determination. Rousseau thinks 
that this loss of self-determination is a crucial impediment to achieving felicity. 
As we have seen, Rousseau conceives felicity as a balance between desires and 
the ability to obtain desired objects. Accordingly, Rousseau thinks that our 
pursuit of happiness demands that potential obstacles to our volition must be 
removed as much as possible. Of course, Rousseau recognises that we cannot 
hope to escape the constraints of necessity and the laws of nature, which we may 
consider an unavoidable fact of life and which consequently do not infringe our 
liberty. But in society, it is not nature that poses the primary obstacles to our 
volition, but rather the opposing wills of fellow citizens as well as the authority of 
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the state. Sociability thereby introduces moral constraints that prevent us from 
doing what we want, thereby diminishing our happiness. 
In response, Rousseau maintains that in order to recreate the self-
determination of the state of nature, citizens themselves should be allowed to 
formulate the laws that would regulate their behaviour.589 As citizens formulate 
their own laws, the constraints to their will are the consequence of their own 
volition. Accordingly, it would be incoherent if citizens experience these laws as 
inhibiting their liberty. Released from despotism, the volition of citizens will only 
be restrained by necessity, which is morally neutral, and by the legal restrictions 
they imposed on themselves. As the resulting laws are self-proclaimed by the 
general will of the people, they do not infringe the liberty of citizens.590 The 
political liberty of the Social Contract thereby intends to revive the self-
determination that had characterised life in the state of nature.591 Like natural 
man, the citizens of the state designed in the Social Contract will no longer 
experience any moral constraints to their felicity. For this reason, Rousseau 
thinks that popular sovereignty is not only an essential requirement for liberty in 
society, but also a crucial prerequisite for the felicity of civilised man.592  
 
Conclusion 
Throughout our preceding discussion, we have seen that Rousseau’s theory of 
human nature is clearly constructed upon empiricist principles. By placing his 
conception of the perfectibility of man in the context of his predecessors, we have 
shown that many of Rousseau’s conclusions, in particular regarding his theory of 
human understanding, are adaptations or elaborations of the philosophies of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac. Rather than a fundamental revision of their 
principles, Rousseau’s most important contribution is the insight that the 
empiricist notion that man’s ideas and intellectual faculties are acquired rather 
than innate entailed that human nature is neither universal nor static, but has 
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rather developed over the course of history. At the same time, we have also seen 
that Rousseau transcends the thought of his predecessors by attributing certain 
moral sentiments to human nature. These include the sentiment of pity and the 
development of amour propre. We have then established that Rousseau's theory 
of conscience may not be interpreted as a form of revived Platonism. While 
transcending his seventeenth-century predecessors, Rousseau’s theory of human 
nature does accord with the intention of some of his contemporaries, including 
Hume and Diderot, to move beyond the reductionist tendencies of empiricism by 
ascribing to human nature a more extensive range of innate abilities and 
sentiments. 
 In the second part of the chapter, we have tried to elucidate the most 
important connections between Rousseau’s theory of human nature and his 
moral and political philosophy. According to Rousseau, the concurrent 
emergence of society and development of human understanding by means of 
language have contributed to the misery of civilised man in several ways. Thus 
the development of reason has both inflated the passions and given rise to amour 
propre, which has in turn stifled the sentiment of pity. As a result, civilised man 
has become an ingenious yet covetous, envious and heartless being that spends 
its life searching for fleeting moments of pleasure, without ever attaining felicity. 
In response, Rousseau proposes to reform civilised man in the image of natural 
man, presenting two approaches by which this goal may be achieved. The first of 
these approaches is outlined in the Émile, and consists of a program of education 
that isolates its pupil from the most pernicious influences of modern society. Like 
natural man, the mature Émile will therefore become both self-sufficient and 
neither covetous nor envious.  
 Subsequently we have tried to show that the political theory of the Social 
Contract, which is often read in isolation, may also be conceived as a second 
solution to the problems resulting from the perfectibility of human nature. We 
have interpreted the institution of both liberty and equality by the constitution of 
the Social Contract as a means of amending the corruption of human nature that 
followed the emergence of society and invention of language. Thus political 
liberty allows citizens to formulate their own laws, thereby providing them with 
a limit to their desires that does not impede their felicity. Furthermore, moral 
equality mitigates the effects of amour propre, thereby encouraging the revival of 
the sentiment of pity in civilised man. As a result, citizens of the polity described 
in the Social Contract will become less covetous or envious. Less subject to 
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unattainable desires for recognition and material goods, these citizens will also 
achieve a greater measure of felicity. Yet the institution of liberty and equality 
will not merely transform them into more felicitous individuals. It will also turn 
the inhabitants of the state into more virtuous citizens who are more inclined to 
identify with the common good. 




Following our investigation of the moral epistemology of Hobbes, Locke, 
Condillac, Helvétius, and Rousseau, we may now outline a number of general 
conclusions. To begin with, our discussion has tried to showcase that these early-
modern philosophers did not consider epistemology and ethics as separate fields 
of inquiry. Rather, we have seen that their epistemological inquiries are 
concerned not only with describing the means by which we may acquire 
knowledge of empirical objects, but also raise the question how humans may use 
their reason to understand morality. At the same time, we have seen that the 
moral philosophies by which they attempt to resolve this ethical question are 
generally accommodated to their more general theories of knowledge and human 
understanding. Accordingly, our investigation has tried to demonstrate that the 
epistemology of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, Helvétius, and Rousseau serves as a 
valuable context to any attempt at a comprehensive interpretation of their 
respective moral philosophies. In our remaining paragraphs, we will briefly 
reiterate the questions of moral epistemology that confronted these thinkers, and 
outline their answers as we have reconstructed them in our interpretation. 
 To begin with, we have seen that all five philosophers agree that there is 
a universal standard of right and wrong that may be formulated as natural law. 
The starting point of our discussion has therefore been to inquire by what 
method these philosophers think that human beings are able to grasp this 
universal moral standard. Yet throughout our discussion we have seen that 
answering this question is less straightforward than may at first be expected. It 
turns out that for all five philosophers, their account of the foundations of 
morality is complicated by at least two important properties of their 
epistemology. The first of these is the tendency, common to all five thinkers, to 
explain human cognition while ascribing to the mind as few innate properties as 
possible. Thus following Locke, they all dismiss the notion that human beings are 
endowed with innate ideas that may serve as the foundation for moral reasoning. 
Yet these philosophers also reject the conception of reason as an autonomous 
faculty innate to human nature. Rather, they present human cognition as nothing 
but a process, set in motion by the passions, of comparing and connecting ideas – 
the cognitive units that provide the contents of our thoughts that may ultimately 




reconciled with any attempt to present the foundations of morality as innate in 
the mind itself. 
 Secondly, the moral epistemology of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, Helvétius, 
and Rousseau is further confounded by their empiricism and their 
representationalist conceptions of knowledge. Thus we have seen that all these 
thinkers maintain that knowledge of empirical reality may only be acquired by 
means of experience. Accordingly, the real essences of empirical objects will 
remain hidden from us, as we are solely able to experience their sensory 
properties. Nonetheless, these philosophers think that humans may acquire at 
least highly probable knowledge of substances if our ideas are made to represent 
the empirical objects we experience. Even if representationalist conceptions of 
knowledge like those found in Locke and his followers are nowadays widely 
contested, these philosophers provided an account of the origins of knowledge of 
empirical objects that was at least reasonably convincing to their 
contemporaries.593 Yet we have seen that by itself, this representationalist 
conception of knowledge cannot explain how we may acquire proper ideas of 
morality. Unlike ideas of substances, moral concepts like ‘justice’ or ‘liberty’ do 
not represent any concrete objects of empirical reality and accordingly cannot 
simply be experienced by means of the senses. The empiricism of the five 
philosophers discussed in this thesis is thus not only opposed to the theory that a 
rational understanding of morality would be innate to human nature, but also 
confound any theory that morality would be a property of the external world. 
 Yet if our understanding of morality is neither innate to human nature, 
nor acquired by means of experience, how do these five philosophers think that 
humans may grasp the universal morality of natural law? Throughout our 
discussion we have seen that these authors themselves do not always provide a 
straightforward answer to this question. Accordingly, we have found that 
modern scholars have reconstructed their answers in variety of diverging 
interpretations. For instance, we have seen that interpreters of both Hobbes and 
Rousseau, unable to reconstruct a coherent account of moral epistemology from 
their writings, have maintained that when these thinkers claim that natural law 
is accessible to reason, they simply assume that this normative reason is an 
innate property of human nature. These interpreters thereby claim that while 
Hobbes and Rousseau advance an empiricist account of the origin of knowledge, 
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they nonetheless retain the rationalist assumption that the ability for normative 
judgment is innate to human nature. Yet throughout our own investigation, we 
have seen that Hobbes and Rousseau describe reason as simply the process of 
comparing and relating ideas present in the mind. Following our discussion of 
Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s epistemologies, we have therefore concluded that these 
thinkers could not have simply assumed that normative reason is somehow 
innate to human nature. 
 Secondly, we have encountered in the scholarship on Hobbes and Locke 
the interpretation that our understanding of morality could be derived from the 
conventional signification of moral terms. This interpretation lends credibility 
from the fact that Hobbes and Locke, as well as their followers, all claimed that 
the more advanced cognitive abilities of the human mind are developed by means 
of language. In particular, the thinkers discussed in this thesis agree that the 
composition of abstract or universal concepts is only made possible by the use of 
words. They thereby explain why humans may acquire advanced forms of 
cognition not accessible to animals, but without supposing that the human mind 
is endowed with any additional innate cognitive faculties. Yet as we have seen, 
this explanation also invites the suggestion that words are not merely cognitive 
tools, but that their signification may also influence the ideas in the minds of 
individuals. Thus we have seen that on the one hand, the five philosophers claim 
that words are indispensible for the composition of complex ideas. But on the 
other hand, we have also seen that these thinkers became increasingly aware of 
the fact that words are not merely private marks to ideas but also allow us to 
communicate our ideas to others. The signification of words is therefore 
circumscribed by linguistic conventions. As we are compelled to adhere to these 
conventions in order to be understood, this suggests that the composition of our 
ideas is influenced or possibly even determined by the standard of common use. 
This suggestion is particularly relevant in the case of moral concepts, as these are 
abstract concepts that do not represent any concrete objects of experience, and 
may only be rendered in linguistic terms.  
 Accordingly, we have seen that a number of scholars have ascribed to 
Hobbes and Locke the view that the moral concepts retained by individuals are 
regulated by the conventional signification of their moral terminology. Yet our 
own discussion has established that while Hobbes’s and Locke’s theories of 
signification may appear to suggest this conclusion, neither thinker explicitly 




signification of terms determines the composition of ideas in the minds of 
individuals is only fully developed in the philosophy of Condillac. As he eradicates 
any remaining assumption that the mind is an autonomous entity, Condillac 
claims that both our ideas and our cognitive faculties are acquired through 
experience and organised by means of language. Drawing a much more explicit 
connection between language and ideas, Condillac maintains that the revision of 
the latter requires the wholesale reform of the former. Accordingly, we have seen 
that Condillac concludes that moral progress requires the amendment of the 
conventional signification of moral terminology. In subsequent chapters, we have 
then seen that Condillac’s theory on the relation between language and ideas is 
not only a development of suggestions implicit in the philosophies of Hobbes and 
Locke, but also an important influence on both Helvétius and Rousseau. Thus we 
have seen that Helvétius adopts Condillac’s conception of the mind as developed 
by means of experience and language, and likewise recommends the reform of 
the conventional signification of moral terms. Furthermore, our last chapter has 
shown that Condillac’s epistemology and philosophy of language also provided 
the main source of inspiration for Rousseau’s conception of human nature as 
perfectible. 
 But if neither innate faculties nor linguistic conventions are the source of 
our rational understanding of morality, how does normative reasoning operate 
according to the five philosophers discussed in this thesis? In our discussion, we 
have presented their accounts of practical deliberation as the key to providing an 
answer to this question. To begin with, we have seen that these thinkers proceed 
from the assumption that all human thoughts and actions are ultimately 
motivated by a desire for pleasure and aversion of pain. Accordingly, some 
modern readers have concluded from this assumption that according to these 
thinkers, humans are necessarily determined by their passions, while their 
reason is merely instrumental and relegated to finding the means to whatever 
they desire. Yet in particular in our discussions of Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s 
accounts of practical deliberation, we have demonstrated that apart from a few 
corporeal appetites like hunger or thirst, they do not consider the passions as 
mindless urges. Rather, the passions originate in mental discourse and could well 
be described as beliefs about the foreseeable consequences of a certain object or 
action. According to our reading, reason is therefore not merely the ‘slave of the 
passions,’ limited to finding the means to whatever we desire. Rather, as it may 




additional role in practical deliberation by assessing whether objects are in fact 
truly desirable. 
 Subsequently, we have established that for these thinkers apart from 
Rousseau, reason participates in normative judgment in a similar way as it 
engages in practical deliberation. First of all, we have seen that these 
philosophers assume that the primary aim of morality is to guide humans 
towards felicity. Yet as they claim that attaining pleasure and avoiding pain is the 
ultimate aim of all human thought and action, the philosophers discussed in this 
thesis, again with the exception of Rousseau, conclude that this felicity consists in 
nothing but the durable satisfaction of our passions. They therefore conceive 
morality as ultimately nothing but a prudential rule that would guide humans 
towards this goal. The way in which reason participates in subjective normative 
judgment is similar to its role in practical deliberation. As reason may not only 
suggest the means to the objects of our desire, but also foresee the consequences 
of the pursuit of our passions, it may formulate general prudential rules that 
would commend actions with generally pleasurable consequences, thereby 
leading individuals towards felicity. Accordingly, we have classified the account 
of moral reasoning of these four thinkers as forms of consequentialism, 
according to which normative judgment relies on foreseeing the consequences of 
our actions. 
 Yet while this account of subjective moral judgment describes how 
humans may use their reason to pursue their felicity from an individual 
perspective, it does not yet explain how they may ascertain the moral guidelines 
that would also ensure their happiness in society. Even if they do not consider 
humans as naturally social beings, the philosophers discussed above all concur 
that humans generally do live together in society. Forced to share limited 
resources, humans are bound to come into conflict with each other when they 
pursue their passions without regard for the interests of their fellows. As such 
conflicts tend to be mutually destructive, prudential reasoning dictates that 
humans living in society anticipate the actions of their fellows. In addition, 
individuals should try to contemplate the consequences of their own pursuits for 
those around them. For humans living in society, morality is thus not merely a 
prudential guide towards the satisfaction of their own passions, but rather a 
communal rule that, if universally upheld, will diffuse conflicts of interest and 
provide the ideal conditions in which citizens may pursue their felicity. Yet once 




also the good of society as a whole, the question arises how individuals may 
employ their reason to ascertain the most prudential rules that would not merely 
promote their self-interest, but also the common good. 
 Throughout this thesis, we have seen that our five philosophers have 
each formulated a different answer to this question. In our first chapter, we have 
shown that Hobbes aims to derive a universal morality from a substantive 
conception of human nature. Thus we have seen that Hobbes prefaces his moral 
and political philosophy with an account of the development of human cognition, 
as well as a detailed investigation of the mechanism by which the passions 
provide the motivation for all of our actions. Based on this theoretical account of 
human nature, Hobbes subsequently demonstrates in his famous thought 
experiment that individuals living in the state of nature are destined to a 
gruesome existence. Unchecked by any centralised authority, humans are prone 
to pursue their selfish passions to the detriment of others, leading first to 
diffidence and ultimately to a state of war. Yet following his investigation of 
human nature, Hobbes also identifies the passions that dispose individuals 
towards a peaceful and more pleasant existence. Thus Hobbes concludes that in 
particular the desire for self-preservation, as well as the inclination for 
commodious living and the aspiration to acquire knowledge, disposes individuals 
towards following the laws of nature and subjecting to centralised authority. We 
have then claimed that the reasoning leading Hobbes to this conclusion employs 
an approach similar to that of practical deliberation. Scrutinising the various 
passions prevalent in human nature in view of their consequences, Hobbes has 
employed reason to draw normative conclusions by foreseeing which desires 
should be pursued as they direct humans towards felicity, and which passions 
should ignored due to their propensity to cause misery. His natural laws are then 
the prudential guidelines towards satisfying the one passion that has favourable 
consequences under all circumstances – the desire for self-preservation. 
 In our next chapter, we have seen that John Locke is prevented from 
adopting Hobbes’s approach to moral epistemology as it conflicts with at least 
two central tenets of his philosophy. To begin with, Locke’s epistemology 
introduces a strict distinction between ideas of substances acquired by means of 
experience, and ideas of modes such as moral concepts that are constructed by 
the mind at will. Even if Locke does not spell out the consequences of this 
position for morality with the same transparency as his successor David Hume, 




values in his epistemology. In line with his own prohibition against the use of 
ideas of substances in moral reasoning, Locke then explicitly rejects the practice 
of adopting a substantive conception of human nature as the foundation for 
morality. For Locke, the conception of human nature to be used in moral 
reasoning describes humans solely as individuals motivated by a desire for 
pleasure and aversion of pain, who may employ their capacity for reasoning to 
achieve this aim. In isolation, this conception of human nature would provide 
grounds to interpret Locke as a consequentialist and perhaps (proto-)utilitarian 
moralist. Yet we have seen that this reading, proposed by several modern 
interpreters, is impeded by Locke's adherence to the notion that morality is not 
simply a prudential guideline towards felicity during life on earth, but rather a 
divine decree enforced by sanctions and rewards administered in the afterlife. 
We have concluded that together with his injunction against deriving normative 
conclusions from a substantive conception of human nature, Locke’s adherence 
to the notion of morality as a divine decree prevents us from reconstructing an 
entirely coherent interpretation of Locke’s moral epistemology. 
 In the following chapter, we have seen that Condillac derives his theory 
of human nature almost entirely from Locke. Thus Locke’s conception of man as 
a being motivated by the passions and guided by reason also provides the basis 
for Condillac’s moral philosophy. Yet we have observed that following this 
account of human motivation, Condillac is hardly concerned with any ulterior 
questions of moral epistemology. Thus Condillac simply thinks that if humans 
employ their reason in order to foresee the consequences of their actions, they 
would realise that it would be in their long-term self-interests to become social 
beings and act in accordance with the common interest. At the same time, we 
have seen that Condillac develops Locke’s reflections on the role of language in 
cognition into a comprehensive theory of linguistic determinism. More 
preoccupied with the role of language in human cognition, Condillac thus 
concludes that moral progress does not necessarily require a novel approach to 
moral epistemology, but rather the reform of the conventional signification of 
moral terminology.  
Subsequently, we have seen that while Helvétius also builds upon the 
empiricist conception of human nature proposed by Locke and further developed 
by Condillac, he presents an account of human cognition that severely simplifies 
the theories of his predecessors. We have therefore concluded that the main 




credible and coherent theory, but rather to provide abstract argumentation to 
support his call to moral and political reform. Nonetheless, the reductionism of 
Helvétius’s moral philosophy highlights two important properties of the 
empiricist moral theories we have investigated in this thesis. Firstly, by claiming 
that the mind is nothing but a collection of ideas endowed with sensibility, 
Helvétius draws attention to the potentially mechanistic character of empiricist 
accounts of human understanding that claim that all ideas are derived from 
sensation and all actions are occasioned by the passions. Earlier empiricists had 
tried to avoid or mitigate the consequences of determinism, either by tacitly 
assuming that the mind is an autonomous entity separate from its ideas, or by 
claiming that language allows human understanding to reason independent from 
the immediate stimuli of sensation. Yet as he largely ignores Condillac’s account 
of the role of language in cognition, and takes the empiricist tendency to ascribe 
to human nature as few innate properties as possible to its logical conclusion, 
Helvétius presents the mind as an entirely passive entity, wholly determined by 
its passions and the external stimuli of sensation. Following the critiques of 
contemporaries like Diderot and Rousseau, we have concluded that this theory 
can no longer be taken seriously as a comprehensive account of human nature. 
Secondly, Helvétius’s moral philosophy takes the crucial step of 
transforming the qualified consequentialism of his predecessors into a genuine 
theory of moral utilitarianism. While Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac all retain 
consequentialist notions of normative judgment, they do not conclude that the 
purpose of morality is therefore simply the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number. Thus we have seen that following his consequentialist account of 
normative judgment, Hobbes conducts a scrutiny of the passions prevalent in 
human nature and identifies the desires likely to have the most agreeable 
consequences, concluding that all rational individuals would agree that the desire 
for self-preservation should take precedence above all other passions. 
Accordingly, the aim of Hobbes’s natural laws is not simply to maximise pleasure 
and minimise pain, but rather to guide humans towards their self-preservation. 
Subsequently, we have seen that Locke’s consequentialist account of normative 
judgment is curtailed by his belief in Divine retribution. For Locke, the aim of 
morality is thus not simply the maximisation of pleasure during life on earth, but 
rather to direct us towards attaining eternal bliss in the afterlife. Finally, 
Condillac presents the argument, common among many eighteenth-century 




realise that they are better able to satisfy their needs when united in society. 
Condillac’s consequentialism thereby merely provides him with an explanation of 
human sociability. Yet Helvétius, true to his generally less nuanced approach to 
philosophy, simply concludes from the position that all human actions are 
motivated by the passions that the aim of morality and the state should be to 
ensure felicity by maximising pleasure and minimising pain. By uniting a 
consequentialist theory of normative judgment with the principle of the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number, Helvétius presents one of the first consistent 
formulations of modern utilitarianism. 
 In our final chapter we have discussed the moral philosophy of Rousseau, 
arguably the most influential early-modern critic of the consequentialist moral 
theories proposed by the other thinkers featured in this thesis. Yet even if 
Rousseau’s conclusions diverge sharply from those of his predecessors, we have 
tried to show that his epistemology, philosophy of language and account of 
practical deliberation are nonetheless adaptations of the theories of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Condillac. Rather than adopting fundamentally different 
preconceptions, Rousseau reassesses their theories on a few crucial points, 
leading him to conclusions notably opposed to those of his predecessors. Thus we 
have seen that Rousseau’s conception of human nature as perfectible is 
developed from Locke’s and above all Condillac’s theories on language and 
cognition. Adopting Locke’s notion that all ideas in the mind are acquired by 
means of experience, as well as Condillac’s theory that human cognition is only 
fully developed with the help of language, Rousseau concludes that the human 
mind is not only a tabula rasa at birth, but that human nature would have been a 
blank slate at the dawn of humankind as well. Rousseau therefore presents 
human nature as malleable rather than universal. Accordingly, Rousseau 
dismisses the approach, attempted by Hobbes for instance, of adopting a 
conception of human nature as the foundation for a universal theory of morality.  
Furthermore, we have also seen that Rousseau’s revision of Hobbes’s 
account of practical deliberation leads him to a rejection of the notion of morality 
as a prudential guideline towards felicity, conceived as nothing but the sustained 
satisfaction of our desires. Rousseau maintains that felicity cannot be achieved 
simply by expanding our foresight, as the development of reason will also 
increase the objects of desire that will disturb our contentment. Alternatively, 
Rousseau maintains that felicity can be attained only by achieving a balance 




identified two methods by which Rousseau thinks that this balance between 
passions and aptitude may be achieved. The first method, outlined in the Émile, 
consists of a program of education in which a pupil is brought up in isolation to 
become an autonomous individual unperturbed by the seductions of modern 
society. We have subsequently maintained that the political theory of the Social 
Contract provides a second approach towards this aim by allowing citizens to 
formulate their own laws. As the sole impediments to the volition of citizens will 
be either of necessity, or self-declared by means of the general will, their desires 
will no longer extend beyond those things that nature and the law have assigned 
to them. Rousseau’s revised conception of felicity as a balance between the 
passions and the means to satisfy desires thereby provides a potent argument in 
favour of moral autonomy and self-governance. Ultimately on the basis of only a 
slight amendment of Hobbes’s account of practical deliberation, Rousseau has 
therefore formulated a powerful critique of all consequentialist and utilitarian 
moral theories that assume that felicity is nothing but the satisfaction of our 
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Gedurende de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw vond er in de filosofie een 
revolutie plaats die een verregaande invloed heeft gehad op ons wereldbeeld. Aan 
de ene kant bepleitten wetenschappers en filosofen nieuwe methodes, gebaseerd 
op waarneming en experimentatie, om kennis te verkrijgen van de wereld om 
ons heen. Aan de andere kant waren filosofen op zoek naar een universele 
moraal – een objectieve wet, inzichtelijk gemaakt door middel van de ratio, die 
beschrijft wat rechtvaardig is, onafhankelijk van omstandigheden en heersende 
morele conventies (ook wel het natuurrecht genoemd). Dit proefschrift gaat over 
de vraag hoe het denken over deze twee vraagstukken elkaar beïnvloed heeft.  En 
meer specifiek over de vraag hoe nieuwe inzichten over de oorsprong van kennis 
(epistemologie in vakterminologie) ook de aanzet hebben gegeven voor een 
verandering in het denken over de moraal (ethiek). 
Eén van de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen in de epistemologie en ethiek 
gedurende de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw uitte zich in een fundamentele 
verschuiving in het denken over de rol en functie van de ratio (of: rede) binnen 
de menselijke geest. Tot halverwege de zeventiende eeuw waren veel filosofen er 
van overtuigd dat ieder mens, in ieder geval in potentie, de beschikking zou 
hebben over een onafhankelijke faculteit van de rede. Indien consistent 
geraadpleegd, zou deze rationele faculteit obectieve kennis kunnen verschaffen 
van zowel de moraal als de wereld om ons heen. Natuurlijk zag men in dat de 
ratio verre van onfeilbaar was. Bovendien zouden mensen continu verleid 
worden door de passies, irrationele verlangens en angsten, om van het pad van 
de rede af te wijken. Desalniettemin dachten veel filosofen dat kennis van de 
moraal en van de wereld om ons heen reeds latent aanwezig zou zijn in de 
menselijke geest. 
De filosofen die in dit proefschrift besproken worden behoren echter tot 
een denkstroming die zich fundamenteel afkeert van deze manier van denken: 
het empirisme. De Britse filosoof John Locke wordt vaak gezien als de aartsvader 
van deze denkstroming, maar dit proefschrift probeert te laten zien dat ook zijn 
directe voorganger Thomas Hobbes, en achttiende eeuwse denkers als Condillac, 
Helvétius, en Rousseau als aanhangers van het empirisme geïnterpreteerd 
kunnen worden. In tegenstelling tot hun voorgangers, en sommige van hun 
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tijdgenoten, die vaak rationalisten worden genoemd, zagen empiristen de ratio 
niet als een autonoom of aangeboren onderdeel van de geest, maar simpelweg als 
de activiteit van het vergelijken en verbinden van ideeën. Locke en zijn 
volgelingen stelden bovendien dat de inhoud van deze ideeën geheel afkomstig is 
uit zintuiglijke waarneming. Volgens empiristen is kennis daarom niet slechts 
een product van een aangeboren rationele faculteit. Ware kennis komt tot stand 
door het vergelijken en verbinden van ideeën die we via onze zintuigen hebben 
waargenomen. De opkomst van het empirisme in de filosofie was dan ook nauw 
verbonden met de popularisering van wetenschappelijke methoden waarin 
waarneming en experimentatie centraal stonden. 
Hoewel het empirisme van Locke en zijn volgelingen een aantrekkelijk 
antwoord gaf op de vraag hoe mensen wetenschappelijke kennis kunnen 
vergaren van de wereld om ons heen, was niet onmiddelijk duidelijk hoe dezelfde 
methode kan leiden tot inzicht in de moraal. Ook bij morele vraagstukken zien 
empiristen redeneren als niets anders dan het verbinden en vergelijken van 
ideeën. Maar wat is dan de oorsprong van deze morele ideeën? Het is duidelijk 
dat morele concepten zoals “rechtvaardigheid,” “vrijheid,” of “natie-staat” niet 
simpelweg door middel van zintuiglijke waarneming worden verkregen. 
Integendeel, deze morele concepten zijn door mensen bedacht, en hebben geen 
bestaan buiten de menselijke geest. Maar als de ideeën die ten grondslag liggen 
aan onze morele oordelen door ons zelf bedacht zijn, hoe kunnen we dan weten 
of deze overeenkomen met de universele moraal van het natuurrecht?  
Deze vraag vormt het startpunt van mijn proefschrift. In mijn 
proefschrift tracht ik daarom te reconstrueren hoe we volgens vijf vroegmoderne 
empiristische filosofen objectieve morele concepten zouden kunnen verkrijgen, 
om daarmee, met gebruik van de rede, tot universele morele oordelen te komen. 
Daarbij is gebleken dat hoewel deze vijf denkers een groot aantal fundamentele 
veronderstellingen delen, hun antwoorden op dit vraagstuk sterk uiteenlopen. 
 Eén van de belangrijkste van deze gedeelde veronderstellingen was het 
idee dat morele normen de functie hebben om ons te leiden richting een zo lang 
en gelukkig mogelijk leven. Bij de compositie van morele concepten zouden wij 
daarom dit doel voor ogen moeten houden. Deze veronderstelling leidde echter 
direct tot een aantal nieuwe vraagstukken. Allereerst rees de vraag wat mensen 
eigenlijk gelukkig maakt? En in het verlengde daarvan: hoe voorkom je dat het 
streven naar geluk van één persoon ten koste gaat van het welvaren van 
anderen? Om deze vragen te beantwoorden dient men echter te weten hoe 
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mensen in elkaar zitten, wat voor gedrag ze vertonen, en wat hen drijft. Het 
beantwoorden van deze vragen, en daarmee het beredeneren van een objectieve 
moraal, vereist daarom een studie van de menselijke natuur. 
 Een fundamenteel onderdeel van deze studie naar de menselijke natuur 
was een theorie die beschrijft wat ons motiveert, hoe mensen besluiten om iets te 
ondernemen of te overdenken. Alle vijf filosofen die in dit proefschrift besproken 
worden waren het er daarbij over eens dat al onze daden en gedachten 
uiteindelijk het gevolg zijn van bepaalde verlangens of angsten, die collectief ook 
wel de passies worden genoemd. Met dit standpunt weken zij af van veel 
voorgangers en tijdgenoten, die in navolging van o.a. Plato dachten dat de 
menselijke wil bepaald zou worden door ofwel de passies, ofwel door een 
autonome rationele faculteit. Zij ontwaarden in de menselijke geest een 
voortdurende strijd tussen enerzijds de passies, die ons zouden verleiden om ons 
over te geven aan kortzichtige verlangens en angsten, en de ratio, die ons inzicht 
zou geven in een juiste en rechtvaardige manier van leven. De empiristen die in 
dit proefschrift besproken worden hadden de menselijke geest echter juist 
ontdaan van deze autonome rationele faculteit. Zij meenden dientengevolge dat 
menselijke handelingen en gedachten juist altijd voortkomen uit de passies. De 
rol van de ratio zou daarom beperkt zijn tot het beredeneren van de meest 
effectieve manier van handelen om onze verlangens te realiseren. 
 Bij deze laatste stelling, die geldt als de standaardinterpretatie in de 
secundaire literatuur, plaatst dit proefschrift wel een kanttekening. Moderne 
interpretaties stellen doorgaans dat de vijf empiristen besproken in dit 
proefschrift de ratio geheel ondergeschikt maken aan de passies. Daardoor zou 
deze beperkt zijn tot het vinden van manieren om verlangens te realiseren, en 
daarmee slechts een instrumentele rol spelen in de wilsvorming. Dit proefschrift 
probeert echter te laten zien dat in ieder geval volgens de filosofie van Hobbes, 
Locke, en Rousseau, de ratio óók deelneemt aan de wilsvorming door de passies 
te beoordelen op basis van de consequenties die het najagen ervan zou kunnen 
hebben. De functie van de ratio is daarmee niet slechts instrumenteel. De ratio 
bepaalt ook welke zaken het werkelijk waard zijn om te verlangen of te vrezen. 
 Op basis van deze veronderstellingen over de menselijke natuur 
construeren de vijf filosofen die hier besproken worden hun theorie van de 
moraal. Het is met name op dit punt dat zij van mening verschillen – zowel over 
de juiste aanpak als in hun conclusies. In het eerste hoofdstuk bespreken we de 
morele epistemologie (= theorie die beschrijft hoe mensen inzicht krijgen in de 
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moraal) van Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), die voornamelijk bekendheid geniet 
vanwege zijn gedachte-experiment van de natuurstaat en zijn radicale 
herformulering van het concept natuurrecht. In de secundaire literatuur is er 
echter onenigheid over de juiste interpretatie van de rol van de ratio in zijn 
morele epistemologie. Sommige auteurs stellen dat wanneer Hobbes stelt dat het 
natuurrecht inzichtelijk kan worden gemaakt door middel van de rede, hij doelt 
op een aangeboren rationele faculteit. Dit proefschrift laat echter zien dat niet 
alleen in het geval van de wetenschap, maar ook wat betreft de moraal, de ratio 
voor Hobbes niets anders is dan de aangeleerde vaardigheid (verder ontwikkeld 
met behulp van taal) van het combineren en vergelijken van ideeën. Een andere 
veel voorkomende interpretatie stelt dat volgens Hobbes de ratio, en daarmee het 
natuurrecht, slechts een prudentiele functie heeft door ons de meest effectieve 
manier te verschaffen om onze verlangens te realiseren. In lijn met de eerder 
genoemde kanttekening over de juiste interpretatie van de relatie tussen de ratio 
en de passies, stelt dit proefschrift dat in Hobbes’ deductie van het natuurrecht 
de ratio niet slechts een instrumentele rol speelt, maar tevens aangeeft welke 
passies aanwezig in de menselijke natuur het verdienen nagevolgd of vermeden 
te worden. Hobbes’ gedachte-experiment van de natuurstaat dient er daarom toe 
om te demonstreren dat sommige verlangens, zoals het verlangen naar macht en 
rijkdom, uiteindelijk schadelijke consequenties met zich meebrengen. 
Tegelijkertijd laat het zijn dat sommige andere passies, zoals de angst voor de 
dood, het verlangen naar kennis en het streven naar een voldaan leven, mensen 
juist aanzetten om een sociaal, en daarmee gelukkiger, leven te leiden. 
 In het tweede hoofdstuk bespreken we de filosofie van John Locke (1632- 
1704), die naast zijn verhandelingen over politiek en het natuurrecht 
voornamelijk invloedrijk is geweest door zijn omvangrijke tractaat over 
epistemologie (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding). In dit hoofdstuk 
ontdekken we echter verschillende breuklijnen tussen Locke’s 
natuurrechtstheorie enerzijds, en zijn epistemologie anderzijds, die een 
consistente interpretatie van zijn filosofie bemoeilijken. In de secundaire 
literatuur menen sommige auteurs dat Locke’s morele epistemologie dezelfde 
methodologie gebruikt als die van Hobbes. Locke’s conceptie van natuurrecht zou 
daarom gebaseerd zijn op een empirische studie van de menselijke natuur, en 
daarbij aangeven hoe mensen het meest effectief hun verlangens kunnen 
bevredigen. In dit proefschrift zien we echter dat deze interpretatie niet 
houdbaar is. Allereerst wordt deze weersproken door een fundamentele aanname 
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in Locke’s epistemologie. Locke maakt namelijk een strikt onderscheid tussen 
ideeën van objecten in de wereld om ons heen, die wij door middel van de 
waarneming hebben verkregen, en ideeën van morele concepten, die door 
mensen zelf zijn bedacht. Het is volgens hem niet toegestaan om deze twee typen 
ideeën door elkaar te gebruiken en onze morele concepten te modelleren op 
empirische objecten. In feite zegt Locke daarmee dat het niet juist is om 
conclusies over hoe de wereld is, te presenteren als argument voor hoe dingen 
zouden moeten zijn. In lijn met deze positie stelt Locke dan ook dat een conceptie 
van hoe de menselijke natuur is, niet gebruikt kan worden om te 
beargumenteren hoe mensen zouden moeten zijn. Volgens Locke moeten we in 
de ethiek de mens dan ook slechts beschouwen als een rationeel wezen dat 
streeft naar de bevrediging van uiteenlopende passies. Een tweede 
veelvoorkomende interpretatie neemt deze laatste stelling als uitgangspunt, en 
schrijft Locke de positie toe dat de functie van de moraal simpelweg bestaat uit 
het voorschrijven van de meest effectieve manieren om onze verlangens te 
realiseren. Locke wordt daarbij gepresenteerd als een voorloper van het 
utilitarisme, een denkstroming binnen de ethiek die streeft naar het grootste 
geluk voor de grootste aantallen. In ons hoofdstuk zien we echter dat deze 
interpretatie wordt gecompliceerd doordat Locke vasthoudt aan het idee dat het 
natuurrecht een wet is die door God is uitgevaardigd. Volgens Locke is het 
primaire doel van het natuurrecht niet ons geluk tijdens het leven op aarde, maar 
wordt onze gehoorzaamheid aan God’s wet pas beloond (of bestraft) in het 
hiernamaals. Omdat er, naast de interpretatie van de Bijbel, geen eenduidige 
manier bestaat om God’s plan voor de mensheid te achterhalen, blijft het 
enigszins onduidelijk hoe Locke denkt dat we de voorschriften van het 
natuurrecht zouden kunnen inzien. 
 In het derde hoofdstuk behandelen we het denken van Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac (1714-1780), een Franse filosoof die zich sterk heeft laten beïnvloeden 
door de epistemologie van John Locke. De filosofie van Condillac is daarbij 
onderscheidend vanwege zijn conclusie dat onze gedachten in veel gevallen 
gevormd worden door de taal die we spreken. De oorsprong van deze theorie ligt 
reeds besloten in de epistemologie van zowel Hobbes en Locke, die beiden al een 
nauw verband zagen tussen woorden en ideeën. Sterker nog, zij stelden dat 
bepaalde type ideeën, waaronder abstracte ideeën, maar ook morele concepten, 
letterlijk pas denkbaar worden in relatie tot woorden. En passant gaf Hobbes 
hiermee ook een verklaring waarom mensen in staat zijn tot verschillende 
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vormen van abstract denken, terwijl dieren, die immers ook zintuigen en een 
rudimentair verstand bezitten, beperkt blijven tot instinctief handelen doordat zij 
het vermogen tot het leren van een taal ontberen. Condillac werkt deze theorieën 
verder uit, en merkt op dat wij als individu niet vrij zijn om de betekenis van 
onze woorden te kiezen, maar dat deze in belangrijke mate wordt bepaald door 
conventies van de taal die we spreken. Condillac concludeert vervolgens dat het 
daarom onvermijdelijk is dat onze gedachten worden beïnvloed door de 
linguistische conventies die de betekenis van onze woorden bepalen. Condillac 
formuleert hiermee als één van de eerste filosofen in de geschiedenis een theorie 
van linguistisch relativisme, die stelt dat ons denken in belangrijke mate wordt 
bepaald door de taal die we spreken. Voor Condillac is deze conclusie echter 
problematisch, omdat linguistische conventies gedurende de geschiedenis 
geleidelijk en ongereguleerd tot stand gekomen zijn. Condillac gelooft daarom dat 
veel van onze linguistische conventies een inaccurate afspiegeling zijn van de 
werkelijkheid. Condillac denkt bovendien dat de linguistische conventies die de 
betekenis van morele termen bepalen vol zitten met historische gegroeide 
vooroordelen. Om deze redenen stelt Condillac een grondige hervorming van de 
taal voor, waardoor linguistische conventies een zo accuraat mogelijke 
afspiegeling van de werkelijkheid zouden worden. De linguistische conventies 
voor morele terminologie zouden daarbij in overeenstemming kunnen worden 
gebracht met het natuurrecht. Helaas presenteert Condillac weinig concrete 
plannen om dit laatste doel te realiseren. Condillac’s filosofie is dan ook niet 
primair belangwekkend om zijn ethiek, maar eerder vanwege zijn bespiegelingen 
over de relatie tussen taal en het denken die, zoals we zullen zien, van grote 
invloed zijn geweest voor Rousseau’s theorie van de menselijke natuur. 
 Het vierde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift behandelt het denken van 
Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715 – 1771) die, anders dan zijn tijdgenoot Condillac, 
juist voornamelijk in morele en politieke vraagstukken geïnteresseerd is. Sterker 
nog, Helvétius’ filosofische beschouwingen over moraal en de menselijke natuur 
kunnen gelezen worden als primair een theoretische onderbouwing bij zijn 
oproep tot concrete sociale en politieke hervormingen. Helvétius presenteert een 
sterk gesimplificeerde vorm van empirisme, die geïnspireerd lijkt door het werk 
van Locke en Condillac, maar de nuance mist van zijn voorgangers. Aan de ene 
kant stelt Helvétius naar aanleiding van Locke’s stelling dat al onze ideeën te 
herleiden zijn tot de waarneming dat de menselijke geest in feite niets anders is 
dan een verzameling ideeën. Helvétius concludeert hieruit vervolgens dat ons 
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verstand  wordt gevormd door de omgeving die we waarnemen, en presenteert 
daarmee de mens als een wezen dat geheel wordt bepaald door externe krachten. 
Aan de andere kant herinterpreteert Helvétius de stelling van Hobbes en Locke 
dat al onze daden en gedachten uiteindelijk te herleiden zijn tot verlangens en 
angsten, en stelt dat mensen in het geheel worden gedomineerd door hun 
passies. Helvétius lijkt daarmee te ontkennen dat mensen de mogelijkheid 
hebben om door middel van de ratio hun verlangens en angsten te beoordelen. 
Als gevolg van deze twee simplificaties presenteert Helvétius de menselijke geest 
als niets meer dan een passieve verzameling ideeën die wordt voortgedreven 
door het streven naar genot en de angst voor pijn. Deze reductionistische 
conceptie van de menselijke natuur ligt vervolgens ten grondslag aan de morele 
filosofie van Helvétius. In het verlengde van zijn stelling dat ieder mens wordt 
gedreven door een verlangen naar genot en een angst voor pijn, concludeert 
Helvétius dat de functie van de moraal is om zoveel mogelijk individuen de kans 
te geven hun passies te bevredigen. Met andere woorden, zowel de moraal als de 
samenleving heeft tot doel om te zorgen voor het grootste geluk voor het grootste 
aantal personen. Helvétius komt daarmee ontegenzeggelijk tot een vroege 
formulering van een utilitaristische ethiek.  
 In het laatste hoofdstuk behandelen we de filosofie van Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712 – 1778) in de context van het empirisme zoals we dat in eerdere 
hoofdstukken hebben bestudeerd. Doordat Rousseau voornamelijk geïnteresseerd 
is in morele en politieke vraagstukken, en niet zozeer in epistemologie, wordt hij 
vaak niet als empiristisch filosoof gelezen. In dit hoofdstuk laten we echter zien 
dat Rousseau’s conceptie van de menselijke natuur als veranderlijk, die ten 
grondslag ligt aan zijn ethiek, in belangrijke mate is afgeleid van zijn 
empiristische voorgangers. Om te beginnen neemt Rousseau van hen het idee 
over dat mensen redeneren op basis van ideeën afkomstig uit de waarneming en 
gestructureerd door middel van woorden. Rousseau gaat daarbij mee in de 
theorie dat abstract en moreel denken pas mogelijk wordt na het leren van een 
taal. Van Condillac neemt Rousseau bovendien de suggestie over dat taal een 
historisch construct is, dat in de vroege geschiedenis is ontstaan en zich 
geleidelijk ontwikkeld heeft. Gezien de belangrijke rol van taal in de ontwikkeling 
van het menselijk verstand, concludeert Rousseau hieruit dat de menselijke 
natuur gedurende de geschiedenis aan verandering onderhevig is geweest. 
Volgens Rousseau was de “natuurlijke mens”, aan het begin van de geschiedenis 
en voor de uitvinding van taal, een dom maar gelukkig wezen. Net als veel dieren 
256 Nederlandse Samenvatting 
 
 
leefde deze natuurlijke mens solitair, in harmonie met zijn omgeving, en waren 
zijn gedachten en verlangens beperkt tot zijn meest essentiele behoeftes. Na de 
uitvinding van taal konden mensen echter niet alleen met elkaar communiceren, 
maar kregen zij ook de mogelijkheid om complexe ideeën te construeren. 
Enerzijds stelde deze mogelijkheid hen in staat om op een abstracter niveau na te 
denken over de wereld om hen heen, met uitvindingen als landbouw en 
metaalbewerking tot gevolg. Anderzijds stelde deze mensen in staat om morele 
concepten, zoals “bezit” en “autoriteit”, te construeren en begrijpen. Hoewel deze 
twee nieuwe vaardigheden van de vroege mens het ontstaan van samenlevingen 
mogelijk maakten, is Rousseau van mening dat dit niet per definitie positieve 
ontwikkelingen zijn geweest – en wel om twee redenen. Allereerst heeft het 
ontstaan van taal er niet alleen voor gezorgd dat we slimmer zijn geworden, 
waardoor we beter zijn in het vinden van manieren om onze verlangens te 
bevredigen. De ontwikkeling van het verstand heeft tegelijkertijd ook gezorgd 
voor een explosieve groei van de passies – simpelweg omdat we beter op de 
hoogte zijn van alles dat we zouden kunnen verlangen of vrezen. Anders dan de 
mens in de natuurstaat, wiens passies in harmonie waren met haar behoeften, 
wordt de moderne mens geplaagd door verlangens en angsten die hij nooit in het 
geheel zal kunnen bevredigen. Volgens Rousseau zal de moderne mens daardoor 
altijd gefrustreerd blijven, en nooit werkelijk geluk vinden. Ten tweede meent 
Rousseau dat de ontwikkeling van de moraal met behulp van taal gedurende de 
vroege geschiedenis van de mensheid heeft gezorgd voor oneerlijkheid en 
onderdrukking. Geïnspireerd door Condillac stelt Rousseau dat gedurende de 
geleidelijke en ongereguleerde ontwikkeling van de moraal, deze vervuld is 
geraakt met vooroordelen in het voordeel van de bovenklasse van de 
samenleving. Eén van Rousseau’s oplossingen voor deze problemen bestaat uit 
een uitgebreid opvoedingsprogramma waarbij kinderen zo veel mogelijk worden 
geïsoleerd van de schadelijke invloeden van moderne samenlevingen. In dit 
proefschrift presenteren we echter ook Rousseau politieke theorie zoals 
beschreven in Het Sociaal Contract als een plan om deze gebreken van moderne 
samenleving op te lossen. Door te zorgen voor morele gelijkheid en politieke 
vrijheid streeft Rousseau’s politieke theorie namelijk naar een recreatie van de 
omstandigheden die de mens in de natuurstaat gelukkig maakten. 




Het afmaken van dit proefschrift heeft meer voeten in de aarde gehad, en 
bovendien aanzienlijk meer tijd gekost, dan ik van te voren had gedacht. Alweer 
zo’n 8 jaar geleden begon ik als afgestudeerd historicus bij de Faculteit 
Wijsbegeerte van de RUG aan mijn onderzoeksproject. De overstap van 
geschiedenis naar filosofie had ik behoorlijk onderschat. Mede hierdoor was het 
proefschrift nog lang niet af nadat mijn contract afliep, en heb ik dit in mijn eigen 
tijd af moeten maken, wat niet altijd makkelijk was. Gelukkig heb ik familie, 
vrienden, en collega’s die mij tijdens dit proces met morele steun dan wel 
inhoudelijke aanwijzingen geholpen hebben. In het bijzonder zou ik willen 
bedanken: 
 
Mijn promotor Lodi Nauta, die altijd nauw bij mijn onderzoek betrokken is 
gebleven, ook toen duidelijk werd dat het een project van de lange adem zou 
gaan worden. Je ontelbare inhoudelijke suggesties hebben dit boek gemaakt wat 
het is. Maar zonder je blijvende geloof in mij was het mij niet gelukt om dit 
proefschrift af te maken. 
 
Daarnaast mijn tweede promotor Annelien de Dijn, die later bij het project 
betrokken raakte, maar desondanks erg belangrijk is geweest om mijn onderzoek 
richting te geven. Dank voor het altijd waardevolle commentaar bij mijn stukken 
en je blijvende betrokkenheid bij het project. 
 
Mijn oud-collega’s aan de Faculteit Wijsbegeerte, die vaak waardevolle suggesties 
hadden gedurende de WIP en Via Moderna colloquia. Met name wil ik Martin 
Lenz, Han-Thomas Adriaenssen, Andrea Sangiacomo en Bianca Bosman 
bedanken voor het lezen en uitgebreid becommentariëren van mijn stukken. 
 
Alle vrienden die mij over de jaren moreel gesteund hebben. In het bijzonder zou 
ik graag Saco van der Ploeg willen noemen, die niet alleen de rol van paranimf op 
zich heeft genomen, maar ook het initiatief heeft genomen om een 




wetenschap,” met de bedoeling mij aan te sporen het proefschrift nou eindelijk 
eens af te maken. 
 
Verder ook Bart Geelen, die er niet alleen ook in Gent bij was, maar ook de 
fantastische omslag van dit proefschrift heeft ontworpen. 
 
Daarnaast in, willekeurige volgorde, vrienden die altijd sterk betrokken zijn 
geweest bij mijn poging tot promoveren: Jaap Verheijen, Jan Gerlach, Luca 
Braccioli, Luuk de Goede, Floris Oskam, Ilse van Nierop, Renée Scheepers, 
Yvonne Jongma, Sander van Hees. 
 
Tenslotte mijn belangrijkste steun en toeverlaat: mijn ouders, Jos en Marja, en 
mijn twee broers, Maarten (tevens paranimf) en Steven. Zonder jullie 
aanmoediging en adviezen was het me niet gelukt! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
